

Energy for Sustainable Development

An assessment of energy policy impacts on achieving Sustainable Development Goal 7 in Indonesia --Manuscript Draft--

Manuscript Number:	ESD_2019_1663R3
Article Type:	Full Length Article
Keywords:	Energy policy effectiveness; Renewable Energy; sustainable development goals; Energy access; Energy efficiency; Indonesia
Corresponding Author:	Wayan Santika Murdoch University Murdoch, Western Australia AUSTRALIA
First Author:	Wayan Santika
Order of Authors:	Wayan Santika Tania Urmee Yeliz Simsek Parisa Bahri M. Anisuzzaman
Abstract:	<p>As countries start to implement the Sustainable Development Goals in their national development agendas, reviews of the current policy environment are necessary to ensure that the goals are achievable by 2030. The present study assesses the effectiveness of energy policy in Indonesia in supporting progress toward universal energy access, a substantial increase in renewable energy deployment, and improvement in energy efficiency. Laws and regulations related to energy were reviewed, and their contribution to achieving the energy targets of the Sustainable Development Goals in Indonesia was evaluated in terms of policy effectiveness. Results show that providing electricity for the remaining 1.1 million households living in the outermost and least developed regions of the archipelago is very challenging. However, Indonesia is still on track to achieve 100% residential electrification by 2030 as long as enough budget is allocated annually. Indonesia may not be able to provide access to clean cooking fuels and technology for everyone by 2030. The current policy focusing mostly on gas for cooking will be less effective in reaching the remaining households that cook with solid biomass and usually live in poverty. Similarly, the current policy scenario is not sufficient to allow enough progress to achieve the renewable energy target. Finally, the assessment of energy efficiency policy suggests that sectoral energy use is shaped by variables and regulation not primarily intended to improve energy efficiency.</p>
Suggested Reviewers:	<p>Lex Lemmens a.m.c.lemmens-bc@tue.nl Prof. Lemmens is an expert in sustainable energy and has a long experience directing sustainable energy projects in Indonesia and other developing countries</p> <p>Sivanappan Kumar kumar@ait.asia He is a professor of energy and sustainable development. His expertise includes energy policy in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia</p> <p>Kamia Handayani k.handayani@utwente.nl She is an expert in Indonesia's energy supply and demand and currently working on Indonesian electricity systems</p>
Response to Reviewers:	

August 30, 2020

To: Dr. Daniel B. Jones
Editor in Chief, Energy for Sustainable Development

Subject: Submission of Revised Manuscript (3rd revision)

Dear Dr. Jones,

We would like to thank you for reviewing our manuscript entitled, '**An assessment of energy policy impacts on achieving Sustainable Development Goal 7 in Indonesia**'. We also greatly appreciate the reviewer for the constructive feedback and helpful comments, which has significantly improved our manuscript.

Responses to the comments are provided point by point, and the manuscript has been revised accordingly.

Thank you very much for your kind consideration of our revised manuscript.

Sincerely Yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Wayan G. Santika', is placed over a light gray rectangular background.

Wayan G. Santika
Discipline of Engineering and Energy
College of Science, Health, Engineering and Education
Murdoch University
Australia
Email: wayan.santika@murdoch.edu.au

1 1. Introduction

2 The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were ratified in September 2015. A total of 193
3 countries agreed to strive to achieve 169 ambitious targets associated with the 17 SDGs by
4 2030, including to eradicate poverty and hunger, provide access to basic services, promote
5 prosperity, and protect the environment [1]. This 2030 global agenda for sustainable
6 development is expected to provide a framework to integrate social, economic, and
7 environmental goals ~~of sustainable development~~. The vital role of energy as a key enabling
8 factor in achieving the SDGs was acknowledged [2-4]. It was therefore included as the seventh
9 SDG (SDG7): to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all.
10 SDG7 has three main targets for 2030: universal energy access, an increase in the share of
11 renewable energy (RE) in the world's energy consumption, and improved energy efficiency.

12 The SDGs index has ranked the current status and progress of 156 countries, putting Sweden,
13 Denmark, and Finland as countries with the highest scores [in 2018](#). None of them, however,
14 are on track to meet all of the SDGs [5]. On a global scale, the 2018 monitoring report on SDG7
15 reveals that the goal will not be met by 2030 if current trends continue. For instance, under the
16 current trajectory, only 92% and 73% of the global population will enjoy electricity and clean
17 cooking fuels, respectively, by 2030 [6]. It means that 8% of the global population will remain
18 without electricity, and more than a quarter of the population will still cook with highly
19 polluting fuels. Additionally, the RE share of final energy consumption is anticipated to be
20 21%, which could not be considered a substantial increase from the baseline value of 18.3%
21 [7]. Finally, the annual rate of decline of energy intensity (measuring energy efficiency) is
22 anticipated to be 2.4% by 2030, which will miss the target of 2.6% [6].

23 Likewise, at this stage, Indonesia seems unlikely to achieve the SDGs despite the government's
24 efforts to incorporate most of the SDGs into its national development agendas. It was ranked
25 99th among 156 countries in 2018, and its performance was excellent only on SDG1 (no
26 poverty) and SDG13 (climate action), scoring 96.3 and 89.1 (out of 100), respectively [5]. The
27 poorest progress was in SDG9 (industry, innovation, and infrastructure) and SDG10 (reduced
28 inequality), scoring 23.5 and 34.9, respectively. The current achievement of SDG7 in Indonesia
29 was moderate, considering its high electrification ratio coupled with low clean cooking energy
30 access and low emission efficiency of the electricity generation sector [5]. Indonesia's
31 electrification ratio was 98.3% in 2018 [8, 9], and the government claimed that the population
32 without access to clean cooking fuels was 26.8% in 2016 [10]. The RE share was only 8.43%

1 in 2016 [11], which is far below the 23% target by 2025. However, energy intensity in
2 Indonesia was 3.525 MJ/\$2011 PPP \$-of-GDP in 2015, which was much better than the world
3 average energy intensity of 5.132 MJ/\$2011 PPP \$-of-GDP [12]. In comparison with its
4 neighbouring countries, Indonesian energy intensity is lower than that of Vietnam, Thailand,
5 and Malaysia (5.945, 5.412, and 4.682 MJ/\$2011 PPP \$-of-GDP, respectively), but higher than
6 that of the Philippines and Singapore (3.122 and 2.395 MJ/\$2011 PPP \$-of-GDP, respectively).

7 Since SDG targets are interlinked [2-4, 13], it is hard to imagine that Indonesia will soon
8 achieve the goal of health (SDG3), while more than 25% of its population cook with polluting
9 solid fuels. Smoke from solid fuel combustion contributes to indoor air pollution, which is a
10 major health risk factor [14]. Additionally, a Chinese study shows a shift from solid fuels to
11 clean fuels is determined by assets and income growth (SDG8) [15], which indicates that the
12 segment of Indonesia's population still cooking with solid fuels may live below the poverty
13 line (SDG1). Furthermore, ambitious upscaling of RE and a further improvement in energy
14 efficiency are needed to ensure that the country is on track with the 2 °C pathway (SDG13) [2].

15 Energy policy is formulated to attain certain goals. Furthermore, given that support policies are
16 usually associated with high financial costs, the evaluation of energy policy performance is
17 necessary to identify potential inefficiencies and ineffectiveness in its application [16]. Clearly,
18 effective energy policy is essential to meet the SDG7 targets.


19 This study examines the status of the SDG7 targets in Indonesia, analyses their interactions
20 with energy policy, and evaluates the effectiveness of the policy in meeting the targets. It seeks
21 to answer the following questions: (i) which energy policy is linked to SDG7, (ii) how this
22 energy policy interacts with SDG7, and (iii) how effective it is in achieving the SDG7 targets.
23 This analysis offers a careful screening of energy-related laws and regulations in Indonesia and
24 evaluates their effectiveness in supporting the achievement of the three targets of SDG7. This
25 analysis and the methodology used is expected to serve as an example and can be applied to
26 other countries.

27 *Overview of the Indonesian energy sector*

28 Indonesia is the world's largest archipelagic country and is located in Southeast Asia between
29 the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This tropical country was home to almost 264 million
30 inhabitants in 2018 [17], making it the 4th most populous country in the world. With a GDP of
31 3,243 billion \$ (PPP) in 2017, it was ranked the 8th largest economy under the PPP valuation
32 [18].

1 Over 35% of the total energy demand in the Southeast Asian countries was from Indonesia
 2 [19]. The total final energy consumption (TFEC) was 5.5 billion GJ in 2018, of which the
 3 transportation and industrial sectors used 46.6% and 29.9% shares of the TFEC, respectively
 4 [20]. Figure 1 shows that oil share in the total commercial primary energy supply was the
 5 highest (38.81%), followed by coal (32.97%), and natural gas (19.67%), leaving only an 8.55%
 6 share for renewables [20].

7



8

9 *Figure 1. Indonesia's primary energy mix in 2018. Traditional use of biomass is excluded. Other renewables*
 10 *include biomass, biogas, and waste generated power plants. Data source: [20]*

11

12 *Table 1. Fossil energy potential in Indonesia (2018). Data source: [20].*

Fuels	Proven reserves ^a	Production	Years left
Coal ^b	39.9 billion tons	557.77 million tons	72
Oil	3.15 billion barrels	281.83 million barrels	11
Natural gas	96.06 trillion SCF	2.9968 trillion SCF	32

13 ^a According to the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, proven reserves are those scientifically estimated
 14 with a high degree of certainty and ready to be commercially extracted [21].

15 ^b Coal reserve includes a mix of proven and inferred reserves

16 Indonesia is blessed with energy resources [22-24]. However, if the current trends of
 17 production and consumption continue and no new reserves are found and exploited, Indonesia
 18 will run out of coal, oil, and natural gas in 72, 11, and 32 years, respectively (see Table 1). The

1 total RE potential in Indonesia is about 443.2 GW, which is sourced from solar (207.9 GW),
2 hydropower (94.5 GW), wind (60.6 GW), bioenergy (32.65 GW), geothermal (29.5 GW), and
3 ocean (18 GW)¹; unfortunately in 2015, less than 2% of these resources were utilized [21].

4 The decline in oil reserves in Indonesia and its status as a net oil importing country since 2004
5 [21] have opened up new opportunities for renewable energy development. For instance, the
6 Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR) Regulation 32/2008 has imposed
7 mandatory biodiesel use in transport, industrial, and electricity generation sectors since 2008.
8 Renewable energy has great prospects for development in the future of Indonesia.

9

10 **2. Methodology**

11 Policy screening and analysis were conducted to examine the status of SDG7 targets and their
12 interactions with energy policy in Indonesia. The analysis also evaluated the effectiveness of
13 the policy in meeting the targets.

14 **Policy screening process:** The screening process was based on the list of Indonesian energy-
15 related policies provided by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR) in forms
16 of laws and regulations¹. The policies were then grouped and reviewed based on their
17 hierarchy, from laws, governmental regulations, presidential regulations (including decrees,
18 and instructions), to MEMR regulations. MEMR decrees, regulations of the directorate
19 generals under the MEMR, and those passed by ministries other than the MEMR were omitted.

20 A qualitative content analysis was then conducted to provide a list of energy policies related to
21 SDG7. The list was compiled by firstly examining the titles of the laws and regulations for
22 their potential links to electricity access, clean cooking fuels and technology access, RE, and
23 energy efficiency. Those with potential links to SDG7 were downloaded for further screening.
24 The texts were further analyzed to see if their contents regulate any of the above areas of
25 interest, either alone or in combination.

26 **Policy Analysis:** The literature suggests four criteria with which energy policy can be assessed,
27 *i.e.*, effectiveness, efficiency, equity, and institutional feasibility [16, 25]. In this study, energy
28 policy was analysed solely on its effectiveness in meeting SDG7. Table 2 shows indicators of
29 effectiveness chosen in this study.

¹ The list is available at <https://jdih.esdm.go.id/index.php/web/result?q=>

1 *Table 2. SDG7 indicators and reasons for selection*

Indicators	Reasons for choosing the indicators
The current electrification ratio compared to the 100% target	Based on SDG Indicator 7.1.1. Proportion of population with access to electricity
The total number of households without clean cooking fuels and technology compared to the target of all households with access	Based on SDG Indicator 7.1.2. Proportion of population with primary reliance on clean fuels and technology
The modern RE share in the total primary energy supply compared to the national target	Based on SDG Indicator 7.2.1. Renewable energy share in the total final energy consumption
The actual power capacity from renewables compared to the national target	Indonesia sets a target for power capacity
Annual power capacity from hydropower, geothermal bioenergy, wind, and solar, and the annual production of biofuel	It is a way of assessing policy effectiveness using the policy effectiveness index (PEI), as suggested by the IEA [26]. Indonesia sets targets for those energy sources.
The installed capacity of different RE technologies by the independent power providers (IPPs) and private power utilities	It gives an insight about policy effectiveness in attracting investments
Sectoral final energy consumption	Energy policy shapes energy consumption patterns
The national energy intensity compared to the global energy intensity target	Based on SDG Indicator 7.3.1. Energy intensity measured in terms of primary energy and GDP

Formatted: Font: (Default) Times New Roman, 10 pt, Font color: Auto

Formatted: Font: (Default) Times New Roman, 10 pt, Font color: Auto

2

3 The [Policy Effectiveness Index](#) (PEI) reflects the performance of RE policy in stimulating RE
4 development in a particular year and is calculated as additional RE production in that year
5 divided by the remaining target [26], or

$$6 \quad PEI = \frac{P_{t,n} - P_{t,n-1}}{T_{t,2025} - P_{t,n}} \quad (\text{Eq. 1})$$

7 Where $P_{t,n}$ is RE production of technology t for the year n , and $T_{t,2025}$ is the target of RE
8 technology t by 2025. In the case of Indonesia, the 2025 [National Energy Plan](#) targets ([locally](#)
9 [known as RUEN](#)) were chosen.

10 Finally, data were plotted in time-series graphs, and changes in graphs' curve directions were
11 observed and associated with energy policy issued prior to the changes.

12 **Data collection:** Data were gathered mostly from: (1) government reports, including the
13 Handbook of Energy & Economic Statistics of Indonesia [20, 27], Statistics of New and
14 Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation [28], the National Energy General Plan [21], the

1 Annual Performance Report [29], Statistics of Electricity [30], and PLN's Electricity Power
 2 Supply Business Plan [31]; (2) the BPS-Statistics Indonesia, including the National Socio-
 3 economic Survey [32], Indonesia's population profiles based on SUPAS 2015 [33], and
 4 Welfare Statistics [34]; and (3) the World Bank database [12, 35]. These data are publicly
 5 accessible.

6

7 3. Policies linked to SDG7

8 There were 932 laws and regulations listed in the MEMR webpage (Table 3). The oldest and
 9 newest regulations on the list were the Mining Law 11/1967 and MEMR Reg. 1/2019,
 10 respectively. Most of them were excluded during the initial title screening process, leaving only
 11 118 laws and regulations for further analysis. Seventy-three laws and regulations were found
 12 to relate to SDG7 targets and are listed as supplementary material (Appendices, Table A1).

13 *Table 3. Results of the policy screening process*

Policies	Listed	Title screening	Content analysis
Laws	37	7	5
Governmental Regulations	134	11	7
Presidential Regulations	114	32	17
Presidential Decrees	111	10	0
Presidential Instructions	36	5	4
MEMR Regulations	500	53	40
Total	932	118	73

14

15 Table 4 shows that five regulations solely address the electricity access (EA) target, while 5,
 16 29, and 20 ~~others~~ address ~~only~~ clean cooking fuels and technology access (CC), renewable
 17 energy (RE), and energy efficiency (EE) targets, respectively. Five others regulate both
 18 electricity access and renewable energy (EA-RE) targets, while EA-EE, CC-EE, and RE-EE
 19 combined targets have one policy each. Two others simultaneously address EA-RE-EE targets.
 20 Finally, four regulations are related to all SDG7 targets. Overall, Indonesia has passed more
 21 laws and regulations on renewable energy and energy efficiency targets with 41 and 29 laws
 22 and regulations, respectively, than those on electricity access and clean cooking targets (17 and
 23 10 laws and regulations, respectively).

1 *Table 4. Summary of SDG7 related energy policies for Indonesia*

Targets	EA	CC	RE	EE	EA-CC	EA-RE	EA-EE	CC-RE	CC-EE	RE-EE	EA-CC-RE	EA-CC-EE	EA-RE-EE	EA-CC-RE-EE	Total
Regulations	5	5	29	20	0	5	1	0	1	1	0	0	2	4	73

2

3 **4. Policy Analysis**

4 The effectiveness of energy policy in supporting the progress [of-towards](#) SDG7 is analysed by
 5 benchmarking the current national improvement in energy access, renewable energy share, and
 6 energy efficiency against the targets of SDG7. Since the renewable energy target lacks a precise
 7 number, the national target is applied. Table 5 shows comparisons between SDG7 and national
 8 targets. The Indonesian electricity access target is more ambitious than the global electricity
 9 access target. Indonesia, however, has missed the target of 85% access to gas for cooking, and
 10 its universal access to clean cooking energy is unspecified by 2030. On the other hand, the
 11 renewable energy share targets of Indonesia have been clearly stated while the global target
 12 lacks a precise number. Finally, the national energy efficiency target is not as ambitious as the
 13 global one.

14 *Table 5. SDGs and national targets*

Targets	SDGs	National [21]
Access to electricity	100% by 2030	100% by 2020
Access to clean cooking fuels and technology	100% by 2030	85% access to gas for cooking by 2015
Renewable energy share	Increase substantially by 2030	23% by 2025 and 31% by 2050
Energy efficiency	2.6% reduction in energy intensity of GDP, annually [7]	1% reduction in final energy intensity, annually

15

16 4.1. Energy access

17 Target 7.1 of the SDGs calls for universal access to affordable, reliable, and modern energy
 18 services. This target was interpreted as achieving a 100% electrification ratio and 100% access
 19 to clean fuels and technology for cooking. The interpretation follows the multi-tier framework
 20 of energy access proposed by the World Bank, International Energy Agency (IEA), and the
 21 UN's Sustainable Energy for All initiative [36, 37]. They argue that providing access to
 22 electricity for all is a continuous endeavour. It starts from without access (Tier 0), to access to


1 a daily minimum of 3 watts per household for a minimum of 4 hours without considering its
2 reliability and affordability (Tier 1), to access of at least 2 kW power capacity, available for a
3 minimum of 23 hours a day (Tier 5). Tier 5 access allows only 2 hours of disruption a week
4 (reliable) and an electricity expenditure of less than 5% of household income for average use
5 of 365 kWh/year (affordable) [36]. ~~However, electricity access data segregated under the multi-~~
6 ~~tier framework are not readily available for developing countries, and, to the authors'~~
7 ~~knowledge, only Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Cambodia have the data [6, 38-40]. In the meantime,~~
8 ~~all households with access to electricity, from Tier 1 to Tier 5, are taken into consideration.~~
9 Therefore, even a household with a simple stand-alone PV system (Tier 1) is taken into
10 consideration and classified as with-having access to electricity. ~~This narrow interpretation of~~
11 ~~energy access does not fully reflect the intent of SDG Target 7.1 to ensure universal access to~~
12 ~~reliable and affordable energy. Electricity access data segregated under the multi-tier~~
13 ~~framework, however, are not readily available for developing countries, and, to the authors'~~
14 ~~knowledge, only Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Cambodia are ready with the data [6, 38-40]. In the~~
15 ~~meantime, we follow the consensus that takes into consideration even households with Tier 1~~
16 ~~access to electricity.~~

17 4.1.1. Electricity access

18 Figure B1 (see Appendices) presents a flow diagram of the effective policies on electricity
19 access. It shows the structure of laws, regulations, and the players related to policies on
20 electricity access. The arrows indicate that the laws and regulations which are higher in
21 hierarchy influence or regulate those pointed by the arrows. This study found that at least seven
22 regulations effectively improved electricity access.

23 In general, the progress on electrification programs is promising. The 2008-2027 General Plan
24 of National Electricity (RUKN 2008-2027) set an electrification ratio target of 93% by 2025,
25 and subsequent plans have set more ambitious targets. RUKN 2015-2034 and the 2017 RUEN
26 set targets of 99.99% by 2021 and 100% by 2020, respectively. The challenging nature of
27 providing infrastructure in an ~~the~~ archipelagic country, however, means that more than 2,000
28 rural villages are estimated to be ~~left~~ without electricity by the end of 2019 under ~~the a~~ business
29 as usual scenario [29]. Figure 2 shows households with electricity relative to the total number
30 of households. The number of houses with electricity increased significantly from 2001 to
31 2018, reducing the percentage of houses without electricity. From 2001 to 2006, more than 1
32 million new connections were added annually, increasing to 1.6 million houses on average

1 every year during the 2007-2010 period. Governmental Regulation (GR) 3/2005 (concerning
 2 electricity provision and use), the fast track program (FTP) 1 of coal power plant development
 3 (Presidential Regulation 71/2006), Energy Law 30/2007, and Finance Ministerial (FM)
 4 Regulation 111/2007 contributed to this improvement. FM Regulation 111/2007 ensured that
 5 the government covered the difference between the state electricity company's (PLN) rural
 6 electricity production costs and the tariff plus a margin. It gave PLN an incentive to supply
 7 electricity to more houses.



8
 9 *Figure 2. Electricity access in Indonesia. Data source: [8, 30, 41, 42].*

10
 11 The amount of household electrification achieved between 2011 to 2017 was even more
 12 significant. On average, almost 3.5 million more houses were supplied with electricity each
 13 year. The electrification ratio rose remarkably to 98.3% in 2018, surpassing the 97.5% target
 14 [8, 30]. The policy responsible for this achievement relates to the decision in 2011 to finance
 15 rural electrification programs under a specifically allocated budget (locally known as DAK).
 16 DAK is the state budget assigned to regional governments for carrying out national priority
 17 programs. The state budget allocated to PLN for electrification programs increased more than
 18 fivefold, from only IDR 571 billion in 2010 to IDR 2.93 trillion in 2011 [43]. As a result, almost

1 5.6 million more houses were connected with electricity in that year alone, and the
2 electrification ratio grew considerably from 67.15% to 72.95% [30]. FTP 1 continued to
3 contribute to the improvement together with fast track program 2 (FTP 2). A more recent
4 announcement from the ministry claimed that the electrification ratio reached 98.3% in 2018
5 [9]. Figure 2 indicates that, if the current progress is maintained under the current policy
6 scenario, 100% electricity access is achievable ~~can be achieved~~ by 2020.

7 4.1.2. Access to clean cooking fuels and technology

8 Households without access to clean fuels for cooking are defined as those cooking with
9 kerosene, charcoal, or fuelwood using unimproved cookstoves. We assume that families
10 cooking with improved cookstoves (ICSs) in Indonesia are negligible as only 5,500 ICSs of
11 the 7,000 stoves target were distributed by 2012 (from a pilot project under the Indonesia Clean
12 Stove Initiative) [44, 45].

13 Overall, the successful implementation of the “Kerosene to LPG Conversion Program”
14 substantially reduced the number of households without access from 48.49 to 17.81 million
15 during the 2007-2016 period (calculated from [10]). Households using primarily kerosene for
16 cooking reduced dramatically from 20.25 million (36.6%) in 2007 to 2.51 million (3.8%) in
17 2016. During the same period, households cooking mainly with fuelwood have been halved
18 from 27.3 million to 14.3 million (reduced from 49.4% to 21.6%). It is not clear if the reduction
19 in fuelwood use was due to the conversion program [46].

20 Figure B2 presents the few laws and regulations affecting access to clean cooking and
21 technology, and Figure 3 shows households without access to clean cooking fuels and
22 technology between 2007 to 2016. During this period, the percentage of households without
23 access to clean fuels and technology decreased significantly from 87.6% to 26.8%. Between
24 2008 and 2009, under PR 104/2007, approximately 15.8 million and 24.2 million free LPG
25 starter kits were distributed to households and small/micro enterprises respectively [46],
26 contributing to a substantial reduction from 48.5 million households in 2007 to 36.7 million
27 households in 2009 without access to clean cooking technology. From 2010 to 2015, a total of
28 13.6 million LPG starter kits were distributed [46], contributing to a further reduction to 20.1
29 million households without access in 2015. By 2016, about 17.8 million households remained
30 without access to clean cooking fuels and technology [10]. A recent national socio-economic
31 census reveals that 17.46% of households were still without access to clean fuels and
32 technology in 2019 [34].




Figure 3. Households without access to clean fuels for cooking and its trendline to 2030, fitted to the 2007-2016 historical data. Data source: [10].

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Unlike electricity, there is no policy specifically targeting the reduction of fuelwood use (or solid biomass in general). A proxy target of the 2014 National Energy Policy (locally known as KEN) was to achieve an 85% share of gas use in the household sector by 2015, but almost 30% of households still cooked either with fuelwood, kerosene, or charcoal in 2015 [10]. The 2017 National Energy General Plan (locally known as RUEN) sets targets of 4.7 million and 1.7 million houses connected to natural gas pipelines and biogas digesters, respectively, by 2025 [21]. A centrally controlled gas pipeline will mostly serve city houses previously consuming LPG, and in this way, biogas digesters may replace LPG and traditional biomass.


Since there is no major program addressing solid biomass use, universal access to clean cooking energy may not be achieved by 2030, as predicted by the (dashed) trendline² (Figure 3). When the trendline is extended to 2030, almost 5 million households will still be left behind without access to clean cooking fuels. At this stage, it appears that Indonesia is not on track to reach universal access to clean cooking. Targeting only 1.7 million houses connected to biogas digesters will not suffice to address the issue, especially when the ministerial data [47] suggest that biomass consumption of the household sector (mostly solid) increased significantly during the 2007-2016 period. It suggests that households relying on solid biomass for cooking could

² More information about trendlines can be found at <https://support.office.com/en-us/article/choosing-the-best-trendline-for-your-data-1bb3c9e7-0280-45b5-9ab0-d0c93161daa8>

1 be much higher than the estimation, ~~with~~ fuel stacking (using more than one fuel side-by-
 2 side) ~~was likely to happen~~ [46, 48].

4 4.2. Renewable energy

5 SDGs Target 7.2 is to increase the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix
 6 substantially. Indonesia sets its target to be 23% of the total primary energy supply (TPES) by
 7 2025. Figure B3 shows laws and regulations strongly associated with the development of the
 8 renewable energy share in Indonesia. The interactions between these regulations and the
 9 development in renewable energy are depicted in Figure 4. The government claimed an
 10 achievement of 8.43% RE share in 2017, which increased from 4.42% in 2010 [11, 28]. The
 11 policies responsible for this progress include Energy Law 30/2007, which obligates local and
 12 central governments to increase the utilization of local and renewable energy and encourages
 13 them to provide incentives for renewable energy use. In 2009, the Electricity Law was passed.
 14 In agreement with the Energy Law, the Electricity Law requires that electricity generation
 15 should prioritize renewable sources.



17
 18 *Figure 4. Modern renewable energy share in the TPES and its trendlines to 2030. The blue, orange, and grey*
 19 *dashed lines assume polynomial, exponential, and linear trends, respectively, fitted to the 2010-2017*
 20 *historical data. Data sources: [11, 28, 49].*

1 The laws were soon supported by MEMR 31/2009 and MEMR 32/2009, obligating PLN to
2 buy electricity generated from small RE and geothermal producers, respectively, under the
3 feed-in-tariff (FIT) mechanism. Presidential Regulation (PR) 61/2011, concerning the national
4 action plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (RAN-GRK), also sought to provide electricity
5 from RE and biogas digester sets in compliance with the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
6 Framework Convention on Climate Change. The protocol bound its state parties to reduce
7 greenhouse gas emissions, and Indonesia passed the protocol as a national law in 2004.
8 However, progress was slow until 2012 despite the regulatory framework development. The
9 RE share in the energy mix only increased from 4.42% in 2010 to 4.52% in 2012 [28]. The
10 slow rate of increase is understandable, considering that RE projects may take years to
11 complete.

12 In 2013, electricity consumption from RE increased by almost 9 million BOE to 60.68 million
13 BOE (see Table 6). However, the increase was mainly due to the contribution of two large
14 hydropower plants (603 MW total capacity) operating since the 1980s in North Sumatera, and
15 three hydropower plants (365 MW) located in South Sulawesi. It turns out that those plants
16 were added to the national list only in 2013 [50, 51]. Biodiesel consumption also grew
17 significantly at the same time, thanks to the MEMR 32/2008 ordering mandatory biodiesel
18 blends ranging from 5% in the transportation sector to 10% in industrial, commercial, and
19 generation sectors by 2015. Consequently, the total RE share rose to 5.18%. Another
20 meaningful improvement was observed after the enactment of MEMR 25/2013. It demanded a
21 mandatory blending of 10% biodiesel (B10) in the transport, industrial, and commercial
22 sectors, and 20% in the electricity generation sector, in effect since January 2014. The biodiesel
23 consumption almost doubled from 5.93 million BOE in 2013 to 10.44 million BOE the next
24 year (see Table 6). Electricity generated from renewables increased from 60.68 million to 66.73
25 million BOE in the same period, and coal consumption dropped significantly, which
26 contributed to the increase in the share of RE to 6.35%.

27 However, due to low fossil fuel prices, the biodiesel price could not compete and domestic
28 biodiesel demand halved in 2015, slowing down RE penetration in the energy mix [52]. The
29 government responded by passing MEMR 12/2015 and PR 61/2015. The former was the
30 revised version of MEMR 25/2013 and increased mandatory biodiesel blending to 20% (in
31 transport, industrial, and commercial sectors) and 30% (in the electricity generation sector) in
32 January 2016. Under PR 61/2015, money collected from palm oil export levies initiated oil
33 palm plantation funding to be used to subsidize the difference between diesel and biodiesel

1 prices. In reality, the mandatory blending implementation of B20 and B30 in the transport
 2 sector began in 2016 and 2020, respectively. The regulations effectively increased domestic
 3 biodiesel consumption from 0.86 million kilolitres in 2015 to 2.25 million kilolitres (2016) and
 4 2.4 million kilolitres (2017) [53]. It helped to boost the RE share to 7.7% in 2016 and 8.43%
 5 in 2017.

6 Figure 4 also shows extended linear, exponential, and second-order polynomial trendlines of
 7 the renewable energy share to 2030. The most optimistic projection (the polynomial trendline)
 8 indicates that the share will be 21% by 2025. When exponential growth is assumed, it will be
 9 19%, and the 23% target by 2025 will not be achieved if the trend continues. The minister of
 10 energy and mineral resources admitted that Indonesia might miss the target, and a target of
 11 20% by 2025 will be more reasonable [54].

12 *Table 6. Primary energy use in Indonesia. Data source: [28]*

Sources	Primary energy use (Million BOE)					
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Renewable electricity	48.18	49.77	51.68	60.68	66.73	73.50
Biodiesel	1.26	2.03	3.79	5.93	10.44	5.18
Coal	281.40	334.14	377.89	406.37	321.60	364.62
Oil	518.41	546.64	533.83	542.95	544.80	545.73
Natural gas	269.94	261.71	259.46	270.13	271.38	279.63

13
 14 Similarly, the 2017 RUEN estimates that 45.2 GW power capacity from renewables will be
 15 necessary to reach the 23% target. However, the current power capacity from renewable energy
 16 only increased from 5.5 GW in 2012 to 7.3 GW in 2017 (see Figure 5). If the trend continues,
 17 the total power capacity will be less than 12 GW by 2025, substantially lower than the RUEN
 18 target.

19




Figure 5. Actual power capacity from renewable energy (solid blue), its exponential trendline (dashed blue), and RUEN target to 2025 (orange). Data sources: [21, 30].


In an attempt to achieve 23% of renewable energy share by 2025, Indonesia will depend mostly on hydropower, bioenergy, and geothermal because of their large reserves [55] and their dispatchable and non-intermittent nature. Targets increased by more than 200 MW in most RE areas between 2016 and 2017, but the realisation of those targets fell short in all areas (see Table 7). Geothermal and bioenergy power plant development [targets were](#) missed by 8.5% and 19.7% in 2017, respectively. Hydropower plants achieved only 57.7% of their target in 2016. Indonesia missed its renewable electricity targets even though the annual target was increased by less than 1 GW in 2017. To achieve the renewable electricity capacity of 45.2 GW by 2025, an annual target of at least 4.5 GW has to be met.

Table 7. Targets and realization of renewable power plants (off- and on-grid) [56]

Power plant capacity (MW)	2016			2017		
	Target	Realization	%	Target	Realization	%
Geothermal	1,713.0	1,643.50	95.9%	1,976.0	1,808.5	91.5%
Bioenergy	2,069.4	1,787.9	86.4%	2,291.9	1,839.5	80.3%
Hydro	9,252.0	5,334.7	57.7%	9,590.0	NA	NA
Solar	92.1	91.6	99.5%	118.6	96.76	81.6%
Wind	11.5	2.4	21.0%	19.2	NA	NA

1 Figure 6 shows the policy effectiveness indicators (PEIs) of each RE. The measure is related
 2 to its annual increase in power capacity during the 2013-2018 period, except for biofuel, which
 3 was estimated based on the total volume of biodiesel production during the same period. The
 4 graph indicates that the current RE policies in Indonesia are not effective in supporting the
 5 development of hydropower and solar technology. The 6% hydropower increase in 2013 was
 6 not caused by newly added power, as has been previously explained. Geothermal energy shows
 7 progress over the last three years, but it will not be enough to meet the target. Bioenergy
 8 (electricity generated from biomass, biogas, and solid waste) showed promising progress in
 9 2014 and 2015 only. Positive development in wind energy technology is expected in the near
 10 future. After the installation of Sidrap wind park in 2018 (75 MW), Jeneponto wind park with
 11 the power capacity of 72 MW was also installed to the Sulawesi system in early 2019 [57].
 12 Other wind projects, including Sukabumi (170 MW), Lebak (150 MW), Jeneponto (175 MW),
 13 and Sidrap II (75 MW), are under negotiation with PLN [58]. Finally, biofuel production
 14 fluctuated, but corrective policy responses, including the mandatory biodiesel blending and oil
 15 palm plantation funding, created considerable progress towards reaching the target.

16



17

18 *Figure 6. Policy Effectiveness Indicators (PEIs) of RE measured based on total power capacity added from*
 19 *2013 to 2018. The biofuel PEI was based on biodiesel production. Constructed based on [30, 56, 59-62].*

20

1 Good policy instruments attract private and foreign investments [55, 63]. These investments
 2 are represented by the capacity development of renewable power plants owned by the IPPs and
 3 PPU's (see Table 8). Overall, only 745 MW of new power from RE was added between 2013
 4 to 2017, indicating a slow influx of investments. Most of the investments flowed to geothermal
 5 energy (455 MW) and mini hydropower (177 MW). During the same period, PLN only added
 6 31 MW of renewable power to the system [30]. In contrast, almost 5,000 MW of power from
 7 fossil fuels was added during the same period, of which two-thirds was generated from coal
 8 power plants [30].

9 *Table 8. The capacity of renewable power plants operated by the IPPs and PPU's in Indonesia, in Megawatts.*
 10 *Data source: extracted from [30].*

Year	Hydro	Mini Hydro	Micro Hydro	Geothermal	Wind Power	Solar	Waste	Biomass /biogas	Total
2012	587.12	34.43	3.38	770.80	0.59	0.03	26	0	1,422.35
2013	1,567.37	46.35	17.82	775.40	0.59	0.06	26	0	2,433.59
2014	1,567.37	103.28	18.59	830.40	0.69	0.06	36	0	2,556.39
2015	1,567.37	114.18	18.59	860.40	0.69	0.06	36	0	2,597.29
2016	1,612.37	155.58	53.89	1,065.40	0.69	7.06	36	0	2,930.99
2017	1,612.37	223.33	53.89	1,230.40	0.69	8.06	36	13.7	3,178.44

11
 12 Similarly, PLN is planning to add 27,063 MW (48%) coal-based power plants and 12,617 MW
 13 other fossil-based power plants between 2019-2028 [31]. This time, however, renewables will
 14 contribute about 30% of the planned installations (16,714 MW). Compared to the current
 15 achievement, this plan shows Indonesia's commitment to achieving its 23% renewable share
 16 in the national energy mix. However, intention does not always translate to the actual
 17 realisation of the plan. For example, the second fast track program (FTP2) has been initiated
 18 since 2010, and its latest plan was to install 17,458 MW power plants, including 6,658 MW
 19 hydro and geothermal power plants [31]. Still, only 755 MW power has been connected to the
 20 systems by the end of 2018.

21 The policy most responsible for the development of RE, or the lack thereof, was the FIT
 22 mechanism. The FIT policy for geothermal energy, for example, has changed four times (under
 23 MEMR Reg. 32/2009, 2/2011, 22/2012, and 17/2014), offering higher prices to attract
 24 investments. Similarly, the FIT policy of small hydropower has changed three times (MEMR
 25 Reg. 12/2014, 22/2014, and 19/2015) after MEMR Reg. 31/2009 and 4/2012, which regulated
 26 small and medium scales RE in general, did not attract enough investments. The regulations
 27 were finally responded positively to by the geothermal and mini-hydro energy developers, as
 28 shown in Table 8.

1 In contrast, the tariff policy for solar photovoltaic followed a reverse auction mechanism under
2 MEMR Reg. 17/2013. Given a ceiling price of USD 0.25/kWh (USD 0.30/kWh if the
3 technology had 40% local content), the bidder with the lowest bid won. The high ceiling prices
4 without a clear mechanism for loss recovery made PLN reluctant to support the policy [64].
5 For comparison, the current electricity price in Indonesia is approximately USD 0.10/kWh. The
6 initial regulation did not work well and was replaced with MEMR Reg. 19/2016. This time
7 PLN costs were compensated, and the prices were fixed without auction, ranging from USD
8 0.145 to USD 0.25 in Java and Papua islands, respectively.

9 We have yet to see the full impact of these policies when the MEMR changed the regulations
10 again under MEMR Reg. 12/2017. In the same year, it was amended and replaced with MEMR
11 Reg. 43/2017 and 50/2017, regulating all types of RE. The tariffs were fixed based on the
12 regional and national average generation costs (locally known as BPP). On some occasions,
13 the tariffs were set to only 85% of the BPP. Since the BPP is influenced mainly by the costs of
14 coal-generated power plants (PPs), the renewable PPs now must directly compete with cheap
15 coal PPs. The low tariffs as a consequence of the regulation will reduce the profitability of a
16 project and thus will discourage private investments [65].

17


18 4.3. Energy efficiency

19 Figure B4 presents the structure of the laws, policies, and respective players responsible for
20 energy efficiency related activities. One of the most significant regulations related to energy
21 conservation in the 21st century Indonesia is policy on renewable energy development and
22 energy conservation (under MEMR Decree 2/2004) [66]. This regulation includes energy
23 subsidies, standardizing energy products, regulating energy conservation and management, and
24 prioritizing renewable energy use. Subsequently, MEMR 31/2005 and PR 55/2005 were
25 released and provided guidelines for increasing energy conservation in commercial, industrial,
26 and residential sectors as well as fuel price increases.

27 Effective energy efficiency policies reduce energy consumption. Changes in energy
28 consumption patterns were observed and associated with policies applied before the changes
29 (see Figure 7). MEMR 31/2005 and, [in particular, PR 55/2005 regulation on oil price controls,](#)
30 restricted growth in energy consumption in the transport, residential, and commercial sectors.
31 However, higher fuel prices were responded to differently by the industrial sector. The sector
32 reduced fuel use and replaced it with much cheaper coal [67]. From 2004 to 2007, oil and gas

1 consumption in the industrial sector decreased from 159.79 million to 132.14 million BOE,
 2 and coal use doubled from 55.34 million to 121.9 million BOE [27]. Consequently, the
 3 industrial sector energy consumption rose substantially in 2007.

4 Another significant endeavour into energy conservation was the kerosene to LPG mega-
 5 conversion program (PR 104/2007), causing residential and commercial sectors to reduce
 6 consumption during the 2007-2010 period³. Unfortunately, the program had no meaningful
 7 impact on the transport and industrial sectors. The reduction observed in the industrial sector
 8 was mainly due to an economic slowdown and coal price increase. Economic growth dropped
 9 from 6.35% in 2007 to 4.63% in 2009 (see Table 9) while the imported coal price peaked at
 10 324.98 USD/tonne in 2009 from only 131.5 USD/tonne in 2007 [27, 68]. These conditions
 11 helped reduce coal consumption from 121.9 million BOE in 2007 to 82.59 million BOE in
 12 2009, while oil and gas consumption were stagnant [68].



13
 14 *Figure 7. Final energy consumption of different sectors in Indonesia and related regulations to energy*
 15 *conservation (in BOE). Energy data are from [27, 68].*
 16

17 Subsequently, GR 70/2009 was passed in November 2009. It proposed energy efficiency
 18 standardization and labelling, encouraged incentives for energy conservation, and required
 19 entities consuming 6,000 TOE or more energy per year to conduct mandatory energy
 20 management. It was followed by the introduction of PR 61/2011 concerning the national action

³ Compared to kerosene, LPG has a higher caloric value.

1 plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (RAN-GRK) and MEMR 14/2012 concerning energy
 2 management. They provide more detailed procedures for the implementation of GR 70/2009.
 3 The impact on energy consumption of those regulations is unclear at this point in time. The
 4 substantial drop in industrial sector energy consumption in 2013-2014 is likely due to a global
 5 economic crisis hitting ~~the~~ emerging markets, including Indonesia [69, 70]. Even now,
 6 Indonesia is still experiencing slow economic growth. It appears that economic crises have kept
 7 the industrial sector energy consumption low, so it is difficult to tell if the energy conservation
 8 programs have contributed to it.


9 In June 2013, the government significantly decreased subsidies and increased the prices of
 10 gasoline (increased 44.4% to IDR 6,500) and diesel fuel (22.2% to IDR 5,500) under MEMR
 11 18/2013. In November 2014, the prices were increased further to IDR 8,500 for gasoline (31%)
 12 and IDR 7,500 for diesel oil (27%) under MEMR 34/2014. Less than six weeks later, the prices
 13 were corrected to IDR 7,600 and IDR 7,250 for gasoline and diesel oil, respectively, on 1
 14 January 2015 (MEMR 39/2014). The new prices are still significantly higher than the 2013
 15 ones. As a result, ~~growth in~~ transportation sector energy consumption slowed down in 2013
 16 and 2014 (as a consequence of MEMR 18/2013) and became negative in 2015 (associated with
 17 MEMR 34/2014 and 39/2014).

18 *Table 9. Indonesia GDP growth [68]*

Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
GDP growth (%)	6.01	4.63	6.22	6.49	6.23	5.81	5.01	4.88	5.03	5.07

19
 20 ~~The SDG energy efficiency target of the SDGs is~~ Target 7.3, ~~which~~ is to double the annual
 21 global rate of energy efficiency improvement. Energy efficiency is measured using the energy
 22 intensity of GDP (SDG Indicator 7.3.1), and the target is to achieve an annual reduction in
 23 energy intensity of 2.6% by 2030 [7]. Assuming the reduction increases linearly from 2.1% in
 24 2015 to 2.6% by 2030 [7], ~~the~~ global energy intensity will decline from 5.131 MJ/~~\$~~2011 PPP
 25 ~~\$ of GDP~~ in 2015 [12] to 3.58 MJ/~~\$~~2011 PPP ~~\$ of GDP~~ by 2030 [4]. Interestingly, the energy
 26 intensity in Indonesia was 3.53 MJ/~~\$~~2011 PPP ~~\$ of GDP~~ in 2015 [12], which is lower than the
 27 2030 SDGs target. ~~Indonesia achieved its SDG 7 target in 2015 without any SDGs~~
 28 ~~interventions.~~ The World Bank data [12] also shows that the Indonesian energy intensity
 29 declined from 5.24 to 3.53 MJ/~~\$~~2011 PPP ~~\$ of GDP~~ during the 2001-2015 period. The annual
 30 reduction in energy intensity, therefore, became 2.79% during the period, surpassing the 2.6%
 31 reduction target of the SDGs [71]. ~~On the other hand, the national target is only a 1% reduction~~

1 ~~in final energy intensity. This is supported by o~~ Our calculation shows that final energy
 2 intensities in 2001 and 2015 were 3.67 and 2.49 MJ/\$2011 PPP \$ of GDP, respectively, which
 3 ~~give~~ a slightly lower reduction in final energy intensity of 2.73% during the period. Lower
 4 energy intensity of GDP is associated with higher energy efficiency. The higher the percentage
 5 of the annual energy intensity reduction, the lower the energy intensity. Indonesia has,
 6 however, sets a lower reduction target of 1% in final energy intensity than what has been
 7 achieved, and it is suggested it should revise it to, at least, maintain the current achievement of
 8 2.73%.



9
 10 *Figure 8. The primary energy intensity in Indonesia. The average primary energy intensities of high and lower-*
 11 *middle-income groups and the world are shown for comparison. Data source: [12].*
 12

13 Figure 8 compares the primary energy intensity in Indonesia with the average energy intensities
 14 of high and lower-middle-income group countries and with the average value for the whole
 15 world. The graph shows that Indonesia consumed less energy for every dollar of GDP it
 16 produced than all income group countries and the world averages. Low energy intensity of
 17 GDP does not mean that Indonesia is advanced in energy efficiency. This issue is discussed in
 18 the next section.

19

1 **5. Discussions**

2 Government Regulation 79/2014 on national energy policy sets national energy targets ~~for~~
 3 Indonesia (see Table 10). The first four targets are comparable to the SDG7 targets, as
 4 previously discussed. The next two targets show that the primary energy supply in 2025 is
 5 expected to increase to more than twice its 2015 supply [21]. ~~While t~~hese targets ~~and those~~
 6 ~~for power generation and electricity consumption support are in synergy with~~ the energy access
 7 target of SDG7, ~~as providing electricity and clean energy for cooking for everyone requires~~
 8 ~~more energy. However,~~ a trade-off may exist between these targets and the energy efficiency
 9 target. ~~The reduction target of the energy intensity of GDP may not be achieved if the increase~~
 10 ~~in energy consumption is too high. Power generation and electricity consumption targets are~~
 11 ~~also in synergy with electricity access target, and a similar trade-off exists between them and~~
 12 ~~energy intensity of GDP for the same reasons.~~ Indonesia expects an ambitious reduction in oil
 13 share from 46% of the total primary energy mix in 2015 to less than 25% in 2025, and at the
 14 same time ~~to increase~~ its coal share, ~~in order~~ to improve its energy security. Indonesia is an
 15 oil net importer country with vast coal resources. The oil share reduction target provides an
 16 opportunity to increase renewable energy use, ~~while which is undermined by~~ a growing coal
 17 consumption target ~~creates the opposite effect~~. Finally, the natural gas share remains the same.


18 *Table 10. Indonesian national energy targets*

1. Electrification ratio	100% by 2020
2. Gas for cooking access	85% by 2015
3. Renewable energy share	More than 23% and 31% by 2025 and 2050, respectively
4. Reduction of final energy intensity	1% annually
5. Primary energy	400 and 1000 MTOE by 2025 and 2050, respectively
6. Per capita primary energy	1.4 and 3.2 TOE/capita by 2025 and 2050, respectively
7. Power generation	115 and 430 GW by 2025 and 2050, respectively
8. Electricity consumption	2500 and 7000 kWh/cap
9. Oil share	Less than 25% and 20% by 2025 and 2050, respectively
10. Coal share	More than 30% and 25% by 2025 and 2050, respectively
11. Natural gas share	More than 22% and 24% by 2025 and 2050, respectively

19
 20 Synergies and trade-offs also exist between SDG7 and other SDGs. For instance, poor access
 21 to energy (SDG7) keeps people in poverty (SDG1), and energy poverty is strongly associated
 22 with economic poverty [72]. Poor energy access usually means a lack of access to electricity
 23 and clean energy for cooking. Figure 9 shows an example of a synergy between electricity
 24 access and poverty reduction in Indonesia. Access to electricity has a strong negative
 25 correlation with poverty. Lack of access to clean energy also will adversely affect women more
 26 than men (SDG5) [73]. Without access to clean energy for cooking, women will spend more

1 time collecting solid biomass [74], and cooking with it harms their health. In addition, a recent
 2 study estimates that the implementation of SDGs in the national development agenda of
 3 Indonesia will increase energy demand [75].

4



5

6 *Figure 9. A synergy between electricity access and poverty reduction in Indonesia. Data source: [76]*

7

8 **5.1. Electricity access**

9 The analysis shows that several policies have contributed to the expansion of electricity access
 10 since 2001. The inclusion of rural electrification programs in the DAK has contributed to the
 11 increase in access to electricity and put them in the spotlight since 2011. ~~As a result, access to~~
 12 ~~electricity has increased significantly. However~~ ~~Although our trendlines indicated this could~~
 13 ~~continue~~, experience from other countries shows that supplying electricity to the last 10% to
 14 15 % of the population is the hardest, the slowest, and the costliest since most of these houses
 15 are more remotely located [77]. ~~The ADB even predict that universal electricity access will not~~
 16 ~~be achieved in Indonesia by 2020 with the current level of funding.~~ One of the latest regulations
 17 in response to the challenge in rural electrification is Presidential Regulation 47/2017, requiring
 18 the provision of free solar panel systems with LED lamps (locally known as LTSHE) to people

1 in the most remote areas of Indonesia. During 2017-2019, some 400 thousand LTSHEs were
2 to be distributed to the most remote locations for free [78]. ~~A more ambitious fast track program
3 of 35 GW electricity infrastructure initiated in May 2015 together with the FTP 1 and FTP 2
4 also contributed significantly to electricity access development. Between 2015 to February
5 2018, about 7.9 GW more power was added to the system, mostly from the delayed
6 commencement of FTP 1, FTP 2, and regular projects (6,425 MW) [79]. The rest were from
7 the 35-GW program.~~

8 ~~The electrification ratio reached 98.3% in 2018. The PLN contributed about 97% of total
9 connections, followed by 2.52% off-grid connections and 0.38% LTSHEs [9]. However, in
10 2019 there are still 1.2 million houses (1.7%) without access to electricity, however, MEMR's
11 proposal to provide free electricity connection to 1.2 million houses requires IDR 6 trillion
12 (USD 413.79 million) of the state budget [80]. It will be enough to cover current connection
13 costs with additional sources of finance to come from the regular MEMR budget and corporate
14 social responsibility programs of state-owned enterprises [81]. However, the latest
15 announcement from the MEMR in early 2020 reveals that the electrification ratio only slightly
16 increased to 98.89% in 2019 [82]. Since 2019, Rural electrification programs are no longer
17 under DAK since 2019, which indicates that the programs are not a national priority anymore.
18 The Ministry now estimates that almost IDR 11 trillion (USD 758.62 million) will be needed
19 to provide electricity for the remaining households and that the PLN's budget is only IDR 2.1
20 trillion [83]. ~~The ADB predicts that, with the current level of funding, universal electricity
21 access will not be achieved in Indonesia by 2020. It is therefore suggested unlikely that
22 universal access to electricity will be achieved by the end of 2020, and a revised target may
23 need to be set to 2025.~~~~

24 5.2. Access to clean cooking fuels and technology

25 ~~By~~ In contrast to electricity access, significantly less attention has been paid to clean cooking
26 fuels and technology access. The existing policies do not sufficiently respond to the SDG
27 target. There is not a specific policy to ensure zero traditional use of solid biomass for cooking,
28 which is the dominant contributor to ~~the~~ low clean cooking access after the kerosene to LPG
29 conversion program successfully reduced kerosene use. Addressing the traditional use of
30 biomass with natural gas and biogas programs will not be enough. Natural gas usually replaces
31 LPG in urban areas, and biogas cannot reach non-farming communities. Providing LPG starter
32 kits to the households may not bridge the gap since household choice for cooking fuels is

1 influenced by affordability, availability, accessibility, and acceptability of the fuels [45].
2 Without their willingness to pay for clean fuels, especially when solid biomass is abundant,
3 people will be reluctant to adopt a clean way of cooking.

4 ~~Our suggestion is~~ A solution could be to promote the use of improved cookstoves (ICS) for
5 those using solid biomass for cooking by including the ICS program in ~~to~~ the national energy
6 plan ~~(RUEN)~~. It can be done in a similar way ~~to~~ the government ~~providing-provision of~~ free
7 LPG starter kits (under PR 104/2007) or free stand-alone solar systems (under PR 47/2017) to
8 rural households. This will ensure all households have access to a cleaner way of cooking by
9 2030. Lessons learned from the Kerosene-to-LPG Conversion Program and the Indonesia
10 Clean Stove Initiative can be used to develop more effective policy at the national level. Lesson
11 learned from the successful kerosene-to-LPG conversion program includes the necessity for
12 strong political commitment and firm policy objectives, effective marketing and a good public
13 awareness campaign, a sole credible implementing agency (Pertamina), and effective
14 monitoring and evaluation [45]. Rural energy programs, including electrification and clean
15 cooking, which have been nationally prioritized and financed under the DAK since 2013, were
16 renamed in 2016 as small and medium scale energy programs to allow for urban application.
17 However, the programs were removed from the 2019 DAK list, indicating that the government
18 lacks ~~the~~ commitment to achieving universal access to clean cooking. Judging from policy
19 development and target achievement as well as the inadequate public awareness campaign, it
20 appears that even policymakers are unaware of the indoor air pollution hazards from solid
21 biomass smoke. The World Bank estimates that indoor air pollution from the traditional use of
22 biomass for cooking in Indonesia leads to about 165,000 premature deaths annually [84].

23 According to the Asia Sustainable and Alternative Energy Program (ASTAE), barriers to
24 expanding the ICS program include a lack of a development roadmap, limited working capital
25 for producers, and no market demand for advanced ICS [45]. ASTAE also finds that traditional
26 production models, a limited supply chain, and the lack of awareness by consumers and
27 government on the adverse effects of indoor air pollution are some other obstacles to the
28 expansion. To achieve the target of universal access to clean cooking fuels and technology, the
29 MEMR will need to orchestrate all aspects of the program (from planning to implementation)
30 and encourage participation from different institutions and stakeholders. Those stakeholders
31 include public and private sectors, not-for-profit organizations, universities, international
32 bodies, users, and the relevant ministries responsible for public health, women and children,
33 social lives and villages, industries and enterprises, and research.

1 Another aspect worth mentioning is the fact that cooking with biomass is associated with
2 poverty, and when people can afford gas, they will switch to it [85]. This situation creates an
3 energy dilemma between providing clean energy access (mitigating energy poverty) and
4 promoting renewable energy (mitigating climate change). The dilemma is common in
5 developing countries such as Indonesia, and the government response to it is usually to relegate
6 the renewable energy target to a peripheral role [24]. It is also true in the context of electricity
7 access, in which the government prefers cheap coal-fired electricity to renewables. The
8 domestic pressures to provide affordable and reliable energy access in the short term trump
9 international commitments and expectations to increase the share of renewable energy in the
10 national energy mix [24].

11 5.3. Renewable energy

12 In regard to the renewable energy target, the current policy is not enough to allow Indonesia to
13 meet the target. The government may push the mandatory biodiesel blend to be more than 30%
14 by 2025 but, overall, the transport sector consumes more gasoline than diesel fuels. For
15 example, the share of biodiesel in the total primary energy supply was only 1.94% in 2018 [20].
16 Indonesia is reluctant to force a compulsory bioethanol blend because ethanol production may
17 become a risk to its food security. In the electricity generation sector, significant improvement
18 has been shown by hydropower, bioenergy, and geothermal; however, their output is not
19 enough to meet the target, while solar and wind energy show a very low deployment. In the
20 ~~case of~~ wind energy ~~case~~, it is argued that low wind speeds in the country make it unattractive
21 for investment, but ~~such barriers do not exist this is not the case~~ for solar energy ~~as solar energy~~
22 ~~potential is high at around 207.9 GW [21]~~.

23 A study involving stakeholder interviews revealed that the current policy is not attractive for
24 investments for the following reasons [86]: Firstly, regulatory uncertainties due to frequent
25 policy changes increase investment risks for the developers. These uncertainties have been
26 discussed in the previous section of this paper. Secondly, the coal industry ~~develops~~ ~~has a very~~
27 ~~strong ties~~ with the government, which, in turn, offers the industry fiscal supports (tax
28 exemption, loan guarantees, and price supports) that keep the BPP relatively low. In this
29 economic environment, tariffs become less attractive for renewable generation. Next, the rent-
30 seeking behaviour in fossil fuel industries hinders RE development.⁴ For instance, in many

⁴ Some middlemen, including in some cases PLN subsidiaries, who are involved in the fuel distribution allegedly make profits from their close tie with PLN, which provides power purchasing agreements in favour of gas and diesel-fired power plants [81].

1 rural electrification cases, electricity generation from more expensive diesel generators is
2 preferred over cheaper renewables. The involvement of subsidiaries of PLN and Pertamina (the
3 state-owned oil company) as diesel fuel suppliers allegedly creates a conflict of interests that
4 hinder the penetration of renewable energy. Lastly, the build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT)
5 requirement, in which developers should transfer the ownership of the renewable PPs to PLN
6 after 20 years of operation, significantly reduces the incentive for investment.

7 Another study involving a detailed inventory of coal and renewable energy subsidies
8 demonstrates that coal subsidies are substantially larger than renewable energy subsidies [87].
9 The study estimates that subsidies to coal in 2014 and 2015 were worth about USD 946 million
10 and 644 million, respectively, while subsidies to renewables were worth around USD 36
11 million and 133 million. Since coal generates most of the electricity in Indonesia, the cost of
12 subsidies for coal-fired electricity was around 4.9 USD/GWh in 2015, slightly lower than that
13 for renewable electricity of 5.5 USD/GWh [87]. The study also reveals that total costs per unit
14 of renewable electricity were still higher than those of coal power generation, even though
15 renewables received higher subsidies. These total costs, however, do not reflect the true costs
16 of generation as they do not take into account the large environmental and social costs
17 associated with carbon emissions and air pollution. These externality costs of coal-generated
18 and renewable energy electricity are estimated at 60 and 0.2 USD/MWh, respectively [87]. If
19 the externality cost is included, then coal will not be able to compete with renewables.
20 Likewise, subsidies for diesel fuel, kerosene, and LPG increased significantly in 2018 as the
21 global oil prices increased (see Figure 10). Fossil fuel subsidies reduce the competitiveness of
22 renewables and decrease incentives to conserve energy.




Figure 10. Fuel subsidies in Indonesia (assuming USD 1 equals IDR 14,000). Data sources: [88, 89]

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

As the production of first-generation bioethanol may become a risk to its food security, Indonesia needs to encourage the production of second generation bioethanol, which is made from non-food sources. In 2015, the potential of agricultural wastes for bioethanol production in Indonesia was about 11.88 billion litres, mostly from rice straws, bananas, and oil palms [90]. For comparison, gasoline consumption was 30.69 billion litres in the same year [68]. Indonesia is the world's largest producer of palm oil, and its production generates a vast amount of wastes, as only 10% of the plant can be extracted for oil [91]. However, since the national price of gasoline is low (subsidised), justifying the use of bioethanol exclusively based on cost considerations will be difficult.

To enable the government to reach its renewable energy targets, it needs to increase spending on second-generation bioethanol research and development and provide financial incentives for its production as it is currently only in the early phases of commercialization [92]. Kurnia *et al.* [93] suggest the development of more research on (1) efficient systems of transportation and distribution to link oil palm plantation, processing plants, and users, and (2) methods for efficient, cost-effective, and profitable biofuel production from oil palm wastes with less environmental impacts. At the same time, the bioethanol blending mandate should be imposed, and a tariff should be put on cheaper, foreign first-generation bioethanol [94]. These policy initiatives will increase bioethanol production, which in turn will increase learning in second generation bioethanol. [High social acceptance can be expected from the mandatory bioethanol program, as has happened in the case of +](#)the mandatory biodiesel blending program [resulted](#)

1 [in high social acceptance and so similar would be expected from a mandatory bioethanol](#)
2 [program.](#)

3 In the wind energy sector, a 75 MW wind farm in operation since 2018 in South Sulawesi
4 proves that wind energy can attract substantial foreign investment. The electricity feed-in tariff
5 was set at USD 0.11/kWh in 2015 [95]. More recently, the developer signed another contract
6 to increase its capacity by adding another 60-75 MW. Under MEMR Reg. 50/2017, the new
7 tariff is set to be USD 0.07/kWh, which is 85% of the regional BPP. The developer's
8 spokesman explained that the new tariff was still feasible since the second project does not
9 need to invest in sea or road infrastructure to access to the site. It is not clear whether the BOOT
10 scheme is part of this new agreement, but MEMR Reg. 50/2017 does not seem to discourage
11 investment in wind energy.

12 Responding to the slow deployment of solar energy, the government passed MEMR Reg.
13 49/2018. It allows PLN's customers to install rooftop solar panels and export excess power to
14 the grid. However, only 65% of the costs can be claimed back. ~~While the regulation promotes~~
15 ~~rooftop solar energy production and use, but, at the same time, reflects PLN's~~ [had indicated an](#)
16 [unwillingness to participate in the project as it will cause significant loss of revenue from](#)
17 [reduced consumers' electricity bills. A PLN's regional business director](#) ~~once~~
18 [said that rooftop solar panels should not be installed in Jakarta, where electricity is easily accessed, but only be](#)
19 [installed](#) outside Java, where electricity is scarce [96]. Under the current electricity price, the
20 selling price of 65% of the existing electricity tariff will prolong the payback period for rooftop
21 solar and discourage investment. The regulation also limits the capacity a customer can install.
22 A house powered by 2 kW grid electricity can only have 2 kW rooftop of solar panels.

23 [Lessons](#) learned from the mandatory biodiesel blend could also be applied to solar energy. For
24 instance, a compulsory deployment of solar energy could be imposed on governmental offices
25 and new commercial and industrial buildings. When a new norm of rooftop solar energy
26 develops, the regulation can be extended to existing buildings and houses.

27 5.4. Energy efficiency

28 GDP represents a country's total value of production and income, and energy is consumed as
29 an input factor for production as well as to support ~~lifestyle-the average~~ (standard of living)
30 [97]. Therefore, ~~while~~ the energy intensity of GDP ~~represents can indicate the~~ energy efficiency
31 ~~is of~~ both the production system and ~~lifestyle standard of living, it may mask a lower quality of~~
32 [life](#). Advanced countries usually have efficient production systems and an energy-intensive

1 ~~lifestyle standard of living~~. In contrast, developing nations will usually have inefficient
2 production systems and a non-energy-intensive standard of living. ~~Therefore, it would appear~~
3 ~~that~~ low energy intensity in Indonesia ~~may not be unlikely to~~ be the result of efficient production
4 systems; ~~it may and instead~~ be due to a lower standard of living. Using 2004 data, Suehiro [97]
5 found that the industrial sector energy intensity in Indonesia was about 2.5 times less efficient
6 than that of Japan, ~~and while~~ the energy intensity of the non-industrial sector ~~(lifestyle) in~~
7 ~~Indonesia is was~~ significantly lower.

8 The per capita electricity and cooking energy consumption measures are a proxy for living
9 standards. In 2017, 62,543,434 households (93%) enjoyed grid electricity, consuming
10 approximately 93,583.52 GWh of electricity [30]. Hence, on average, Indonesian families
11 consume about 1,496 kWh, annually, which falls under Tier-4 of household electricity access.
12 Electricity access under this category is reliable enough to power daily household appliances,
13 including general lighting, phone charging, fan, television, food processing, washing
14 machine, and refrigerator (without air conditioning).

15 Household energy consumption for cooking in Indonesia is very modest. Calculations using
16 the BPS and MEMR data [10, 20] show that kerosene and gas (LPG and natural gas)
17 consumption for cooking in 2016 was 1,896 and 1,774 MJ/person, respectively. This is very
18 close to the minimum annual cooking energy requirement for the basic human needs of 40 kg
19 of oil equivalence or 1,675 MJ/person [98]. The per-person consumption of energy for cooking
20 indicates that the average Indonesian lives a very modest lifestyle. A study assessing energy
21 poverty in typical rural, suburban, and urban areas in Central Java shows that 48% of the
22 households fell into the category of extreme energy poor, and another 43% is considered
23 medium energy poor [48]. Central Java is one of the provinces with the lowest electricity
24 consumption per household, which was 1090.6 kWh/household, or about 981.5 MJ/person, in
25 2017 (Tier 3 electricity access) [30]. The study used household energy consumption thresholds
26 of 2,088 and 4,320 MJ/cap to define extreme and medium energy-poor households,
27 respectively.

28 In energy efficiency measures, assessing the policy impacts of reducing national energy
29 consumption and intensity is challenging. Different variables influence sectoral energy use in
30 a country. In the industrial and other sectors, for example, economic performance (growth) has
31 a significant impact on energy consumption, while low economic growth is associated with
32 lower energy demand. In the transportation sector, fuel prices ~~are more dominant than others~~

1 ~~it particularly appear to~~ shaping consumption as a reduction in energy consumption is noted
2 every time energy prices increase. ~~Finally, energy consumption~~ While in residential and
3 commercial sectors, energy consumption is associated with fuel choices, in which cooking with
4 LPG or natural gas is more efficient than cooking with kerosene.


5 Figure 7 shows that the transport sector has surpassed the industrial sector as the sector that
6 consumed the most energy in Indonesia since 2013. At the same time, the energy consumption
7 of the commercial and residential sectors also increased. As Indonesian production systems
8 follow a more energy-efficient path, people are moving to a more energy-intensive society.
9 This claim is supported by the IEA findings, in which the residential sector energy consumption
10 in Indonesia increased 35% from 2000 to 2015 caused by increases in population, house
11 ownership, house floor areas and spatial dimensions, and average per capita device and
12 equipment ownership [99]. The study also shows that 86% of the increase in passenger
13 transport energy consumption during the same period was due to a greater distance travelled
14 per passenger. At the same time, there has been an activity shift from energy-intensive
15 manufacturing to less energy-intensive production and services [100].

16 Consequently, in order to meet the required targets, more attention needs to be given to the
17 transport, residential, and commercial sectors. Efficiency improvement efforts in these sectors
18 may include: transportation infrastructure improvements to reduce traffic congestion and
19 increase access to public transport; vehicle fuel conversion from oil to gas and electricity;
20 increasing fuel efficiency standards for large and inefficient vehicles; the application of
21 building energy efficiency standards, and promoting the adoption of more efficient LED lamps,
22 air conditioners, and other appliances.

23 5.5. Data limitation

24 A shortcoming of the present study is that it relies mostly on government data to analyse the
25 achievement of the targets. Some studies show that ~~in many countries,~~ official data are may
26 be intentionally manipulated ~~for particular reasons, including GDP and energy intensity data~~
27 manipulation for political gains [101, 102], and understating income per capita data to generate
28 more aid [103]. ~~It does not mean that Indonesia also exaggerates its achievement.~~ A comparison
29 of electrification ratio data between ~~those of~~ the World Bank and the Indonesian government
30 shows a divergence that has narrowed in the most recent figures that Indonesia does not
31 overestimate its achievement (Figure 11). ~~Moreover,~~ Indonesia regularly conducts an
32 intercensal population survey (every ten years between the census) and annual national socio-

1 economic surveys (each year), which collect data on household electricity and cooking fuel use
 2 (see for example [32, 33]). These data are used to validate government estimates. The
 3 International Energy Agency also adopted the World Bank estimates for electrification ratio
 4 and clean cooking fuel use in Indonesia [7, 104], but in a recent report, its estimates have been
 5 very close to those of the Indonesian government [105].



6
 7 *Figure 11. Electrification ratio in Indonesia: The World Bank estimate and Indonesia's claim. Data sources:*
 8 *[30, 50, 106, 107].*

10 ~~In contrast, a comparison using access to clean fuels and technology for cooking~~ Table 11
 11 reveals that estimates of the Indonesian government are significantly higher than those of the
 12 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) and the World Bank
 13 (see). ~~The Indonesian data of clean energy access for cooking are also sourced from the same~~
 14 ~~national socio-economic survey. Since the government energy data are based on censuses and~~
 15 ~~surveys, we are convinced that they are reliable.~~

16 *Table 11. Access to clean energy for cooking (% of population) in Indonesia, according to the Indonesian*
 17 *government, UNDESA, and the World Bank. Data sources: [35, 76, 108-110]*

	2015	2016	2017
Indonesian Government	69.42	73.23	76.71
UNDESA	60	63	65
World Bank	56.49	58.37	-

18
 19
 20

1 6. Conclusion

2 Indonesia has declared its commitment to incorporate the SDGs, including the energy goal,
3 into its national development plan, as stated in its voluntary national reviews (VNRs) on the
4 SDGs. The electrification ratio increased dramatically from 67.15% in 2010 to 98.3% in 2018.
5 The decision to promote rural electrification programs as nationally prioritised programs
6 financed under the specifically allocated state budget (DAK) is the main policy responsible for
7 the achievement. However, the programs have not been under DAK since 2019, which explains
8 the small increase in the electrification ratio to only 98.89% the same year. Providing electricity
9 access to the remaining 1.1 million households by the end of 2020 will be very challenging for
10 Indonesia as most of them are located in the outermost and least developed regions of the
11 country. Indonesia may need to revise its universal electricity access target to 2025, instead of
12 2020, as more than five times the currently allocated budget is needed to meet the target.

13 Access to clean cooking fuels and technology has increased significantly from 12.4% to
14 82.54% of total households between 2007 to 2019. However, much still needs to be done to
15 ensure zero traditional use of biomass for cooking. The current policy, which only focuses on
16 ~~promotion of gas use for cooking, is unlikely to be~~ will be less effective since household choice
17 for cooking fuels is ~~influenced~~ driven by affordability, availability, accessibility, and
18 acceptability of the fuels. In areas where clean cooking fuels are unaffordable, the willingness
19 to pay for them is low, and solid fuels are abundant, so ICS use should be encouraged. Policy
20 on ICS use may not fully address the SDG target of ensuring access to clean cooking fuels and
21 technology for everyone, but, in the short and medium terms, it ensures more efficient use of
22 biomass and improves residential indoor air quality. The ICS program can be executed in a
23 similar wayline with the distribution of free LPG starter kits and ~~free~~ stand-alone solar systems
24 ~~are distributed to rural households~~. Furthermore, rural energy programs, which address rural
25 electrification and clean cooking, should be reinstated and funded under DAK. ~~As those~~
26 ~~programs are no longer under the DAK list, they are no longer nationally prioritised programs,~~
27 ~~and the universal access to clean energy for cooking target will be more difficult to achieve.~~

28 Renewable energy deployment rose significantly from 4.4% to 8.43% between 2010 to 2017,
29 but current efforts will not be enough to meet the 23% target by 2025. The mandatory biodiesel
30 blending programs, B20 and B30, has been successfully implemented since 2016 and early
31 2020. However, its contribution to the primary energy mix was only 1.94% in 2018 as diesel
32 fuel consumption is less than a quarter of the total use of crude oil and petroleum products. A

1 similar mandatory blending policy is not enforced ~~to for~~ bioethanol. ~~On the other hand,~~
2 ~~R~~Regulatory uncertainties and frequent policy changes discourage investment in renewable
3 electricity generation. ~~The T~~Tariff policies change from feed-in tariffs, to reverse auction
4 mechanisms, to fixed tariffs based on average generation costs (BPP). PLN, the utility
5 company, is reluctant to support FIT and reverse auction policies for the loss they create due
6 to high tariffs. In contrast, low tariffs created by the BPP mechanism discourage private
7 investments. As a result, renewable generation increases only about 0.36 GW annually, far
8 from the annual target of 4.5 GW.

9 Policy assessments on energy efficiency and conservation show that sectoral energy
10 consumption is influenced mostly by variables and regulation not primarily intended to
11 improve energy efficiency. ~~For instance, e~~Energy consumption in the transportation sector is
12 shaped largely by fuel pricing policy- ~~more efficient~~ energy use in household and commercial
13 sectors is associated with the cooking fuel conversion policy. ~~On the other hand, while~~
14 decreases in industrial and other sectors' energy demand are associated with low economic
15 growths. The energy intensity of GDP, as a proxy for energy efficiency, is ~~currently lower~~ in
16 Indonesia ~~than the 2030 global target~~, indicating modest energy consumption per dollar of
17 production (GDP). ~~The present study also reveals that Indonesia's annual 1% reduction target~~
18 ~~of final energy intensity of 1% is too low compared to~~ ~~is lower than the annual 2.73% reduction~~
19 ~~the country has been achieving.~~ ~~The current energy consumed per dollar of production~~
20 ~~(GDP) in Indonesia is even lower than the 2030 global target. Furthermore, as~~ ~~However, while~~
21 the energy intensity of GDP tends to decrease over time, ~~a further decrease in national energy~~
22 ~~use per dollar of GDP is expected by 2030.~~ ~~The present study also reveals that Indonesia's~~
23 ~~annual reduction target of final energy intensity of 1% is too low compared to the 2.73%~~
24 ~~reduction the country has achieved.~~ ~~T~~he fact that energy demand ~~of in~~ the transport sector has
25 surpassed that of the industrial sector, and energy use in household and commercial sectors ~~is~~
26 ~~increasing steadily increases over time~~ indicates that a more energy-intensive ~~lifestyle standard~~
27 ~~of living~~ is expected ~~in the near future~~. Therefore, appropriate policy responses will be needed,
28 ~~especially in transportation, residential, and commercial in these~~ sectors. ~~We also found that~~
29 ~~F~~ossil fuel energy subsidies ~~have also~~ hindered progress in renewable energy and energy
30 efficiency. Gradually removing subsidies for fossil fuels is necessary if progress is to be made
31 on these targets.

32

1 **Acknowledgment**

2 W.G. Santika thanks the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Ministry of Finance of the
3 Republic of Indonesia for their financial support under the Indonesian Lecturer Scholarship
4 (BUDI-LPDP).

5 Y. Simsek acknowledges the financial support of the Chilean National Commission for
6 Scientific and Technological Research under scholarship CONICYT-PCHA/ Doctorado
7 Nacional/ 2018–21181469.

8

9 **References**

- 10 [1] UN. (2015). *Historic new sustainable development agenda unanimously adopted by 193 UN*
11 *members*. Available at: [https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2015/09/historic-](https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2015/09/historic-new-sustainable-development-agenda-unanimously-adopted-by-193-un-members/)
12 [new-sustainable-development-agenda-unanimously-adopted-by-193-un-members/](https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2015/09/historic-new-sustainable-development-agenda-unanimously-adopted-by-193-un-members/).
13 Accessed on 29 March 2019.
- 14 [2] D. L. McCollum *et al.*, "Connecting the Sustainable Development Goals by their energy inter-
15 linkages," *Environmental Research Letters*, vol. 13, no. 3, p. 033006, 2018.
- 16 [3] F. F. Nerini *et al.*, "Mapping synergies and trade-offs between energy and the Sustainable
17 Development Goals," *Nature Energy*, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 10-15, 2018.
- 18 [4] W. G. Santika, M. Anisuzzaman, P. A. Bahri, G. Shafiullah, G. V. Rupf, and T. Urmee, "From
19 goals to joules: A quantitative approach of interlinkages between energy and the Sustainable
20 Development Goals," *Energy Research & Social Science*, vol. 50, pp. 201-214, 2019.
- 21 [5] J. Sachs, G. Schmidt-Traub, C. Kroll, G. Lafortune, and G. Fuller, *SDG Index and Dashboards*
22 *Report 2018*. New York: Bertelsmann Stiftung and Sustainable Development Solutions
23 Network (SDSN), 2018.
- 24 [6] World Bank, "Tracking SDG7: The energy progress report 2018," Washington DC: The World
25 Bank,, 2018.
- 26 [7] IEA and the World Bank, "Sustainable Energy for All 2017: Progress Towards Sustainable
27 Energy," Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017. Available at:
28 [http://seforall.org/sites/default/files/eegp17-](http://seforall.org/sites/default/files/eegp17-01_gtf_full_report_final_for_web_posting_0402.pdf)
29 [01_gtf_full_report_final_for_web_posting_0402.pdf](http://seforall.org/sites/default/files/eegp17-01_gtf_full_report_final_for_web_posting_0402.pdf).
- 30 [8] MEMR/DGE, "Laporan Kinerja Tahun 2018 (2018 Performance Report)," Jakarta: Directorate
31 General of Electricity - MEMR, 2019.
- 32 [9] A. D. Afriyadi, "98% orang RI sudah nikmati listrik, Jonan: Alhamdulillah (Some 98% of the
33 population have enjoyed electricity, Jonan says *alhamdulillah*)," ed: Detik.com, 2019.
- 34 [10] BPS. (2017). *Percentage of Household Population by Province and Type of Cooking Fuel,*
35 *2001, 2007-2016*. Available at:
36 [https://www.bps.go.id/statictable/2014/09/10/1364/persentase-rumah-tangga-menurut-](https://www.bps.go.id/statictable/2014/09/10/1364/persentase-rumah-tangga-menurut-provinsi-dan-bahan-bakar-utama-untuk-memasak-tahun-2001-2007-2016.html#)
37 [provinsi-dan-bahan-bakar-utama-untuk-memasak-tahun-2001-2007-2016.html#](https://www.bps.go.id/statictable/2014/09/10/1364/persentase-rumah-tangga-menurut-provinsi-dan-bahan-bakar-utama-untuk-memasak-tahun-2001-2007-2016.html#). Accessed
38 on 18 June 2018.
- 39 [11] C. Mulyana. (2018). *Indonesia bertekad bauran energi baru dan terbarukan 23% (Indonesia*
40 *to increase renewable energy share to 23%)*. Available at:
41 [http://mediaindonesia.com/read/detail/149971-indonesia-bertekad-bauran-energi-baru-](http://mediaindonesia.com/read/detail/149971-indonesia-bertekad-bauran-energi-baru-dan-terbarukan-23)
42 [dan-terbarukan-23](http://mediaindonesia.com/read/detail/149971-indonesia-bertekad-bauran-energi-baru-dan-terbarukan-23). Accessed on 16 March 2019.
- 43 [12] World Bank. (2019). *World Development Indicators: Sustainable Development Goals*.
44 Available at: <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/sdgs/>. Accessed on 20 March 2019.

- 1 [13] ICSU, "Guide to SDG Interactions: from Science to Implementation," Paris: International
2 Council for Science (ICSU), 2017.
- 3 [14] K. R. Smith and A. Pillarisetti, "Household Air Pollution from Solid Cookfuels and Its Effects
4 on Health," in *Injury Prevention and Environmental Health*, C. N. Mock, R. Nugent, O.
5 Kobusingye, and K. R. Smith, Eds. Washington (DC): The International Bank for
6 Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2017.
- 7 [15] B. Hou, H. Liao, and J. Huang, "Household cooking fuel choice and economic poverty:
8 evidence from a nationwide survey in China," *Energy and Buildings*, vol. 166, pp. 319-329,
9 2018.
- 10 [16] IRENA, "Evaluating policies in support of the deployment of renewable power," Abu Dhabi:
11 International Renewable Energy Agency, 2012. Available at:
12 [https://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/Evaluating_policies_in_support
13 of_the_deployment_of_renewable_power.pdf](https://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/Evaluating_policies_in_support_of_the_deployment_of_renewable_power.pdf).
- 14 [17] World Bank. (2019). *Population, total*. Available at:
15 <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ID>. Accessed on 25 March
16 2019.
- 17 [18] World Bank. (2018). *GDP, PPP (current international \$)*. Available at:
18 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?year_high_desc=true. Accessed
19 on 25 March 2019.
- 20 [19] IEA, "Southeast Asia energy outlook 2017," Paris: International Energy Agency, 2017.
21 Available at:
22 [https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2017SpecialReport_Sou
23 theastAsiaEnergyOutlook.pdf](https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2017SpecialReport_SoutheastAsiaEnergyOutlook.pdf).
- 24 [20] MEMR, "Handbook of Energy & Economic Statistics of Indonesia 2018 (Final Edition),"
25 Jakarta: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,, 2019.
- 26 [21] MEMR, "Rencana Umum Energi Nasional (National Energy General Plan)," Jakarta: Ministry
27 of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2017.
- 28 [22] R. Dutu, "Challenges and policies in Indonesia's energy sector," *Energy Policy*, vol. 98, pp.
29 513-519, 2016.
- 30 [23] S. Mujiyanto and G. Tiess, "Secure energy supply in 2025: Indonesia's need for an energy
31 policy strategy," *Energy Policy*, vol. 61, pp. 31-41, 2013.
- 32 [24] N. Gunningham, "Managing the energy trilemma: The case of Indonesia," *Energy policy*, vol.
33 54, pp. 184-193, 2013 2013.
- 34 [25] IRENA, "Evaluating renewable energy policy: A review of criteria and indicators for
35 assessment," Abu Dhabi: International Renewable Energy Agency, 2014. Available at:
36 [https://www.irena.org/-
37 /media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2014/Evaluating_RE_Policy.pdf](https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2014/Evaluating_RE_Policy.pdf).
- 38 [26] IEA, "Deploying renewables: Principles for effective policies," Paris: International Energy
39 Agency, 2008.
- 40 [27] MEMR, "Handbook of Energy & Economic Statistics of Indonesia 2012," Jakarta: Ministry of
41 Energy and Mineral Resources, 2012.
- 42 [28] MEMR, "Statistik EBTKE 2016 (2016 Statistics of new and renewable energy and energy
43 conservation)," Jakarta: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2016.
- 44 [29] MEMR/DGE, "Laporan Kinerja Tahun 2017 (2017 Annual Performance Report)," Jakarta:
45 Directorate General of Electricity - MEMR, 2018.
- 46 [30] MEMR, "Statistics of Electricity 2017," Jakarta: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
47 2018.
- 48 [31] PLN, "PLN's Electricity Power Supply Business Plan 2019-2028," Jakarta: Ministry of Energy
49 and Mineral Resources,, 2019.

- 1 [32] BPS. (2018). *SUSENAS*. Available at:
2 <https://mikrodata.bps.go.id/mikrodata/index.php/catalog/SUSENAS>. Accessed on 19 August
3 2019.
- 4 [33] BPS, "Profil penduduk Indonesia hasil SUPAS 2015 (Indonesia's population profiles based on
5 SUPAS 2015)," Jakarta: BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2016.
- 6 [34] BPS, "2019 Welfare Statistics," Jakarta: BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2019.
- 7 [35] World Bank. (2019). *Access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking (% of population)*.
8 Available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.CFT.ACCS.ZS?locations=ID>. Accessed
9 on 17 June 2019.
- 10 [36] M. Bhatia and N. Angelou, "Beyond connections: energy access redefined," Washington DC:
11 The World Bank, 2015.
- 12 [37] IEA and the World Bank, "Global Tracking Framework," Washington, DC: World Bank, 2014.
- 13 [38] World Bank, "Rwanda Beyond Connections: Energy Access Diagnostic Report Based on the
14 Multi-Tier Framework," Washington DC: The World Bank, 2018.
- 15 [39] World Bank, "Ethiopia Beyond Connections: Energy Access Diagnostic Report Based on the
16 Multi-Tier Framework," Washington DC: The World Bank, 2018.
- 17 [40] World Bank, "Cambodia Beyond Connections: Energy Access Diagnostic Report Based on the
18 Multi-Tier Framework," Washington DC: The World Bank, 2018.
- 19 [41] MEMR, "2008 Statistics of Electricity and Energy," Jakarta: Ministry of Energy and Mineral
20 Resources, 2008.
- 21 [42] BPS, "Trends of selected socio-economic indicators of Indonesia," Jakarta: BPS-Statistics
22 Indonesia, 2018.
- 23 [43] A. C. Nugroho, "Proyek listrik pedesaan: PLN raup dana APBN 2,54 triliun (Rural
24 electrification projects: The PLN granted IDR 2.54 trillion of the state budget)," ed:
25 *Bisnis.com*, 2012.
- 26 [44] ESMAP. (2016). *Indonesia clean cooking: ESMAP supports innovative approaches to build
27 the local cookstoves market, helps increase access*. Available at:
28 <https://www.esmap.org/node/57286>. Accessed on 13 March 2019.
- 29 [45] ASTAE, "Indonesia: Toward universal access to clean cooking. East Asia and Pacific Clean
30 Stove Initiative Series," Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2013. Available at:
31 https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/16068/792790ESWOP1290_ox0377371B00PUBLIC00.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
- 32 [46] K. Thoday, P. Benjamin, M. Gan, and E. Puzzolo, "The Mega Conversion Program from
33 kerosene to LPG in Indonesia: Lessons learned and recommendations for future clean
34 cooking energy expansion," *Energy for Sustainable Development*, vol. 46, pp. 71-81, 2018.
- 35 [47] MEMR, "Handbook of Energy & Economic Statistics of Indonesia 2017," Jakarta: Ministry of
36 Energy and Mineral Resources, 2017.
- 37 [48] R. K. Andadari, P. Mulder, and P. Rietveld, "Energy poverty reduction by fuel switching.
38 Impact evaluation of the LPG conversion program in Indonesia," *Energy Policy*, vol. 66, pp.
39 436-449, 2014.
- 40 [49] G. A. Panggabean. (2017). *Pemerintah bidik bauran energi terbarukan 18% (The government
41 aims 18% renewable energy share)*. Available at:
42 <https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/20171015/44/699308/pemerintah>. Accessed on 16 March
43 2019.
- 44 [50] MEMR, "2013 Statistics of electricity," Jakarta: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
45 2013. Available at: [http://www.djk.esdm.go.id/images/pdf/statistik-
46 ketenagalistrikan/statistik-ketenagalistrikan-2013.pdf](http://www.djk.esdm.go.id/images/pdf/statistik-ketenagalistrikan/statistik-ketenagalistrikan-2013.pdf).
- 47 [51] MEMR, "2014 Statistics of electricity," Jakarta: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
48 2014. Available at: [http://www.djk.esdm.go.id/images/pdf/statistik-
49 ketenagalistrikan/Statistik%20Ketenagalistrikan%202014%20FINAL.pdf](http://www.djk.esdm.go.id/images/pdf/statistik-ketenagalistrikan/Statistik%20Ketenagalistrikan%202014%20FINAL.pdf).
- 50

- 1 [52] GAPKI. (2017). *Perkembangan biodiesel Indonesia dan keberatan Indonesia atas bea masuk*
2 *anti dumping Uni Eropa (Biodiesel development in Indonesia and objections to European*
3 *Union anti dumping measures on biodiesel)*. Available at:
4 [https://gapki.id/news/2519/perkembangan-biodiesel-indonesia-dan-keberatan-indonesia-](https://gapki.id/news/2519/perkembangan-biodiesel-indonesia-dan-keberatan-indonesia-atas-bea-masuk-anti-dumping-uni-eropa)
5 [atas-bea-masuk-anti-dumping-uni-eropa](https://gapki.id/news/2519/perkembangan-biodiesel-indonesia-dan-keberatan-indonesia-atas-bea-masuk-anti-dumping-uni-eropa). Accessed on 16 March 2019.
- 6 [53] GAPKI. (20). *Perkembangan biodiesel di Indonesia dan terbesar di Asia (Indonesia biodiesel*
7 *production biggest in Asia)*. Available at: [https://gapki.id/news/3250/perkembangan-](https://gapki.id/news/3250/perkembangan-biodiesel-di-indonesia-dan-terbesar-di-asia)
8 [biodiesel-di-indonesia-dan-terbesar-di-asia](https://gapki.id/news/3250/perkembangan-biodiesel-di-indonesia-dan-terbesar-di-asia). Accessed on 16 March 2019.
- 9 [54] A. Arvirianty, "Jonan: Energy baru hanya capai 20% di 2025 (Jonan: Renewable energy share
10 will only be 20% by 2025)," ed: CNBC Indonesia, 2018.
- 11 [55] M. Maulidia, P. Dargusch, P. Ashworth, and F. Ardiansyah, "Rethinking renewable energy
12 targets and electricity sector reform in Indonesia: A private sector perspective," *Renewable*
13 *and Sustainable Energy Reviews*, vol. 101, pp. 231-247, 2019.
- 14 [56] MEMR/DGNREEC, "Laporan Kinerja Tahun 2017 (2017 Performance Report)," Jakarta:
15 Directorate General of New and Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation of the Ministry
16 of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2017. Available at:
17 <http://ebtke.esdm.go.id/post/2018/10/08/2030/laporan.kinerja.ditjen.ebtke.tahun.2017>.
- 18 [57] R. S. Ayu, "PLTB Tolo tambah pasokan listrik di Sulawesi (Tolo wind power park increases
19 electricity supply in Sulawesi)," in *Kompas*, ed. Jakarta: Kompas Gramedia, 2019.
- 20 [58] Y. Taqwa. (2019). *Energi angin berpotensi 1,6 GW yang dapat Dikembangkan (Wind energy*
21 *has 1.6 GW potential)*. Accessed on 26 August 2019.
- 22 [59] MEMR/DGNREEC, "Laporan Kinerja Tahun 2018 (2018 Performance Report)," Jakarta:
23 Directorate General of New and Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation of the Ministry
24 of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2018.
- 25 [60] MEMR/DGNREEC, "Laporan Kinerja Tahun 2016 (2016 Performance Report)," Jakarta:
26 Directorate General of New and Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation of the Ministry
27 of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2016.
- 28 [61] MEMR/DGNREEC, "Laporan Kinerja Tahun 2015 (2015 Performance Report)," Jakarta:
29 Directorate General of New and Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation of the Ministry
30 of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2015.
- 31 [62] MEMR/DGNREEC, "Laporan Kinerja Tahun 2014 (2014 Performance Report)," Jakarta:
32 Directorate General of New and Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation of the Ministry
33 of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2014.
- 34 [63] F. Polzin, F. Egli, B. Steffen, and T. S. Schmidt, "How do policies mobilize private finance for
35 renewable energy?—A systematic review with an investor perspective," *Applied energy*, vol.
36 236, pp. 1249-1268, 2019.
- 37 [64] M. Horn and A. Sidharta. (2017). *New Indonesian feed-in tariffs: Will renewables benefit?*
38 Available at:
39 [https://www.dlapiper.com/en/newzealand/insights/publications/2017/03/new-indonesian-](https://www.dlapiper.com/en/newzealand/insights/publications/2017/03/new-indonesian-feed-in-tariffs/#ref4)
40 [feed-in-tariffs/#ref4](https://www.dlapiper.com/en/newzealand/insights/publications/2017/03/new-indonesian-feed-in-tariffs/#ref4). Accessed on 4 April 2019.
- 41 [65] S. F. Kennedy, "Indonesia's energy transition and its contradictions: Emerging geographies of
42 energy and finance," *Energy research & social science*, vol. 41, pp. 230-237, 2018 2018.
- 43 [66] MEMR, "Kebijakan pengembangan energi terbarukan dan konservasi energi (Policy on
44 renewable energy and energy conservation)," Jakarta: Ministry of Energy and Mineral
45 Resources, 2003.
- 46 [67] MEMR, "Indonesia Energy Outlook 2010," Jakarta: The Ministry of Energy and Mineral
47 Resources, 2010.
- 48 [68] MEMR, "Handbook of Energy & Economic Statistics of Indonesia 2018," Jakarta: Ministry of
49 Energy and Mineral Resources, 2018.
- 50 [69] Kontan.co.id. (2013). *Kinerja industri selama tahun 2013 menurun (The industrial sector*
51 *performance slowing down in 2013)* [News]. Available at:

- 1 <https://industri.kontan.co.id/news/kinerja-industri-selama-tahun-2013-menurun>. Accessed
2 on 19 March 2019.
- 3 [70] J. Gruber. (2014). *Welcome to phase three of the global financial crisis*. Available at:
4 [https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesgruber/2014/01/29/welcome-to-phase-three-of-the-](https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesgruber/2014/01/29/welcome-to-phase-three-of-the-global-financial-crisis/#34a17b454a62)
5 [global-financial-crisis/#34a17b454a62](https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesgruber/2014/01/29/welcome-to-phase-three-of-the-global-financial-crisis/#34a17b454a62). Accessed on 19 March 2019.
- 6 [71] W. G. Santika, T. Urmee, M. Anisuzzaman, G. Shafiullah, and P. A. Bahri, "Sustainable energy
7 for all: Impacts of Sustainable Development Goals implementation on household sector
8 energy demand in Indonesia," presented at the The 2018 International Conference on
9 Smart-Green Technology in Electrical and Information Systems, Bali, 25 October 2018, 2018.
- 10 [72] S. Pachauri, A. Scott, L. Scott, and A. Shepherd, "Energy for All: Harnessing the Power of
11 Energy Access for Chronic Poverty Reduction," in "Energy Policy Guide," Chronic Poverty
12 Advisory Network, 2013. Available at:
13 <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/getWSDoc.php?id=1364>.
- 14 [73] S. Oparaocha and S. Dutta, "Gender and energy for sustainable development," *Current*
15 *Opinion in Environmental Sustainability*, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 265-271, 2011.
- 16 [74] S. R. Khandker, H. A. Samad, R. Ali, and D. F. Barnes, "Who Benefits Most from Rural
17 Electrification? Evidence in India," *Energy J.*, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 75-96, 2014.
- 18 [75] W. G. Santika, M. Anisuzzaman, Y. Simsek, P. A. Bahri, G. Shafiullah, and T. Urmee,
19 "Implications of the Sustainable Development Goals on national energy demand: The case of
20 Indonesia," *Energy*, vol. 196, p. 117100, 2020.
- 21 [76] UNDESA. (2019). *SDG Indicator*. Available at:
22 <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/database/>. Accessed on 28 March 2020.
- 23 [77] ADB, *Achieving Universal Electricity Access in Indonesia*. Manila: Asian Development Bank,
24 2016.
- 25 [78] M. Fauzia, "Kementerian ESDM Bagikan Lampu Tenaga Surya Hemat Energi di Pedalaman
26 Papua," ed: Kompas.com, 2018.
- 27 [79] R. H. Prakoswa. (2018). *Mengukur kemajuan program 35 ribu megawatt (Assessing the*
28 *progress of the 35 thousand megawatt program)*. Available at:
29 [https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20180425152605-4-12458/mengukur-kemajuan-](https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20180425152605-4-12458/mengukur-kemajuan-program-35-ribu-megawatt/1)
30 [program-35-ribu-megawatt/1](https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20180425152605-4-12458/mengukur-kemajuan-program-35-ribu-megawatt/1). Accessed on 13 March 2019.
- 31 [80] A. A. Chandra. (2019). *1,2 juta orang miskin dapat sambungan listrik gratis di 2019 (1.2*
32 *million houses of the poor connected to electricity for free in 2019)*. Available at:
33 [https://finance.detik.com/energi/d-4422580/12-juta-orang-miskin-dapat-sambungan-listrik-](https://finance.detik.com/energi/d-4422580/12-juta-orang-miskin-dapat-sambungan-listrik-gratis-di-2019)
34 [gratis-di-2019](https://finance.detik.com/energi/d-4422580/12-juta-orang-miskin-dapat-sambungan-listrik-gratis-di-2019). Accessed on 31 March 2019.
- 35 [81] M. Nafi. (2019). *Pemerintah Gratiskan 1,2 Juta Sambungan Listrik bagi Penduduk Miskin (The*
36 *government provides 1.2 million free electricity connections for the poor)*. Available at:
37 [https://katadata.co.id/berita/2019/02/11/pemerintah-gratiskan-12-juta-sambungan-listrik-](https://katadata.co.id/berita/2019/02/11/pemerintah-gratiskan-12-juta-sambungan-listrik-bagi-penduduk-miskin)
38 [bagi-penduduk-miskin](https://katadata.co.id/berita/2019/02/11/pemerintah-gratiskan-12-juta-sambungan-listrik-bagi-penduduk-miskin). Accessed on 31 March 2019.
- 39 [82] P. E. Wicaksono. (2020). *Target rasio elektrifikasi 99,9 persen di 2019 tak tercapai (The target*
40 *of 99.99% electrification ratio by 2019 is not achieved)*. Available at:
41 [https://www.liputan6.com/bisnis/read/4154216/target-rasio-elektifikasi-999-persen-di-](https://www.liputan6.com/bisnis/read/4154216/target-rasio-elektifikasi-999-persen-di-2019-tak-tercapai)
42 [2019-tak-tercapai](https://www.liputan6.com/bisnis/read/4154216/target-rasio-elektifikasi-999-persen-di-2019-tak-tercapai). Accessed on 12 March 2020.
- 43 [83] Y. Petriella. (2020). *Kementerian ESDM: Rasio elektrifikasi menuju 99,9 persen di 2020*.
44 Available at: [https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/20200210/44/1199187/kementerian-esdm-](https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/20200210/44/1199187/kementerian-esdm-rasio-elektifikasi-memuju-999-persen-di-2020)
45 [rasio-elektifikasi-memuju-999-persen-di-2020](https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/20200210/44/1199187/kementerian-esdm-rasio-elektifikasi-memuju-999-persen-di-2020). Accessed on 12 March 2020.
- 46 [84] World Bank. (2014). *Cleaner cook stoves for a healthier Indonesia*. Available at:
47 [https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/11/03/cleaner-cook-stoves-for-a-](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/11/03/cleaner-cook-stoves-for-a-healthier-indonesia)
48 [healthier-indonesia](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/11/03/cleaner-cook-stoves-for-a-healthier-indonesia). Accessed on 15 August 2019.
- 49 [85] K. R. Smith and K. Dutta, "Cooking with gas," *Energy for Sustainable Development*, vol. 2, no.
50 15, pp. 115-116, 2011.

- 1 [86] R. Bridle *et al.*, "Missing the 23 per cent target: Roadblocks to the development of
2 renewable energy in Indonesia," Winnipeg, Manitoba: The International Institute for
3 Sustainable Development, 2018.
- 4 [87] C. Attwood *et al.*, "Financial supports for coal and renewables in Indonesia," Manitoba:
5 International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2017.
- 6 [88] MoF. (2019). *Subsidi (subsidies)*. Available at: [http://www.data-](http://www.data-apbn.kemenkeu.go.id/Dataset/Details/1037)
7 [apbn.kemenkeu.go.id/Dataset/Details/1037](http://www.data-apbn.kemenkeu.go.id/Dataset/Details/1037). Accessed on 27 August 2019.
- 8 [89] T. Adharsyah. (2019). *Jokowi dan setumpuk risiko di balik rencana naiknya harga BBM*
9 *(Jokowi and risks associated with the plan to rise the prices of fuels)*. Available at:
10 [https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20190702133701-4-82127/jokowi-dan-setumpuk-](https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20190702133701-4-82127/jokowi-dan-setumpuk-risiko-di-balik-rencana-naiknya-harga-bbm)
11 [risiko-di-balik-rencana-naiknya-harga-bbm](https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20190702133701-4-82127/jokowi-dan-setumpuk-risiko-di-balik-rencana-naiknya-harga-bbm). Accessed on 27 August 2019.
- 12 [90] Y. Susmiati, "Prospek produksi bioetanol dari limbah pertanian dan sampah organik (The
13 prospect of bioethanol production from agricultural residues and organic waste)," *Industria:*
14 *Jurnal Teknologi dan Manajemen Agroindustri*, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 67-80, 2018.
- 15 [91] T. L. Chew and S. Bhatia, "Catalytic processes towards the production of biofuels in a palm
16 oil and oil palm biomass-based biorefinery," *Bioresource technology*, vol. 99, no. 17, pp.
17 7911-7922, 2008.
- 18 [92] UNCTAD, "Second generation biofuel markets: State of Play, trade and developing country
19 perspectives," Geneva: The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
20 (UNCTAD), 2016. Available at:
21 https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditcted2015d8_en.pdf.
- 22 [93] J. C. Kurnia, S. V. Jangam, S. Akhtar, A. P. Sasmito, and A. S. Mujumdar, "Advances in biofuel
23 production from oil palm and palm oil processing wastes: a review," *Biofuel Research*
24 *Journal*, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 332-346, 2016.
- 25 [94] H. Eggert, M. Greaker, and E. Potter, "Policies for second generation biofuels: current status
26 and future challenges," Oslo: Statistics Norway 1892-7513, 2011.
- 27 [95] I. U. Aldin. (2018). *Pembangkit Kincir Angin Sidrap Tahap 2 Siap Beroperasi 2019 (Sidrap*
28 *wind power plant 2 ready in 2019)*. Available at:
29 [https://katadata.co.id/berita/2018/07/03/pembangkit-kincir-angin-sidrap-tahap-2-siap-](https://katadata.co.id/berita/2018/07/03/pembangkit-kincir-angin-sidrap-tahap-2-siap-beroperasi-2019)
30 [beroperasi-2019](https://katadata.co.id/berita/2018/07/03/pembangkit-kincir-angin-sidrap-tahap-2-siap-beroperasi-2019). Accessed on 7 April 2019.
- 31 [96] M. Agustinus. (2018). *PLN: Rumah di Jakarta Jangan Pasang PLTS Atap, Listrik Sudah*
32 *Berlebih (PLN: Do not install rooftop solar panel in Jakarta, which has surplus power)*
33 Available at: [https://kumparan.com/@kumparanbisnis/pln-rumah-di-jakarta-jangan-pasang-](https://kumparan.com/@kumparanbisnis/pln-rumah-di-jakarta-jangan-pasang-plts-atap-listrik-sudah-berlebih-1543317995047086339)
34 [plts-atap-listrik-sudah-berlebih-1543317995047086339](https://kumparan.com/@kumparanbisnis/pln-rumah-di-jakarta-jangan-pasang-plts-atap-listrik-sudah-berlebih-1543317995047086339). Accessed on 7 April 2019.
- 35 [97] S. Suehiro, "Energy intensity of GDP as an index of energy conservation: Problems in
36 international comparison of energy intensity of GDP and estimate using sector-based
37 approach," Tokyo: Institute of Energy Economics Japan, 2007.
- 38 [98] V. Modi, S. McDade, D. Lallement, and J. Saghir, "Energy services for the Millennium
39 Development goals.," New York: Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme, United
40 Nations Development Programme, UN Millennium Project, and World Bank, 2005.
- 41 [99] IEA, "Energy Efficiency 2017: Indonesia focus (Bahasa Indonesia)," in "Market Report Series,"
42 Paris: International Energy Agency, 2017.
- 43 [100] IEA. (2019). *Energy efficiency in Indonesia*. Available at:
44 <https://www.iea.org/topics/energyefficiency/e4/indonesia/>. Accessed on 8 April 2019.
- 45 [101] P. Zhang, X. Shi, Y. Sun, J. Cui, and S. Shao, "Have China's provinces achieved their targets of
46 energy intensity reduction? Reassessment based on nighttime lighting data," *Energy policy*,
47 vol. 128, pp. 276-283, 2019.
- 48 [102] J. L. Wallace, "Juking the stats? Authoritarian information problems in China," *British Journal*
49 *of Political Science*, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 11-29, 2016.

- 1 [103] A. Kerner, M. Jerven, and A. Beatty, "Are Development Statistics Manipulable? Simons
2 Papers in Security and Development (No. 37/2014)," Vancouver: School for International
3 Studies, Simon Fraser University, 2014.
- 4 [104] IEA and World Bank, "Sustainable Energy for All 2015—Progress Toward Sustainable
5 Energy," Washington DC: World Bank, 2015.
- 6 [105] IEA. (2019). *Sustainable Development Goal 7: Ensure access to affordable, reliable,
7 sustainable and modern energy for all*. Available at: <https://www.iea.org/sdg/>. Accessed on
8 19 August 2019.
- 9 [106] World Bank. (2019). *Access to electricity (% of population)*. Available at:
10 <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS?locations=ID>. Accessed on 19 August
11 2019.
- 12 [107] J. Waage *et al.*, "Governing the UN Sustainable Development Goals: interactions,
13 infrastructures, and institutions," *The Lancet Global Health*, vol. 3, no. 5, pp. e251-e252,
14 2015 2015.
- 15 [108] BPS, "2015 Welfare Statistics," Jakarta: BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2015.
- 16 [109] BPS, "2016 Welfare Statistics," Jakarta: BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2016.
- 17 [110] BPS, "2017 Welfare Statistics," Jakarta: BPS-Statistics Indonesia,, 2017.

18

Response to the Reviewer (3rd Revision)

We thank the editor and the reviewer for the valuable comments and suggestions. All comments and suggestions have been carefully considered, and revisions and improvements have been made accordingly.

Reviewer comments	Responses
Introduction – Page 2 Line 7 [Avoid repetition] This 2030 global agenda for sustainable development is expected to provide a framework to integrate social, economic, and environmental goals of sustainable development .	Thank you for your suggestion. The sentence has been modified as suggested.
Introduction – P2 L13 [Add date – is 2018 correct?] The SDGs index has ranked the current status and progress of 156 countries, putting Sweden, Denmark, and Finland as countries with the highest scores in 2018 .	The sentence has been modified as suggested.
P4 L1 Over 35% of the total energy demand in the Southeast Asian countries was from Indonesia [19].	The sentence has been modified as suggested.
P5 L3 ocean (18 GW); it unfortunately in 2015, less than 2% of these resources were utilized [21].	The sentence has been modified as suggested.
P6 L1 <i>Table 2. SDG7 indicators and reasons for <u>selection</u></i>	We have revised the sentence as suggested.
P6 L3 [Include full text as first time included in main text] The <u>Policy Effectiveness Index</u> (PEI)	We have revised the sentence as suggested.
P6 L10 [This is first mention of RUEN – also check later mentions of RUEN are consistent] In the case of Indonesia, the 2025 <u>National Energy Plan</u> RUEN targets <u>(RUEN)</u> were chosen.	We have revised the sentence as suggested.
Pg7 L4 The ese data are publicly accessible.	The sentence has been modified as suggested.

<p>Pg7 L15</p> <p>Table 4 shows that five regulations solely address the electricity access (EA) target, while 5, 29, and 20 others address only clean cooking fuels and technology access (CC), renewable energy (RE), and energy efficiency (EE) targets, respectively.</p>	<p>The sentence has been modified as suggested.</p>
<p>Pg8 L4</p> <p>The effectiveness of energy policy in supporting the progress of<u>towards</u> SDG7</p>	<p>The sentence has been modified as suggested.</p>
<p>Pg8 L8</p> <p><u>The</u> Indonesian electricity access target is more ambitious than the global electricity access target.</p>	<p>The sentence has been modified as suggested.</p>
<p>Pg9 L5-16 [Suggest re-arranging sentences as current flow is a little confusing]</p> <p>However e<u>Electricity access data segregated under the multi-tier framework, however, are not readily available for developing countries, and, to the authors' knowledge, only Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Cambodia are ready with- have</u> the data [6, 38-40]. In the meantime, we follow the consensus that takes into consideration all even households with Tier 1 access to electricity, <u>from Tier 1 to Tier 5 are taken into consideration.</u></p> <p>Therefore, even a household with a simple stand-alone PV system (Tier 1) is taken into consideration and classified as having<u>with</u> access to electricity. This narrow interpretation of energy access does not fully reflect the intent of SDG Target 7.1 to ensure universal access to reliable and affordable energy. Electricity access data segregated 12 under the multi-tier framework, however, are not readily available for developing countries, 13 and, to the authors' knowledge, only Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Cambodia are ready with the data 14 [6, 38-40]. In the meantime, we follow the consensus that takes into consideration all</p>	<p>The sentences have been modified as suggested. Thank you for the suggestion.</p>

<p>even 15 households with Tier 1 access to electricity, from Tier 1 to Tier 5.</p>	
<p>Pg9 L27 The challenging nature of providing infrastructure in an the archipelagic country, however, means that more than 2,000 rural villages are estimated to be left without electricity by the end of 2019_ under a the business as usual scenario [29].</p>	<p>The sentence has been modified as suggested.</p>
<p>P11 L5 [This sentence needs changing as currently sounds contradictory to analysis – see P9 L27 above]. Figure 2 indicates that, if the current progress is maintained, 100% electricity access is achievable can be achieved by 2020.</p>	<p>The prediction that universal electricity access in unattainable by 2030 (on P9 L27 above) is suggested by a different study and based on a BAU scenario instead of the current policy scenario suggested by the present study. The sentence has been modified as follow: <i>“Error! Reference source not found. indicates that, if the current progress is maintained under the current policy scenario, 100% electricity access is achievable can be achieved by 2020.”</i></p>
<p>P15 L2 [Use of “or” gives unintended meaning] It suggests that households relying on solid biomass for cooking could be much higher than the estimation, with the fuel stacking (using more than one fuel side-by-side) was likely to happen [46, 48].</p>	<p>The sentence has been modified as suggested.</p>
<p>Pg14 L6 The protocol bound its states parties to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and Indonesia passed the protocol as a national law in 2004</p>	<p>The sentence has been modified as suggested.</p>
<p>Pg16 L9 Geothermal and bioenergy power plant development targets were missed by 8.5% and 19.7% in 2017, respectively.</p>	<p>The sentence has been modified as suggested.</p>

<p>Pg17 L14</p> <p>Finally, biofuel production fluctuated, but corrective policy responses, including the mandatory biodiesel blending and oil palm plantation funding, created considerable progress towards reaching the target.</p>	<p>The sentence has been modified as suggested.</p>
<p>Pg19 L29 [Can you state mechanism used? Price controls?]</p> <p>MEMR 31/2005 and PR 55/2005 regulations restricted growth in energy consumption growth in the transport, residential, and commercial sectors.</p>	<p>Yes, PR 55 /2005 significantly increased oil prices. We have modified the sentence:</p> <p><i>"MEMR 31/2005 and, in particular, PR 55/2005 on oil price controls, restricted growth in the energy consumption in the transport, residential, and commercial sectors."</i></p>
<p>Pg21 L5</p> <p>substantial drop in industrial sector energy consumption in 2013-2014 is likely due to a global economic crisis hitting the emerging markets, including Indonesia [69, 70].</p>	<p>Corrections have been made. Thank you.</p>
<p>Pg21 L15</p> <p>As a result, growth in transportation sector energy consumption slowed down in 2013 and 2014 (as a consequence of MEMR 18/2013) and became negative in 2015 (associated with MEMR 34/2014 and 39/2014).</p>	<p>The sentence has been modified as suggested.</p>
<p>Pg21 L20</p> <p>The SDG energy efficiency target of the SDGs is Target 7.3, which is to double the annual global rate of energy efficiency improvement.</p>	<p>The sentence has been modified as suggested.</p>
<p>Pg21 L20 – Pg22 L8 [Many numbers are quoted and a slight re-organisation can improve clarity and emphasis]</p> <p>Assuming the reduction increases linearly from 2.1% in 2015 to 2.6% by 2030 [7], the global energy intensity will decline from 5.131 MJ/2011 PPP \$ of GDP in 2015 [12] to 3.58 MJ/2011 PPP \$ of GDP by 2030 [4].</p>	<p>Thank you for the constructive feedback. We have revised the paragraph as suggested.</p>

<p>Interestingly, the energy intensity in Indonesia was 3.53 MJ/2011 PPP \$ of GDP in 2015, which is lower than the 2030 SDGs target. Indonesia achieved its SDG 7 target in 2015 without any SDGs interventions. The World Bank data [12] also shows that the Indonesian energy intensity declined from 5.24 to 3.53 MJ/2011 PPP \$ of GDP during the 2001-2015 period. The annual reduction in energy intensity, therefore, became 2.79% during the period, surpassing the 2.6% reduction target of the SDGs [71]. On the other hand, the national target is only a 1% reduction in final energy intensity of GDP. This is supported by our calculation which shows that final energy intensities in 2001 and 2015 were 3.67 and 2.49 MJ/2011 PPP \$ of GDP, respectively, which gave a slightly lower reduction in final energy intensity of 2.73% during the period. Lower energy intensity of GDP is associated with higher energy efficiency. The higher the percentage of the annual energy intensity reduction, the lower the energy intensity. Indonesia has however sets a lower reduction target of 1% in final energy intensity than what has been achieved and- It is suggested it should revise it to, at least, maintain the current achievement of 2.73%.</p>	
<p>Pg23 L2 Government Regulation 79/2014 on national energy policy sets national energy targets for Indonesia (see Table 10).</p>	<p>The sentence has been modified as suggested.</p>
<p>Pg28 L4 [Simplify] The next two targets show that the primary energy supply in 2025 is expected to increase to more than twice its 2015 supply [21]. While these targets and those for power generation and electricity consumption</p>	<p>Thank you for the constructive feedback. We have revised the paragraph as suggested.</p>

<p>support are in synergy with the energy access target of SDG7 as providing electricity and clean energy for cooking for 3 everyone requires more energy. However, a trade-off may exist between these targets and the energy efficiency target. The reduction target of the energy intensity of GDP may not be 5 achieved if the increase in energy consumption is too high. Power generation and electricity 6 consumption targets are also in synergy with electricity access target, and a similar trade-off 7 exists between them and energy intensity of GDP for the same reasons.</p>	
<p>Pg23 L12 – L17 Indonesia expects an ambitious reduction in oil share from 46% of the total primary energy mix in 2015 to less than 25% in 2025, and at the same time to increases its coal share, to improve its energy security. Indonesia is an oil net importer country with vast coal resources. The oil share reduction target provides an opportunity to increase renewable energy use, which is undermined by while a growing coal consumption target creates the opposite effect. Finally, the natural gas share remains the same.</p>	<p>The sentences have been modified as suggested. Thank you.</p>
<p>Pg 24 L9 – Pg25 L23 [The discussion needs to be logical and not introduce new data that doesn't support points being made] The analysis shows that several policies have contributed to the expansion of electricity access since 2001. The inclusion of rural electrification programs in the DAK has contributed to the increase in access to electricity and put them in the spotlight since 2011. As a result, access to 8 electricity has increased significantly. Although our trendlines indicated this could continue. However, experience from other countries shows that supplying electricity to the</p>	<p>Thank you for the constructive feedback. We have revised the paragraph as suggested.</p>

last 10% to 15 % of the population is the hardest, the slowest, and the costliest since most of these houses are more remotely located [77]. ~~The ADB even predict that universal electricity access will not be achieved in Indonesia by 2020 with the current level of funding.~~

One of the latest regulations in response to the challenge in rural electrification is Presidential Regulation 47/2017, requiring the provision of free solar panel systems with LED lamps (locally known as LTSHE) to people in the most remote areas of Indonesia. During 2017-2019, some 400 thousand LTSHEs were to be distributed to the most remote locations for free [78]. ~~A more ambitious fast track program of 35-GW electricity infrastructure initiated in May 2015 together with the FTP 1 and FTP 2 also contributed significantly to electricity access development. Between 2015 to February 2018, about 7.9 GW more power was added to the system, mostly from the delayed commencement of FTP 1 1, FTP 2, and regular projects 2 (6,425 MW) [79]. The rest were from the 35-GW program.~~

~~The electrification ratio reached 98.3% in 2018. The PLN contributed about 97% of total connections, followed by 2.52% off-grid connections and 0.38% LTSHEs [9]. However, in 2019 there are still 1.2 million houses (1.7%) without access to electricity; however, MEMR's proposal to provide free electricity connection to 1.2 million houses requires IDR 6 trillion (USD 413.79 million) of the state budget [80]. It will be enough to cover current connection costs with additional sources of finance to come from the regular MEMR budget and corporate social~~

<p>responsibility programs of state-owned enterprises [81]. However, the latest announcement from the MEMR in early 2020 reveals that the electrification ratio only slightly increased to 98.89% in 2019 [82]. Since 2019 rRural electrification programs are no longer under DAK since 2019, which indicates that the programs are not a national priority anymore. The Ministry now estimates that almost IDR 11 trillion (USD 758.62 million) will be needed to provide electricity for the remaining households and that the PLN's budget is only IDR 2.1 trillion [83]. The ADB predict with the current level of funding that universal electricity access will not be achieved in Indonesia by 2020. It is therefore suggested unlikely that universal access to electricity will be achieved by the end of 2020, and a revised target may need to be set to 2025.</p>	
<p>Pg25 L25 In By contrast to electricity access, significantly less attention has been paid to clean cooking fuels and technology access.</p>	<p>We have revised the sentence as suggested.</p>
<p>Pg25 L27-29 There is not a specific policy to ensure zero traditional use of solid biomass for cooking, which is the dominant contributor to the low clean cooking access after the kerosene to LPG conversion program successfully reduced kerosene use.</p>	<p>We have revised the sentence as suggested.</p>
<p>Pg26 L4-8 Our suggestion is A solution could be to promote the use of improved cookstoves (ICS) for those using solid biomass for cooking by including the ICS program into the national energy plan (RUEN). It can be done in a similar way to the government provision of ding free LPG starter kits (under PR 32 104/2007) or free stand-</p>	<p>We have revised the sentences as suggested.</p>

alone solar systems (under PR 47/2017) to rural households.	
Pg26 L18 However, the programs were removed from the 2019 DAK list, indicating that the government lacks the commitment to achieving universal access to clean cooking.	We have revised the sentence as suggested.
Pg27 L20 In the <u>case of</u> wind energy case , it is argued that low wind speeds in the country make it unattractive for investment, but <u>such barriers do not exist this is not the case</u> for solar energy as solar energy potential is high at around <u>15-207.9 GW [21]</u> .	We have revised the sentence as suggested.
Pg27 L26 Secondly, the coal industry develops a very has strong <u>ties</u> with the government, which, in turn, offers the industry fiscal supports (tax exemption, loan guarantees, and price supports) that keep the BPP relatively low.	We have revised the sentence as suggested.
Pg29 L22 High social acceptance can be expected from the mandatory bioethanol program, as has happened in the case of t The mandatory biodiesel blending program <u>resulted in high social acceptance and so similar would be expected from a mandatory bioethanol program.</u>	We have revised the sentence as suggested.
Pg30 L14 While t The regulation promotes rooftop solar energy production and use but, at the same time, reflects PLN's had indicated an unwillingness to participate in the project as it will cause significant loss of revenue from reduced consumers' electricity bills. A PLN's regional business director enee said that rooftop solar panels should not be installed in Jakarta, where electricity is	We have revised the sentences as suggested.

<p>easily accessed, only be installed but outside Java, where electricity is scarce [96].</p>	
<p>Pg 30 L23 Lessons learned from the mandatory biodiesel blend could also be applied to solar energy.</p>	<p>We have revised the sentence as suggested.</p>
<p>Pg30 L28 [Suggest use standard of living and not interchange with lifestyle. Also make the point at the start of the paragraph that quality of life may be hidden] GDP represents a country's total value of production and income, and energy is consumed as an input factor for production as well as to support the average lifestyle (standard of living) [97]. Therefore, while the energy intensity of GDP represents can indicate the energy efficiency of both the production system and standard of living it may mask a lower quality of life lifestyle. Advanced countries usually have efficient production systems and an energy intensive standard of living lifestyle. In contrast, developing nations will usually have inefficient production systems and a non-energy-intensive standard of living. Therefore, it would appear that low energy intensity in Indonesia is unlikely to may not be the result of efficient production systems; it may and instead be due to a lower standard of living. Using 2004 data, Suehiro [97] found that the industrial sector energy intensity in Indonesia was about 2.5 times less efficient than that of Japan, while the energy intensity of the non-industrial sector (lifestyle) in Indonesia is was significantly lower.</p>	<p>We appreciate reviewer's feedback and modify the paragraph accordingly.</p>
<p>Pg31 L12 Electricity access under this category is reliable enough to power daily household appliances, including general lighting, phone charging, fan, television, food</p>	<p>We have revised the sentence as suggested.</p>

<p>processoring, washing machine, and refrigerator (without air conditioning).</p>	
<p>Pg31 L32 In the transportation sector, fuel prices are more dominant than others in <u>particularly appear to</u> shaping consumption as a reduction in energy consumption is noted every time energy prices increase. Finally, energy consumption. While in residential and commercial sectors <u>energy consumption</u> is associated with fuel choices, in which cooking with LPG or natural gas is more efficient than cooking with kerosene.</p>	<p>We have revised the sentences as suggested.</p>
<p>Pg32 L9 This claim is supported by the IEA findings, in which the residential sector energy consumption in Indonesia increased 35% from 2000 to 2015 caused by increases in population, house ownership and spatial dimenisons- <u>house floor areas</u>, and average per capita device and equipment ownership [99].</p>	<p>We have revised the sentence as suggested.</p>
<p>Pg32 L16 Consequently, in order to meet the required targets, more attention needs to be given to <u>the</u> transport, residential, and commercial sectors. Efficiency improvement efforts in these sectors may include: transportation infrastructure improvementss to reduce traffic congestion and increase access to public transport; vehicle fuel conversion from oil to gas and electricity; increasing fuel efficiency standardss for large and inefficient vehicles; the application of building energy efficiency standardss, and promoting the adoption of more efficient LED lamps, air conditioners, and other appliances.</p>	<p>We have revised the paragraph as suggested.</p>

Pg32 L25 -pg33 L15 [Clarify points and add conclusion-

in both cases what does the divergence mean for your analysis?]

Some studies show that, ~~in many countries,~~ official data ~~may be~~ intentionally manipulated ~~for particular reasons, including GDP and energy intensity data manipulation~~ for political gains [101, 102], and ~~understating income per capita data~~ to generate more aid [103]. ~~It does not mean that Indonesia also exaggerates its achievement.~~ A comparison of electrification ratio data between ~~those of~~ the World Bank and the Indonesian government show a divergence that has narrowed in the most recent figures that Indonesia does not overestimate its achievement (Figure 11). ~~Moreover,~~ Indonesia regularly conducts an intercensal population survey (every ten years between the census) and annual national socio-economic surveys ~~(each year)~~, which collect data on household electricity and cooking fuel use (see for example [32, 33]). ~~These data are used to validate government estimates. The International Energy Agency also adopted the World Bank estimates for electrification ratio and clean cooking fuel use in Indonesia [7, 104], but in a recent report, its estimates have been very close to those of the Indonesian government [105].~~

This data ~~In contrast, a comparison using access to clean fuels and technology for cooking~~ reveals that estimates of the Indonesian government are significantly higher than those of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) and the World Bank (see Table 11). ~~The Indonesian data of clean energy access for cooking 1 are also sourced from the same national socio-economic survey.~~

Thank you for the comments. The

paragraph has been modified, and a conclusion sentence has been added on P33 L14:

"Since the government energy data are based on censuses and surveys, we are convinced that they are reliable."

Formatted: Not Highlight

<p>Pg34 L15</p> <p>The current policy, which only focuses on promotion of gas-use for cooking, is unlikely to be <u>will be less</u> effective since household choice for cooking fuels is influenced by affordability, availability, accessibility, and acceptability of the fuels.</p>	<p>We have modified the sentence as suggested. Thank you.</p>
<p>Pg34 L19 [No need to repeat DAK point]</p> <p>Policy on ICS use may not fully address the SDG target of ensuring access to clean cooking fuels and technology for everyone, but in the short and medium terms, it ensures more efficient use of biomass and improves residential indoor air quality. The ICS program can be executed in a similar way <u>line with the distribution of</u> free LPG starter kits and free stand alone solar systems are distributed to rural households. Furthermore, rural energy programs, which address rural electrification and clean cooking, should be reinstated and funded under DAK. As those programs are no longer under the DAK list, they are no longer nationally prioritised programs, and the universal access to clean energy for cooking target will be more difficult to achieve.</p>	<p>We have modified the sentences as suggested. Thank you.</p>
<p>Pg34 L32</p> <p>A similar mandatory blending policy is not enforced for bioethanol. On the other hand, Rregulatory uncertainties and frequent policy changes discourage investment in renewable electricity generation. The tariff policies change from feed-in tariffs, to reverse auction mechanisms, to fixed tariffs based on average generation costs (BPP).</p>	<p>We have modified the sentences as suggested. Thank you.</p>
<p>Pg35 L10-15</p> <p>For instance, Eenergy consumption in the transportation sector is shaped largely by fuel pricing policy. More <u>more</u> efficient energy use in household and</p>	<p>The sentences have been modified. Thank you.</p>

<p>commercial sectors is associated with the cooking fuel conversion policy, while. On the other hand, decreases in industrial and other sectors' energy demand are associated with low economic growths.</p>	
<p>Pg35 L15-31 [Present reduction in industrial energy use with rise in other sectors]</p> <p>The energy intensity of GDP, as a proxy for energy efficiency, is currently lower in Indonesia than the 2030 global target, indicating modest energy consumption per dollar of production (GDP). The present study also reveals that Indonesia's annual 1% reduction target of final energy intensity of 1% is too low compared to is lower than the annual 2.73% reduction the country has been achieving. The current energy consumed per dollar of production (GDP) in Indonesia is even lower than the 2030 global target. Furthermore, as However while the energy intensity of GDP tends to decrease over time, a further decrease in national energy use per dollar of GDP is expected by 2030. The present study also reveals that Indonesia's annual reduction target of final energy intensity of 1% is too low compared to the 2.73% reduction the country has achieved. The fact that energy demand in the transport sector has surpassed that of the industrial sector and energy use in household and commercial sectors is increasing steadily increases over time indicates that a more energy-intensive standard of living lifestyle is expected in the near future. Therefore, appropriate policy responses will be needed, especially in transportation, residential, and commercial in these sectors. We also found that Fossil fuel energy subsidies have also hindered progress in renewable energy and energy efficiency. Gradually removing energy subsidies for fossil fuels is necessary if progress is to be made on these targets.</p>	<p>Thank you for the feedback. The paragraph has been modified as suggested.</p>

Highlights

- The electrification program as a national priority improves electricity access
- The clean cooking energy target may be missed as policy focuses on gas use only
- Regulatory uncertainties discourage investment in renewable electricity
- Energy use is shaped by policies not primarily intended for energy conservation

1 **An assessment of energy policy impacts on achieving Sustainable Development Goal 7**
 2 **in Indonesia**

3 Wayan G. Santika^{a,b,*}, Tania Urmee^a, Yeliz Simsek^{a,c,d}, Parisa A. Bahri^a, M. Anisuzzaman^a

4
 5 ^a *Discipline of Engineering and Energy, Murdoch University, 90 South Street, Murdoch, Western Australia*
 6 *6150, Australia*

7 ^b *Department of Mechanical Engineering, Politeknik Negeri Bali, Bali, Indonesia*

8 ^c *Department of Mechanical and Metallurgical Engineering, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Vicuña*
 9 *Mackenna 4860, Macul, Santiago, Chile*

10 ^d *UC Energy Research Center, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Vicuña Mackenna 4860, Macul,*
 11 *Santiago, Chile*

12 ^{*} *Corresponding author. Email address: wayan.santika@murdoch.edu.au*

13

14 **Abstract**

15 As countries start to implement the Sustainable Development Goals in their national
 16 development agendas, reviews of the current policy environment are necessary to ensure that
 17 the goals are achievable by 2030. The present study assesses the effectiveness of energy policy
 18 in Indonesia in supporting progress toward universal energy access, a substantial increase in
 19 renewable energy deployment, and improvement in energy efficiency. Laws and regulations
 20 related to energy were reviewed, and their contribution to achieving the energy targets of the
 21 Sustainable Development Goals in Indonesia was evaluated in terms of policy effectiveness.
 22 Results show that providing electricity for the remaining 1.1 million households living in the
 23 outermost and least developed regions of the archipelago is very challenging. However,
 24 Indonesia is still on track to achieve 100% residential electrification by 2030 as long as enough
 25 budget is allocated annually. Indonesia may not be able to provide access to clean cooking
 26 fuels and technology for everyone by 2030. The current policy focusing mostly on gas for
 27 cooking will be less effective in reaching the remaining households that cook with solid
 28 biomass and usually live in poverty. Similarly, the current policy scenario is not sufficient to
 29 allow enough progress to achieve the renewable energy target. Finally, the assessment of
 30 energy efficiency policy suggests that sectoral energy use is shaped by variables and regulation
 31 not primarily intended to improve energy efficiency.

32 **Keywords:** Sustainable Development Goals; energy policy effectiveness; energy access;
 33 renewable energy; energy efficiency; Indonesia.

1 **1. Introduction**

2 The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were ratified in September 2015. A total of 193
3 countries agreed to strive to achieve 169 ambitious targets associated with the 17 SDGs by
4 2030, including to eradicate poverty and hunger, provide access to basic services, promote
5 prosperity, and protect the environment [1]. This 2030 global agenda for sustainable
6 development is expected to provide a framework to integrate social, economic, and
7 environmental goals. The vital role of energy as a key enabling factor in achieving the SDGs
8 was acknowledged [2-4]. It was therefore included as the seventh SDG (SDG7): to ensure
9 access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all. SDG7 has three main
10 targets for 2030: universal energy access, an increase in the share of renewable energy (RE) in
11 the world's energy consumption, and improved energy efficiency.

12 The SDGs index has ranked the current status and progress of 156 countries, putting Sweden,
13 Denmark, and Finland as countries with the highest scores in 2018. None of them, however,
14 are on track to meet all of the SDGs [5]. On a global scale, the 2018 monitoring report on SDG7
15 reveals that the goal will not be met by 2030 if current trends continue. For instance, under the
16 current trajectory, only 92% and 73% of the global population will enjoy electricity and clean
17 cooking fuels, respectively, by 2030 [6]. It means that 8% of the global population will remain
18 without electricity, and more than a quarter of the population will still cook with highly
19 polluting fuels. Additionally, the RE share of final energy consumption is anticipated to be
20 21%, which could not be considered a substantial increase from the baseline value of 18.3%
21 [7]. Finally, the annual rate of decline of energy intensity (measuring energy efficiency) is
22 anticipated to be 2.4% by 2030, which will miss the target of 2.6% [6].

23 Likewise, at this stage, Indonesia seems unlikely to achieve the SDGs despite the government's
24 efforts to incorporate most of the SDGs into its national development agendas. It was ranked
25 99th among 156 countries in 2018, and its performance was excellent only on SDG1 (no
26 poverty) and SDG13 (climate action), scoring 96.3 and 89.1 (out of 100), respectively [5]. The
27 poorest progress was in SDG9 (industry, innovation, and infrastructure) and SDG10 (reduced
28 inequality), scoring 23.5 and 34.9, respectively. The current achievement of SDG7 in Indonesia
29 was moderate, considering its high electrification ratio coupled with low clean cooking energy
30 access and low emission efficiency of the electricity generation sector [5]. Indonesia's
31 electrification ratio was 98.3% in 2018 [8, 9], and the government claimed that the population
32 without access to clean cooking fuels was 26.8% in 2016 [10]. The RE share was only 8.43%

1 in 2016 [11], which is far below the 23% target by 2025. However, energy intensity in
2 Indonesia was 3.525 MJ/\$2011 PPP GDP in 2015, which was much better than the world
3 average energy intensity of 5.132 MJ/\$2011 PPP GDP [12]. In comparison with its
4 neighbouring countries, Indonesian energy intensity is lower than that of Vietnam, Thailand,
5 and Malaysia (5.945, 5.412, and 4.682 MJ/\$2011 PPP GDP, respectively), but higher than that
6 of the Philippines and Singapore (3.122 and 2.395 MJ/\$2011 PPP GDP, respectively).

7 Since SDG targets are interlinked [2-4, 13], it is hard to imagine that Indonesia will soon
8 achieve the goal of health (SDG3), while more than 25% of its population cook with polluting
9 solid fuels. Smoke from solid fuel combustion contributes to indoor air pollution, which is a
10 major health risk factor [14]. Additionally, a Chinese study shows a shift from solid fuels to
11 clean fuels is determined by assets and income growth (SDG8) [15], which indicates that the
12 segment of Indonesia's population still cooking with solid fuels may live below the poverty
13 line (SDG1). Furthermore, ambitious upscaling of RE and a further improvement in energy
14 efficiency are needed to ensure that the country is on track with the 2°C pathway (SDG13) [2].

15 Energy policy is formulated to attain certain goals. Furthermore, given that support policies are
16 usually associated with high financial costs, the evaluation of energy policy performance is
17 necessary to identify potential inefficiencies and ineffectiveness in its application [16]. Clearly,
18 effective energy policy is essential to meet the SDG7 targets.


19 This study examines the status of the SDG7 targets in Indonesia, analyses their interactions
20 with energy policy, and evaluates the effectiveness of the policy in meeting the targets. It seeks
21 to answer the following questions: (i) which energy policy is linked to SDG7, (ii) how this
22 energy policy interacts with SDG7, and (iii) how effective it is in achieving the SDG7 targets.
23 This analysis offers a careful screening of energy-related laws and regulations in Indonesia and
24 evaluates their effectiveness in supporting the achievement of the three targets of SDG7. This
25 analysis and the methodology used is expected to serve as an example and can be applied to
26 other countries.

27 ***Overview of the Indonesian energy sector***

28 Indonesia is the world's largest archipelagic country and is located in Southeast Asia between
29 the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This tropical country was home to almost 264 million
30 inhabitants in 2018 [17], making it the 4th most populous country in the world. With a GDP of
31 3,243 billion \$ (PPP) in 2017, it was ranked the 8th largest economy under the PPP valuation
32 [18].

1 Over 35% of the total energy demand in Southeast Asian countries was from Indonesia [19].
 2 The total final energy consumption (TFEC) was 5.5 billion GJ in 2018, of which the
 3 transportation and industrial sectors used 46.6% and 29.9% shares of the TFEC, respectively
 4 [20]. Figure 1 shows that oil share in the total commercial primary energy supply was the
 5 highest (38.81%), followed by coal (32.97%), and natural gas (19.67%), leaving only an 8.55%
 6 share for renewables [20].

7



8

9 *Figure 1. Indonesia's primary energy mix in 2018. Traditional use of biomass is excluded. Other renewables*
 10 *include biomass, biogas, and waste generated power plants. Data source: [20]*

11

12 *Table 1. Fossil energy potential in Indonesia (2018). Data source: [20].*

Fuels	Proven reserves ^a	Production	Years left
Coal ^b	39.9 billion tons	557.77 million tons	72
Oil	3.15 billion barrels	281.83 million barrels	11
Natural gas	96.06 trillion SCF	2.9968 trillion SCF	32

13 ^a According to the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, proven reserves are those scientifically estimated
 14 with a high degree of certainty and ready to be commercially extracted [21].

15 ^b Coal reserve includes a mix of proven and inferred reserves

16 Indonesia is blessed with energy resources [22-24]. However, if the current trends of
 17 production and consumption continue and no new reserves are found and exploited, Indonesia
 18 will run out of coal, oil, and natural gas in 72, 11, and 32 years, respectively (see Table 1). The

1 total RE potential in Indonesia is about 443.2 GW, which is sourced from solar (207.9 GW),
2 hydropower (94.5 GW), wind (60.6 GW), bioenergy (32.65 GW), geothermal (29.5 GW), and
3 ocean (18 GW); unfortunately in 2015, less than 2% of these resources were utilized [21].

4 The decline in oil reserves in Indonesia and its status as a net oil importing country since 2004
5 [21] have opened up new opportunities for renewable energy development. For instance, the
6 Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR) Regulation 32/2008 has imposed
7 mandatory biodiesel use in transport, industrial, and electricity generation sectors since 2008.
8 Renewable energy has great prospects for development in the future of Indonesia.

9

10 **2. Methodology**

11 Policy screening and analysis were conducted to examine the status of SDG7 targets and their
12 interactions with energy policy in Indonesia. The analysis also evaluated the effectiveness of
13 the policy in meeting the targets.

14 ***Policy screening process:*** The screening process was based on the list of Indonesian energy-
15 related policies provided by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR) in forms
16 of laws and regulations¹. The policies were then grouped and reviewed based on their
17 hierarchy, from laws, governmental regulations, presidential regulations (including decrees,
18 and instructions), to MEMR regulations. MEMR decrees, regulations of the directorate
19 generals under the MEMR, and those passed by ministries other than the MEMR were omitted.

20 A qualitative content analysis was then conducted to provide a list of energy policies related to
21 SDG7. The list was compiled by firstly examining the titles of the laws and regulations for
22 their potential links to electricity access, clean cooking fuels and technology access, RE, and
23 energy efficiency. Those with potential links to SDG7 were downloaded for further screening.
24 The texts were further analyzed to see if their contents regulate any of the above areas of
25 interest, either alone or in combination.

26 ***Policy Analysis:*** The literature suggests four criteria with which energy policy can be assessed,
27 *i.e.*, effectiveness, efficiency, equity, and institutional feasibility [16, 25]. In this study, energy
28 policy was analysed solely on its effectiveness in meeting SDG7. Table 2 shows indicators of
29 effectiveness chosen in this study.

¹ The list is available at <https://jdih.esdm.go.id/index.php/web/result?q=>

1 *Table 2. SDG7 indicators and reasons for selection*

Indicators	Reasons for choosing the indicators
The current electrification ratio compared to the 100% target	Based on SDG Indicator 7.1.1. Proportion of population with access to electricity
The total number of households without clean cooking fuels and technology compared to the target of all households with access	Based on SDG Indicator 7.1.2. Proportion of population with primary reliance on clean fuels and technology
The modern RE share in the total primary energy supply compared to the national target	Based on SDG Indicator 7.2.1. Renewable energy share in the total final energy consumption
The actual power capacity from renewables compared to the national target	Indonesia sets a target for power capacity
Annual power capacity from hydropower, geothermal bioenergy, wind, and solar, and the annual production of biofuel	It is a way of assessing policy effectiveness using the policy effectiveness index (PEI), as suggested by the IEA [26]. Indonesia sets targets for those energy sources.
The installed capacity of different RE technologies by the independent power providers (IPPs) and private power utilities	It gives an insight about policy effectiveness in attracting investments
Sectoral final energy consumption	Energy policy shapes energy consumption patterns
The national energy intensity compared to the global energy intensity target	Based on SDG Indicator 7.3.1. Energy intensity measured in terms of primary energy and GDP

2

3 The Policy Effectiveness Index (PEI) reflects the performance of RE policy in stimulating RE
 4 development in a particular year and is calculated as additional RE production in that year
 5 divided by the remaining target [26], or

$$6 \quad PEI = \frac{P_{t,n} - P_{t,n-1}}{T_{t,2025} - P_{t,n}} \quad (\text{Eq. 1})$$

7 Where $P_{t,n}$ is RE production of technology t for the year n , and $T_{t,2025}$ is the target of RE
 8 technology t by 2025. In the case of Indonesia, the 2025 National Energy Plan targets (locally
 9 known as RUEN) were chosen.

10 Finally, data were plotted in time-series graphs, and changes in graphs' curve directions were
 11 observed and associated with energy policy issued prior to the changes.

12 **Data collection:** Data were gathered mostly from: (1) government reports, including the
 13 Handbook of Energy & Economic Statistics of Indonesia [20, 27], Statistics of New and
 14 Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation [28], the National Energy General Plan [21], the

1 Annual Performance Report [29], Statistics of Electricity [30], and PLN's Electricity Power
 2 Supply Business Plan [31]; (2) the BPS-Statistics Indonesia, including the National Socio-
 3 economic Survey [32], Indonesia's population profiles based on SUPAS 2015 [33], and
 4 Welfare Statistics [34]; and (3) the World Bank database [12, 35]. These data are publicly
 5 accessible.

7 **3. Policies linked to SDG7**

8 There were 932 laws and regulations listed in the MEMR webpage (Table 3). The oldest and
 9 newest regulations on the list were the Mining Law 11/1967 and MEMR Reg. 1/2019,
 10 respectively. Most of them were excluded during the initial title screening process, leaving only
 11 118 laws and regulations for further analysis. Seventy-three laws and regulations were found
 12 to relate to SDG7 targets and are listed as supplementary material (Appendices, Table A1).

13 *Table 3. Results of the policy screening process*

Policies	Listed	Title screening	Content analysis
Laws	37	7	5
Governmental Regulations	134	11	7
Presidential Regulations	114	32	17
Presidential Decrees	111	10	0
Presidential Instructions	36	5	4
MEMR Regulations	500	53	40
Total	932	118	73

14
 15 Table 4 shows that five regulations solely address the electricity access (EA) target, while 5,
 16 29, and 20 address clean cooking fuels and technology access (CC), renewable energy (RE),
 17 and energy efficiency (EE) targets, respectively. Five others regulate both electricity access
 18 and renewable energy (EA-RE) targets, while EA-EE, CC-EE, and RE-EE combined targets
 19 have one policy each. Two others simultaneously address EA-RE-EE targets. Finally, four
 20 regulations are related to all SDG7 targets. Overall, Indonesia has passed more laws and
 21 regulations on renewable energy and energy efficiency targets with 41 and 29 laws and
 22 regulations, respectively, than those on electricity access and clean cooking targets (17 and 10
 23 laws and regulations, respectively).

1 *Table 4. Summary of SDG7 related energy policies for Indonesia*

Targets	EA	CC	RE	EE	EA- CC	EA- RE	EA- EE	CC- RE	CC- EE	RE- EE	EA- CC- RE	EA- CC- EE	EA- RE- EE	EA- CC- RE- EE	Tot- al
Regulations	5	5	29	20	0	5	1	0	1	1	0	0	2	4	73

2

3 **4. Policy Analysis**

4 The effectiveness of energy policy in supporting the progress towards SDG7 is analysed by
 5 benchmarking the current national improvement in energy access, renewable energy share, and
 6 energy efficiency against the targets of SDG7. Since the renewable energy target lacks a precise
 7 number, the national target is applied. Table 5 shows comparisons between SDG7 and national
 8 targets. The Indonesian electricity access target is more ambitious than the global electricity
 9 access target. Indonesia, however, has missed the target of 85% access to gas for cooking, and
 10 its universal access to clean cooking energy is unspecified by 2030. On the other hand, the
 11 renewable energy share targets of Indonesia have been clearly stated while the global target
 12 lacks a precise number. Finally, the national energy efficiency target is not as ambitious as the
 13 global one.

14 *Table 5. SDGs and national targets*

Targets	SDGs	National [21]
Access to electricity	100% by 2030	100% by 2020
Access to clean cooking fuels and technology	100% by 2030	85% access to gas for cooking by 2015
Renewable energy share	Increase substantially by 2030	23% by 2025 and 31% by 2050
Energy efficiency	2.6% reduction in energy intensity of GDP, annually [7]	1% reduction in final energy intensity, annually

15

16 4.1. Energy access

17 Target 7.1 of the SDGs calls for universal access to affordable, reliable, and modern energy
 18 services. This target was interpreted as achieving a 100% electrification ratio and 100% access
 19 to clean fuels and technology for cooking. The interpretation follows the multi-tier framework
 20 of energy access proposed by the World Bank, International Energy Agency (IEA), and the
 21 UN's Sustainable Energy for All initiative [36, 37]. They argue that providing access to
 22 electricity for all is a continuous endeavour. It starts from without access (Tier 0), to access to


1 a daily minimum of 3 watts per household for a minimum of 4 hours without considering its
2 reliability and affordability (Tier 1), to access of at least 2 kW power capacity, available for a
3 minimum of 23 hours a day (Tier 5). Tier 5 access allows only 2 hours of disruption a week
4 (reliable) and an electricity expenditure of less than 5% of household income for average use
5 of 365 kWh/year (affordable) [36]. However, electricity access data segregated under the multi-
6 tier framework are not readily available for developing countries, and, to the authors'
7 knowledge, only Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Cambodia have the data [6, 38-40]. In the meantime,
8 all households with access to electricity, from Tier 1 to Tier 5, are taken into consideration.
9 Therefore, even a household with a simple stand-alone PV system (Tier 1) is taken into
10 consideration and classified as having access to electricity.

11 4.1.1. Electricity access

12 Figure B1 (see Appendices) presents a flow diagram of the effective policies on electricity
13 access. It shows the structure of laws, regulations, and the players related to policies on
14 electricity access. The arrows indicate that the laws and regulations which are higher in
15 hierarchy influence or regulate those pointed by the arrows. This study found that at least seven
16 regulations effectively improved electricity access.

17 In general, the progress on electrification programs is promising. The 2008-2027 General Plan
18 of National Electricity (RUKN 2008-2027) set an electrification ratio target of 93% by 2025,
19 and subsequent plans have set more ambitious targets. RUKN 2015-2034 and the 2017 RUEN
20 set targets of 99.99% by 2021 and 100% by 2020, respectively. The challenging nature of
21 providing infrastructure in an archipelagic country, however, means that more than 2,000 rural
22 villages are estimated to be without electricity by the end of 2019 under a business as usual
23 scenario [29]. Figure 2 shows households with electricity relative to the total number of
24 households. The number of houses with electricity increased significantly from 2001 to 2018,
25 reducing the percentage of houses without electricity. From 2001 to 2006, more than 1 million
26 new connections were added annually, increasing to 1.6 million houses on average every year
27 during the 2007-2010 period. Governmental Regulation (GR) 3/2005 (concerning electricity
28 provision and use), the fast track program (FTP) 1 of coal power plant development
29 (Presidential Regulation 71/2006), Energy Law 30/2007, and Finance Ministerial (FM)
30 Regulation 111/2007 contributed to this improvement. FM Regulation 111/2007 ensured that
31 the government covered the difference between the state electricity company's (PLN) rural

1 electricity production costs and the tariff plus a margin. It gave PLN an incentive to supply
 2 electricity to more houses.



3
 4 *Figure 2. Electricity access in Indonesia. Data source: [8, 30, 41, 42].*

5

6 The amount of household electrification achieved between 2011 to 2017 was even more
 7 significant. On average, almost 3.5 million more houses were supplied with electricity each
 8 year. The electrification ratio rose remarkably to 98.3% in 2018, surpassing the 97.5% target
 9 [8, 30]. The policy responsible for this achievement relates to the decision in 2011 to finance
 10 rural electrification programs under a specifically allocated budget (locally known as DAK).
 11 DAK is the state budget assigned to regional governments for carrying out national priority
 12 programs. The state budget allocated to PLN for electrification programs increased more than
 13 fivefold, from only IDR 571 billion in 2010 to IDR 2.93 trillion in 2011 [43]. As a result, almost
 14 5.6 million more houses were connected with electricity in that year alone, and the
 15 electrification ratio grew considerably from 67.15% to 72.95% [30]. FTP 1 continued to
 16 contribute to the improvement together with fast track program 2 (FTP 2). A more recent
 17 announcement from the ministry claimed that the electrification ratio reached 98.3% in 2018


1 [9]. Figure 2 indicates that, if the current progress is maintained under the current policy
2 scenario, 100% electricity access is achievable by 2020.

3 4.1.2. Access to clean cooking fuels and technology

4 Households without access to clean fuels for cooking are defined as those cooking with
5 kerosene, charcoal, or fuelwood using unimproved cookstoves. We assume that families
6 cooking with improved cookstoves (ICSs) in Indonesia are negligible as only 5,500 ICSs of
7 the 7,000 stoves target were distributed by 2012 (from a pilot project under the Indonesia Clean
8 Stove Initiative) [44, 45].

9 Overall, the successful implementation of the “Kerosene to LPG Conversion Program”
10 substantially reduced the number of households without access from 48.49 to 17.81 million
11 during the 2007-2016 period (calculated from [10]). Households using primarily kerosene for
12 cooking reduced dramatically from 20.25 million (36.6%) in 2007 to 2.51 million (3.8%) in
13 2016. During the same period, households cooking mainly with fuelwood have been halved
14 from 27.3 million to 14.3 million (reduced from 49.4% to 21.6%). It is not clear if the reduction
15 in fuelwood use was due to the conversion program [46].

16 Figure B2 presents the few laws and regulations affecting access to clean cooking and
17 technology, and Figure 3 shows households without access to clean cooking fuels and
18 technology between 2007 to 2016. During this period, the percentage of households without
19 access to clean fuels and technology decreased significantly from 87.6% to 26.8%. Between
20 2008 and 2009, under PR 104/2007, approximately 15.8 million and 24.2 million free LPG
21 starter kits were distributed to households and small/micro enterprises respectively [46],
22 contributing to a substantial reduction from 48.5 million households in 2007 to 36.7 million
23 households in 2009 without access to clean cooking technology. From 2010 to 2015, a total of
24 13.6 million LPG starter kits were distributed [46], contributing to a further reduction to 20.1
25 million households without access in 2015. By 2016, about 17.8 million households remained
26 without access to clean cooking fuels and technology [10]. A recent national socio-economic
27 census reveals that 17.46% of households were still without access to clean fuels and
28 technology in 2019 [34].



1
2
3
4

Figure 3. Households without access to clean fuels for cooking and its trendline to 2030, fitted to the 2007-2016 historical data. Data source: [10].

5 Unlike electricity, there is no policy specifically targeting the reduction of fuelwood use (or
6 solid biomass in general). A proxy target of the 2014 National Energy Policy (locally known
7 as KEN) was to achieve an 85% share of gas use in the household sector by 2015, but almost
8 30% of households still cooked either with fuelwood, kerosene, or charcoal in 2015 [10]. The
9 2017 National Energy General Plan (locally known as RUEN) sets targets of 4.7 million and
10 1.7 million houses connected to natural gas pipelines and biogas digesters, respectively, by
11 2025 [21]. A centrally controlled gas pipeline will mostly serve city houses previously
12 consuming LPG, and in this way, biogas digesters may replace LPG and traditional biomass.

13 Since there is no major program addressing solid biomass use, universal access to clean
14 cooking energy may not be achieved by 2030, as predicted by the (dashed) trendline² (Figure
15 3). When the trendline is extended to 2030, almost 5 million households will still be left behind
16 without access to clean cooking fuels. At this stage, it appears that Indonesia is not on track to
17 reach universal access to clean cooking. Targeting only 1.7 million houses connected to biogas
18 digesters will not suffice to address the issue, especially when the ministerial data [47] suggest
19 that biomass consumption of the household sector (mostly solid) increased significantly during
20 the 2007-2016 period. It suggests that households relying on solid biomass for cooking could

² More information about trendlines can be found at <https://support.office.com/en-us/article/choosing-the-best-trendline-for-your-data-1bb3c9e7-0280-45b5-9ab0-d0c93161daa8>


1 be much higher than the estimation, with fuel stacking (using more than one fuel side-by-side)
2 likely [46, 48].

3

4 4.2. Renewable energy

5 SDGs Target 7.2 is to increase the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix
6 substantially. Indonesia sets its target to be 23% of the total primary energy supply (TPES) by
7 2025. Figure B3 shows laws and regulations strongly associated with the development of the
8 renewable energy share in Indonesia. The interactions between these regulations and the
9 development in renewable energy are depicted in Figure 4. The government claimed an
10 achievement of 8.43% RE share in 2017, which increased from 4.42% in 2010 [11, 28]. The
11 policies responsible for this progress include Energy Law 30/2007, which obligates local and
12 central governments to increase the utilization of local and renewable energy and encourages
13 them to provide incentives for renewable energy use. In 2009, the Electricity Law was passed.
14 In agreement with the Energy Law, the Electricity Law requires that electricity generation
15 should prioritize renewable sources.

16



17

18 *Figure 4. Modern renewable energy share in the TPES and its trendlines to 2030. The blue, orange, and grey*
19 *dashed lines assume polynomial, exponential, and linear trends, respectively, fitted to the 2010-2017 historical*
20 *data. Data sources:[11, 28, 49].*

21

1 The laws were soon supported by MEMR 31/2009 and MEMR 32/2009, obligating PLN to
2 buy electricity generated from small RE and geothermal producers, respectively, under the
3 feed-in-tariff (FIT) mechanism. Presidential Regulation (PR) 61/2011, concerning the national
4 action plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (RAN-GRK), also sought to provide electricity
5 from RE and biogas digester sets in compliance with the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
6 Framework Convention on Climate Change. The protocol bound its state parties to reduce
7 greenhouse gas emissions, and Indonesia passed the protocol as a national law in 2004.
8 However, progress was slow until 2012 despite the regulatory framework development. The
9 RE share in the energy mix only increased from 4.42% in 2010 to 4.52% in 2012 [28]. The
10 slow rate of increase is understandable, considering that RE projects may take years to
11 complete.

12 In 2013, electricity consumption from RE increased by almost 9 million BOE to 60.68 million
13 BOE (see Table 6). However, the increase was mainly due to the contribution of two large
14 hydropower plants (603 MW total capacity) operating since the 1980s in North Sumatera, and
15 three hydropower plants (365 MW) located in South Sulawesi. It turns out that those plants
16 were added to the national list only in 2013 [50, 51]. Biodiesel consumption also grew
17 significantly at the same time, thanks to the MEMR 32/2008 ordering mandatory biodiesel
18 blends ranging from 5% in the transportation sector to 10% in industrial, commercial, and
19 generation sectors by 2015. Consequently, the total RE share rose to 5.18%. Another
20 meaningful improvement was observed after the enactment of MEMR 25/2013. It demanded a
21 mandatory blending of 10% biodiesel (B10) in the transport, industrial, and commercial
22 sectors, and 20% in the electricity generation sector, in effect since January 2014. The biodiesel
23 consumption almost doubled from 5.93 million BOE in 2013 to 10.44 million BOE the next
24 year (see Table 6). Electricity generated from renewables increased from 60.68 million to 66.73
25 million BOE in the same period, and coal consumption dropped significantly, which
26 contributed to the increase in the share of RE to 6.35%.

27 However, due to low fossil fuel prices, the biodiesel price could not compete and domestic
28 biodiesel demand halved in 2015, slowing down RE penetration in the energy mix [52]. The
29 government responded by passing MEMR 12/2015 and PR 61/2015. The former was the
30 revised version of MEMR 25/2013 and increased mandatory biodiesel blending to 20% (in
31 transport, industrial, and commercial sectors) and 30% (in the electricity generation sector) in
32 January 2016. Under PR 61/2015, money collected from palm oil export levies initiated oil
33 palm plantation funding to be used to subsidize the difference between diesel and biodiesel

1 prices. In reality, the mandatory blending implementation of B20 and B30 in the transport
 2 sector began in 2016 and 2020, respectively. The regulations effectively increased domestic
 3 biodiesel consumption from 0.86 million kilolitres in 2015 to 2.25 million kilolitres (2016) and
 4 2.4 million kilolitres (2017) [53]. It helped to boost the RE share to 7.7% in 2016 and 8.43%
 5 in 2017.

6 Figure 4 also shows extended linear, exponential, and second-order polynomial trendlines of
 7 the renewable energy share to 2030. The most optimistic projection (the polynomial trendline)
 8 indicates that the share will be 21% by 2025. When exponential growth is assumed, it will be
 9 19%, and the 23% target by 2025 will not be achieved if the trend continues. The minister of
 10 energy and mineral resources admitted that Indonesia might miss the target, and a target of
 11 20% by 2025 will be more reasonable [54].

12 *Table 6. Primary energy use in Indonesia. Data source: [28]*

Sources	Primary energy use (Million BOE)					
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Renewable electricity	48.18	49.77	51.68	60.68	66.73	73.50
Biodiesel	1.26	2.03	3.79	5.93	10.44	5.18
Coal	281.40	334.14	377.89	406.37	321.60	364.62
Oil	518.41	546.64	533.83	542.95	544.80	545.73
Natural gas	269.94	261.71	259.46	270.13	271.38	279.63

13
 14 Similarly, the 2017 RUEN estimates that 45.2 GW power capacity from renewables will be
 15 necessary to reach the 23% target. However, the current power capacity from renewable energy
 16 only increased from 5.5 GW in 2012 to 7.3 GW in 2017 (see Figure 5). If the trend continues,
 17 the total power capacity will be less than 12 GW by 2025, substantially lower than the RUEN
 18 target.

19




Figure 5. Actual power capacity from renewable energy (solid blue), its exponential trendline (dashed blue), and RUEN target to 2025 (orange). Data sources: [21, 30].


In an attempt to achieve 23% of renewable energy share by 2025, Indonesia will depend mostly on hydropower, bioenergy, and geothermal because of their large reserves [55] and their dispatchable and non-intermittent nature. Targets increased by more than 200 MW in most RE areas between 2016 and 2017, but the realisation of those targets fell short in all areas (see Table 7). Geothermal and bioenergy power plant development targets were missed by 8.5% and 19.7% in 2017, respectively. Hydropower plants achieved only 57.7% of their target in 2016. Indonesia missed its renewable electricity targets even though the annual target was increased by less than 1 GW in 2017. To achieve the renewable electricity capacity of 45.2 GW by 2025, an annual target of at least 4.5 GW has to be met.

Table 7. Targets and realization of renewable power plants (off- and on-grid) [56]

Power plant capacity (MW)	2016			2017		
	Target	Realization	%	Target	Realization	%
Geothermal	1,713.0	1,643.50	95.9%	1,976.0	1,808.5	91.5%
Bioenergy	2,069.4	1,787.9	86.4%	2,291.9	1,839.5	80.3%
Hydro	9,252.0	5,334.7	57.7%	9,590.0	NA	NA
Solar	92.1	91.6	99.5%	118.6	96.76	81.6%
Wind	11.5	2.4	21.0%	19.2	NA	NA

1 Figure 6 shows the policy effectiveness indicators (PEIs) of each RE. The measure is related
 2 to its annual increase in power capacity during the 2013-2018 period, except for biofuel, which
 3 was estimated based on the total volume of biodiesel production during the same period. The
 4 graph indicates that the current RE policies in Indonesia are not effective in supporting the
 5 development of hydropower and solar technology. The 6% hydropower increase in 2013 was
 6 not caused by newly added power, as has been previously explained. Geothermal energy shows
 7 progress over the last three years, but it will not be enough to meet the target. Bioenergy
 8 (electricity generated from biomass, biogas, and solid waste) showed promising progress in
 9 2014 and 2015 only. Positive development in wind energy technology is expected in the near
 10 future. After the installation of Sidrap wind park in 2018 (75 MW), Jeneponto wind park with
 11 the power capacity of 72 MW was also installed to the Sulawesi system in early 2019 [57].
 12 Other wind projects, including Sukabumi (170 MW), Lebak (150 MW), Jeneponto (175 MW),
 13 and Sidrap II (75 MW), are under negotiation with PLN [58]. Finally, biofuel production
 14 fluctuated, but corrective policy responses, including the mandatory biodiesel blending and oil
 15 palm plantation funding, created considerable progress towards reaching the target.

16



17

18 *Figure 6. Policy Effectiveness Indicators (PEIs) of RE measured based on total power capacity added from*
 19 *2013 to 2018. The biofuel PEI was based on biodiesel production. Constructed based on [30, 56, 59-62].*

20

1 Good policy instruments attract private and foreign investments [55, 63]. These investments
 2 are represented by the capacity development of renewable power plants owned by the IPPs and
 3 PPUs (see Table 8). Overall, only 745 MW of new power from RE was added between 2013
 4 to 2017, indicating a slow influx of investments. Most of the investments flowed to geothermal
 5 energy (455 MW) and mini hydropower (177 MW). During the same period, PLN only added
 6 31 MW of renewable power to the system [30]. In contrast, almost 5,000 MW of power from
 7 fossil fuels was added during the same period, of which two-thirds was generated from coal
 8 power plants [30].

9 *Table 8. The capacity of renewable power plants operated by the IPPs and PPUs in Indonesia, in Megawatts.*
 10 *Data source: extracted from [30].*

Year	Hydro	Mini Hydro	Micro Hydro	Geothermal	Wind Power	Solar	Waste	Biomass /biogas	Total
2012	587.12	34.43	3.38	770.80	0.59	0.03	26	0	1,422.35
2013	1,567.37	46.35	17.82	775.40	0.59	0.06	26	0	2,433.59
2014	1,567.37	103.28	18.59	830.40	0.69	0.06	36	0	2,556.39
2015	1,567.37	114.18	18.59	860.40	0.69	0.06	36	0	2,597.29
2016	1,612.37	155.58	53.89	1,065.40	0.69	7.06	36	0	2,930.99
2017	1,612.37	223.33	53.89	1,230.40	0.69	8.06	36	13.7	3,178.44

11
 12 Similarly, PLN is planning to add 27,063 MW (48%) coal-based power plants and 12,617 MW
 13 other fossil-based power plants between 2019-2028 [31]. This time, however, renewables will
 14 contribute about 30% of the planned installations (16,714 MW). Compared to the current
 15 achievement, this plan shows Indonesia's commitment to achieving its 23% renewable share
 16 in the national energy mix. However, intention does not always translate to the actual
 17 realisation of the plan. For example, the second fast track program (FTP2) has been initiated
 18 since 2010, and its latest plan was to install 17,458 MW power plants, including 6,658 MW
 19 hydro and geothermal power plants [31]. Still, only 755 MW power has been connected to the
 20 systems by the end of 2018.

21 The policy most responsible for the development of RE, or the lack thereof, was the FIT
 22 mechanism. The FIT policy for geothermal energy, for example, has changed four times (under
 23 MEMR Reg. 32/2009, 2/2011, 22/2012, and 17/2014), offering higher prices to attract
 24 investments. Similarly, the FIT policy of small hydropower has changed three times (MEMR
 25 Reg. 12/2014, 22/2014, and 19/2015) after MEMR Reg. 31/2009 and 4/2012, which regulated
 26 small and medium scales RE in general, did not attract enough investments. The regulations
 27 were finally responded positively to by the geothermal and mini-hydro energy developers, as
 28 shown in Table 8.

1 In contrast, the tariff policy for solar photovoltaic followed a reverse auction mechanism under
2 MEMR Reg. 17/2013. Given a ceiling price of USD 0.25/kWh (USD 0.30/kWh if the
3 technology had 40% local content), the bidder with the lowest bid won. The high ceiling prices
4 without a clear mechanism for loss recovery made PLN reluctant to support the policy [64].
5 For comparison, the current electricity price in Indonesia is approximately USD 0.10/kWh. The
6 initial regulation did not work well and was replaced with MEMR Reg. 19/2016. This time
7 PLN costs were compensated, and the prices were fixed without auction, ranging from USD
8 0.145 to USD 0.25 in Java and Papua islands, respectively.

9 We have yet to see the full impact of these policies when the MEMR changed the regulations
10 again under MEMR Reg. 12/2017. In the same year, it was amended and replaced with MEMR
11 Reg. 43/2017 and 50/2017, regulating all types of RE. The tariffs were fixed based on the
12 regional and national average generation costs (locally known as BPP). On some occasions,
13 the tariffs were set to only 85% of the BPP. Since the BPP is influenced mainly by the costs of
14 coal-generated power plants (PPs), the renewable PPs now must directly compete with cheap
15 coal PPs. The low tariffs as a consequence of the regulation will reduce the profitability of a
16 project and thus will discourage private investments [65].

17


18 4.3. Energy efficiency

19 Figure B4 presents the structure of the laws, policies, and respective players responsible for
20 energy efficiency related activities. One of the most significant regulations related to energy
21 conservation in the 21st century Indonesia is policy on renewable energy development and
22 energy conservation (under MEMR Decree 2/2004) [66]. This regulation includes energy
23 subsidies, standardizing energy products, regulating energy conservation and management, and
24 prioritizing renewable energy use. Subsequently, MEMR 31/2005 and PR 55/2005 were
25 released and provided guidelines for increasing energy conservation in commercial, industrial,
26 and residential sectors as well as fuel price increases.

27 Effective energy efficiency policies reduce energy consumption. Changes in energy
28 consumption patterns were observed and associated with policies applied before the changes
29 (see Figure 7). MEMR 31/2005 and, in particular, PR 55/2005 on oil price controls, restricted
30 growth in energy consumption in the transport, residential, and commercial sectors. However,
31 higher fuel prices were responded to differently by the industrial sector. The sector reduced
32 fuel use and replaced it with much cheaper coal [67]. From 2004 to 2007, oil and gas

1 consumption in the industrial sector decreased from 159.79 million to 132.14 million BOE,
 2 and coal use doubled from 55.34 million to 121.9 million BOE [27]. Consequently, the
 3 industrial sector energy consumption rose substantially in 2007.

4 Another significant endeavour into energy conservation was the kerosene to LPG mega-
 5 conversion program (PR 104/2007), causing residential and commercial sectors to reduce
 6 consumption during the 2007-2010 period³. Unfortunately, the program had no meaningful
 7 impact on the transport and industrial sectors. The reduction observed in the industrial sector
 8 was mainly due to an economic slowdown and coal price increase. Economic growth dropped
 9 from 6.35% in 2007 to 4.63% in 2009 (see Table 9) while the imported coal price peaked at
 10 324.98 USD/tonne in 2009 from only 131.5 USD/tonne in 2007 [27, 68]. These conditions
 11 helped reduce coal consumption from 121.9 million BOE in 2007 to 82.59 million BOE in
 12 2009, while oil and gas consumption were stagnant [68].



13
 14 *Figure 7. Final energy consumption of different sectors in Indonesia and related regulations to energy*
 15 *conservation (in BOE). Energy data are from [27, 68].*
 16

17 Subsequently, GR 70/2009 was passed in November 2009. It proposed energy efficiency
 18 standardization and labelling, encouraged incentives for energy conservation, and required
 19 entities consuming 6,000 TOE or more energy per year to conduct mandatory energy
 20 management. It was followed by the introduction of PR 61/2011 concerning the national action

³ Compared to kerosene, LPG has a higher caloric value.

1 plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (RAN-GRK) and MEMR 14/2012 concerning energy
 2 management. They provide more detailed procedures for the implementation of GR 70/2009.
 3 The impact on energy consumption of those regulations is unclear at this point in time. The
 4 substantial drop in industrial sector energy consumption in 2013-2014 is likely due to a global
 5 economic crisis hitting emerging markets, including Indonesia [69, 70]. Even now, Indonesia
 6 is still experiencing slow economic growth. It appears that economic crises have kept the
 7 industrial sector energy consumption low, so it is difficult to tell if the energy conservation
 8 programs have contributed to it.


9 In June 2013, the government significantly decreased subsidies and increased the prices of
 10 gasoline (increased 44.4% to IDR 6,500) and diesel fuel (22.2% to IDR 5,500) under MEMR
 11 18/2013. In November 2014, the prices were increased further to IDR 8,500 for gasoline (31%)
 12 and IDR 7,500 for diesel oil (27%) under MEMR 34/2014. Less than six weeks later, the prices
 13 were corrected to IDR 7,600 and IDR 7,250 for gasoline and diesel oil, respectively, on 1
 14 January 2015 (MEMR 39/2014). The new prices are still significantly higher than the 2013
 15 ones. As a result, transportation sector energy consumption slowed down in 2013 and 2014 (as
 16 a consequence of MEMR 18/2013) and became negative in 2015 (associated with MEMR
 17 34/2014 and 39/2014).

18 *Table 9. Indonesia GDP growth [68]*

Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
GDP growth (%)	6.01	4.63	6.22	6.49	6.23	5.81	5.01	4.88	5.03	5.07

19
 20 SDG energy efficiency Target 7.3 is to double the annual global rate of energy efficiency
 21 improvement. Energy efficiency is measured using the energy intensity of GDP (SDG Indicator
 22 7.3.1), and the target is to achieve an annual reduction in energy intensity of 2.6% by 2030 [7].
 23 Assuming the reduction increases linearly from 2.1% in 2015 to 2.6% by 2030 [7], global
 24 energy intensity will decline from 5.131 MJ/\$2011 PPP GDP in 2015 [12] to 3.58 MJ/\$2011
 25 PPP GDP by 2030 [4]. Interestingly, the energy intensity in Indonesia was 3.53 MJ/\$2011 PPP
 26 GDP in 2015 [12], which is lower than the 2030 SDGs target. The World Bank data [12] also
 27 shows that the Indonesian energy intensity declined from 5.24 to 3.53 MJ/\$2011 PPP GDP
 28 during the 2001-2015 period. The annual reduction in energy intensity, therefore, became
 29 2.79% during the period, surpassing the 2.6% reduction target of the SDGs [71]. This is
 30 supported by our calculation shows that final energy intensities in 2001 and 2015 were 3.67
 31 and 2.49 MJ/\$2011 PPP GDP, respectively, which give a slightly lower reduction in final

1 energy intensity of 2.73% during the period. Lower energy intensity of GDP is associated with
 2 higher energy efficiency. The higher the percentage of the annual energy intensity reduction,
 3 the lower the energy intensity. Indonesia has, however, set a lower reduction target of 1% in
 4 final energy intensity than what has been achieved, and it is suggested it should revise it to, at
 5 least, maintain the current achievement of 2.73%.



6
 7 *Figure 8. The primary energy intensity in Indonesia. The average primary energy intensities of high and lower-*
 8 *middle-income groups and the world are shown for comparison. Data source: [12].*
 9

10 Figure 8 compares the primary energy intensity in Indonesia with the average energy intensities
 11 of high and lower-middle-income group countries and with the average value for the whole
 12 world. The graph shows that Indonesia consumed less energy for every dollar of GDP it
 13 produced than all income group countries and the world averages. Low energy intensity of
 14 GDP does not mean that Indonesia is advanced in energy efficiency. This issue is discussed in
 15 the next section.

16

17 **5. Discussions**

18 Government Regulation 79/2014 on national energy policy sets national energy targets for
 19 Indonesia (see Table 10). The first four targets are comparable to the SDG7 targets, as

1 previously discussed. The next two targets show that the primary energy supply in 2025 is
 2 expected to increase to more than twice its 2015 supply [21]. While these targets and those for
 3 power generation and electricity consumption support the energy access target of SDG7, a
 4 trade-off may exist between these targets and the energy efficiency target. Indonesia expects
 5 an ambitious reduction in oil share from 46% of the total primary energy mix in 2015 to less
 6 than 25% in 2025, and at the same time to increase its coal share in order to improve its energy
 7 security. Indonesia is an oil net importer country with vast coal resources. The oil share
 8 reduction target provides an opportunity to increase renewable energy use, which is
 9 undermined by a growing coal consumption target. Finally, the natural gas share remains the
 10 same.

11 *Table 10. Indonesian national energy targets*

1. Electrification ratio	100% by 2020
2. Gas for cooking access	85% by 2015
3. Renewable energy share	More than 23% and 31% by 2025 and 2050, respectively
4. Reduction of final energy intensity	1% annually
5. Primary energy	400 and 1000 MTOE by 2025 and 2050, respectively
6. Per capita primary energy	1.4 and 3.2 TOE/capita by 2025 and 2050, respectively
7. Power generation	115 and 430 GW by 2025 and 2050, respectively
8. Electricity consumption	2500 and 7000 kWh/cap
9. Oil share	Less than 25% and 20% by 2025 and 2050, respectively
10. Coal share	More than 30% and 25% by 2025 and 2050, respectively
11. Natural gas share	More than 22% and 24% by 2025 and 2050, respectively

12
 13 Synergies and trade-offs also exist between SDG7 and other SDGs. For instance, poor access
 14 to energy (SDG7) keeps people in poverty (SDG1), and energy poverty is strongly associated
 15 with economic poverty [72]. Poor energy access usually means a lack of access to electricity
 16 and clean energy for cooking. Figure 9 shows an example of a synergy between electricity
 17 access and poverty reduction in Indonesia. Access to electricity has a strong negative
 18 correlation with poverty. Lack of access to clean energy also will adversely affect women more
 19 than men (SDG5) [73]. Without access to clean energy for cooking, women will spend more
 20 time collecting solid biomass [74], and cooking with it harms their health. In addition, a recent
 21 study estimates that the implementation of SDGs in the national development agenda of
 22 Indonesia will increase energy demand [75].

23




Figure 9. A synergy between electricity access and poverty reduction in Indonesia. Data source: [76]

5.1. Electricity access

The analysis shows that several policies have contributed to the expansion of electricity access since 2001. The inclusion of rural electrification programs in the DAK has contributed to the increase in access to electricity and put them in the spotlight since 2011. Although our trendlines indicated this could continue, experience from other countries shows that supplying electricity to the last 10% to 15% of the population is the hardest, the slowest, and the costliest since most of these houses are more remotely located [77]. One of the latest regulations in response to the challenge in rural electrification is Presidential Regulation 47/2017, requiring the provision of free solar panel systems with LED lamps (locally known as LTSHE) to people in the most remote areas of Indonesia. During 2017-2019, some 400 thousand LTSHEs were to be distributed to the most remote locations for free [78].

However, in 2019 there are still 1.2 million houses (1.7%) without access to electricity. Since 2019, rural electrification programs are no longer under DAK, which indicates that the programs are not a national priority anymore. The Ministry now estimates that almost IDR 11 trillion (USD 758.62 million) will be needed to provide electricity for the remaining households and that the PLN's budget is only IDR 2.1 trillion [79]. The ADB predicts that, with the current

1 level of funding, universal electricity access will not be achieved in Indonesia by 2020. It is
2 therefore suggested a revised target may need to be set to 2025.

3 5.2. Access to clean cooking fuels and technology

4 In contrast to electricity access, significantly less attention has been paid to clean cooking fuels
5 and technology access. The existing policies do not sufficiently respond to the SDG target.
6 There is not a specific policy to ensure zero traditional use of solid biomass for cooking, which
7 is the dominant contributor to low clean cooking access after the kerosene to LPG conversion
8 program successfully reduced kerosene use. Addressing the traditional use of biomass with
9 natural gas and biogas programs will not be enough. Natural gas usually replaces LPG in urban
10 areas, and biogas cannot reach non-farming communities. Providing LPG starter kits to the
11 households may not bridge the gap since household choice for cooking fuels is influenced by
12 affordability, availability, accessibility, and acceptability of the fuels [45]. Without their
13 willingness to pay for clean fuels, especially when solid biomass is abundant, people will be
14 reluctant to adopt a clean way of cooking.

15 A solution could be to promote the use of improved cookstoves (ICS) for those using solid
16 biomass for cooking by including the ICS program in the national energy plan. It can be done
17 in a similar way to the government provision of free LPG starter kits (under PR 104/2007) or
18 free stand-alone solar systems (under PR 47/2017) to rural households. This will ensure all
19 households have access to a cleaner way of cooking by 2030. Lessons learned from the
20 Kerosene-to-LPG Conversion Program and the Indonesia Clean Stove Initiative can be used to
21 develop more effective policy at the national level. Lesson learned from the successful
22 kerosene-to-LPG conversion program includes the necessity for strong political commitment
23 and firm policy objectives, effective marketing and a good public awareness campaign, a sole
24 credible implementing agency (Pertamina), and effective monitoring and evaluation [45]. Rural
25 energy programs, including electrification and clean cooking, which have been nationally
26 prioritized and financed under the DAK since 2013, were renamed in 2016 as small and
27 medium scale energy programs to allow for urban application. However, the programs were
28 removed from the 2019 DAK list, indicating that the government lacks commitment to
29 achieving universal access to clean cooking. Judging from policy development and target
30 achievement as well as the inadequate public awareness campaign, it appears that even
31 policymakers are unaware of the indoor air pollution hazards from solid biomass smoke. The

1 World Bank estimates that indoor air pollution from the traditional use of biomass for cooking
2 in Indonesia leads to about 165,000 premature deaths annually [80].

3 According to the Asia Sustainable and Alternative Energy Program (ASTAE), barriers to
4 expanding the ICS program include a lack of a development roadmap, limited working capital
5 for producers, and no market demand for advanced ICS [45]. ASTAE also finds that traditional
6 production models, a limited supply chain, and the lack of awareness by consumers and
7 government on the adverse effects of indoor air pollution are some other obstacles to the
8 expansion. To achieve the target of universal access to clean cooking fuels and technology, the
9 MEMR will need to orchestrate all aspects of the program (from planning to implementation)
10 and encourage participation from different institutions and stakeholders. Those stakeholders
11 include public and private sectors, not-for-profit organizations, universities, international
12 bodies, users, and the relevant ministries responsible for public health, women and children,
13 social lives and villages, industries and enterprises, and research.

14 Another aspect worth mentioning is the fact that cooking with biomass is associated with
15 poverty, and when people can afford gas, they will switch to it [81]. This situation creates an
16 energy dilemma between providing clean energy access (mitigating energy poverty) and
17 promoting renewable energy (mitigating climate change). The dilemma is common in
18 developing countries such as Indonesia, and the government response to it is usually to relegate
19 the renewable energy target to a peripheral role [24]. It is also true in the context of electricity
20 access, in which the government prefers cheap coal-fired electricity to renewables. The
21 domestic pressures to provide affordable and reliable energy access in the short term trump
22 international commitments and expectations to increase the share of renewable energy in the
23 national energy mix [24].

24 5.3. Renewable energy

25 In regard to the renewable energy target, the current policy is not enough to allow Indonesia to
26 meet the target. The government may push the mandatory biodiesel blend to be more than 30%
27 by 2025 but, overall, the transport sector consumes more gasoline than diesel fuels. For
28 example, the share of biodiesel in the total primary energy supply was only 1.94% in 2018 [20].
29 Indonesia is reluctant to force a compulsory bioethanol blend because ethanol production may
30 become a risk to its food security. In the electricity generation sector, significant improvement
31 has been shown by hydropower, bioenergy, and geothermal; however, their output is not
32 enough to meet the target, while solar and wind energy show a very low deployment. In the


1 case of wind energy, it is argued that low wind speeds in the country make it unattractive for
2 investment, but such barriers do not exist for solar energy.

3 A study involving stakeholder interviews revealed that the current policy is not attractive for
4 investments for the following reasons [82]: Firstly, regulatory uncertainties due to frequent
5 policy changes increase investment risks for the developers. These uncertainties have been
6 discussed in the previous section of this paper. Secondly, the coal industry has strong ties with
7 the government, which, in turn, offers the industry fiscal supports (tax exemption, loan
8 guarantees, and price supports) that keep the BPP relatively low. In this economic environment,
9 tariffs become less attractive for renewable generation. Next, the rent-seeking behaviour in
10 fossil fuel industries hinders RE development.⁴ For instance, in many rural electrification cases,
11 electricity generation from more expensive diesel generators is preferred over cheaper
12 renewables. The involvement of subsidiaries of PLN and Pertamina (the state-owned oil
13 company) as diesel fuel suppliers allegedly creates a conflict of interests that hinder the
14 penetration of renewable energy. Lastly, the build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) requirement,
15 in which developers should transfer the ownership of the renewable PPs to PLN after 20 years
16 of operation, significantly reduces the incentive for investment.

17 Another study involving a detailed inventory of coal and renewable energy subsidies
18 demonstrates that coal subsidies are substantially larger than renewable energy subsidies [83].
19 The study estimates that subsidies to coal in 2014 and 2015 were worth about USD 946 million
20 and 644 million, respectively, while subsidies to renewables were worth around USD 36
21 million and 133 million. Since coal generates most of the electricity in Indonesia, the cost of
22 subsidies for coal-fired electricity was around 4.9 USD/GWh in 2015, slightly lower than that
23 for renewable electricity of 5.5 USD/GWh [83]. The study also reveals that total costs per unit
24 of renewable electricity were still higher than those of coal power generation, even though
25 renewables received higher subsidies. These total costs, however, do not reflect the true costs
26 of generation as they do not take into account the large environmental and social costs
27 associated with carbon emissions and air pollution. These externality costs of coal-generated
28 and renewable energy electricity are estimated at 60 and 0.2 USD/MWh, respectively [83]. If
29 the externality cost is included, then coal will not be able to compete with renewables.
30 Likewise, subsidies for diesel fuel, kerosene, and LPG increased significantly in 2018 as the

⁴ Some middlemen, including in some cases PLN subsidiaries, who are involved in the fuel distribution allegedly make profits from their close tie with PLN, which provides power purchasing agreements in favour of gas and diesel-fired power plants [81].

1 global oil prices increased (see Figure 10). Fossil fuel subsidies reduce the competitiveness of
2 renewables and decrease incentives to conserve energy.



3
4 *Figure 10. Fuel subsidies in Indonesia (assuming USD 1 equals IDR 14,000). Data sources: [84, 85]*

5
6 As the production of first-generation bioethanol may become a risk to its food security,
7 Indonesia needs to encourage the production of second generation bioethanol, which is made
8 from non-food sources. In 2015, the potential of agricultural wastes for bioethanol production
9 in Indonesia was about 11.88 billion litres, mostly from rice straws, bananas, and oil palms
10 [86]. For comparison, gasoline consumption was 30.69 billion litres in the same year [68].
11 Indonesia is the world's largest producer of palm oil, and its production generates a vast amount
12 of wastes, as only 10% of the plant can be extracted for oil [87]. However, since the national
13 price of gasoline is low (subsidised), justifying the use of bioethanol exclusively based on cost
14 considerations will be difficult.

15 To enable the government to reach its renewable energy targets, it needs to increase spending
16 on second-generation bioethanol research and development and provide financial incentives
17 for its production as it is currently only in the early phases of commercialization [88]. Kurnia
18 *et al.* [89] suggest the development of more research on (1) efficient systems of transportation
19 and distribution to link oil palm plantation, processing plants, and users, and (2) methods for
20 efficient, cost-effective, and profitable biofuel production from oil palm wastes with less
21 environmental impacts. At the same time, the bioethanol blending mandate should be imposed,
22 and a tariff should be put on cheaper, foreign first-generation bioethanol [90]. These policy
23 initiatives will increase bioethanol production, which in turn will increase learning in second

1 generation bioethanol. The mandatory biodiesel blending program resulted in high social
2 acceptance and so similar would be expected from a mandatory bioethanol program.

3 In the wind energy sector, a 75 MW wind farm in operation since 2018 in South Sulawesi
4 proves that wind energy can attract substantial foreign investment. The electricity feed-in tariff
5 was set at USD 0.11/kWh in 2015 [91]. More recently, the developer signed another contract
6 to increase its capacity by adding another 60-75 MW. Under MEMR Reg. 50/2017, the new
7 tariff is set to be USD 0.07/kWh, which is 85% of the regional BPP. The developer's
8 spokesman explained that the new tariff was still feasible since the second project does not
9 need to invest in sea or road infrastructure to access to the site. It is not clear whether the BOOT
10 scheme is part of this new agreement, but MEMR Reg. 50/2017 does not seem to discourage
11 investment in wind energy.

12 Responding to the slow deployment of solar energy, the government passed MEMR Reg.
13 49/2018. It allows PLN's customers to install rooftop solar panels and export excess power to
14 the grid. However, only 65% of the costs can be claimed back. While the regulation promotes
15 rooftop solar energy production and use, PLN had indicated an unwillingness to participate in
16 the project as it will cause significant loss of revenue from reduced consumers' electricity bills.
17 A PLN regional business director said that rooftop solar panels should only be installed outside
18 Java, where electricity is scarce [92]. Under the current electricity price, the selling price of
19 65% of the existing electricity tariff will prolong the payback period for rooftop solar and
20 discourage investment. The regulation also limits the capacity a customer can install. A house
21 powered by 2 kW grid electricity can only have 2 kW rooftop of solar panels.

22 Lessons learned from the mandatory biodiesel blend could also be applied to solar energy. For
23 instance, a compulsory deployment of solar energy could be imposed on governmental offices
24 and new commercial and industrial buildings. When a new norm of rooftop solar energy
25 develops, the regulation can be extended to existing buildings and houses.

26 5.4. Energy efficiency

27 GDP represents a country's total value of production and income, and energy is consumed as
28 an input factor for production as well as to support the average standard of living [93].
29 Therefore, while the energy intensity of GDP can indicate the energy efficiency of both the
30 production system and standard of living, it may mask a lower quality of life. Advanced
31 countries usually have efficient production systems and an energy-intensive standard of living.
32 In contrast, developing nations will usually have inefficient production systems and a non-

1 energy-intensive standard of living. It would appear that low energy intensity in Indonesia is
2 unlikely to be the result of efficient production systems; and instead be due to a lower standard
3 of living. Using 2004 data, Suehiro [93] found that the industrial sector energy intensity in
4 Indonesia was about 2.5 times less efficient than that of Japan, while the energy intensity of
5 the non-industrial sector was significantly lower.

6 The per capita electricity and cooking energy consumption measures are a proxy for living
7 standards. In 2017, 62,543,434 households (93%) enjoyed grid electricity, consuming
8 approximately 93,583.52 GWh of electricity [30]. Hence, on average, Indonesian families
9 consume about 1,496 kWh, annually, which falls under Tier-4 of household electricity access.
10 Electricity access under this category is reliable enough to power daily household appliances,
11 including general lights, phone charger, fan, television, food processor, washing machine, and
12 refrigerator (without air conditioning).

13 Household energy consumption for cooking in Indonesia is very modest. Calculations using
14 the BPS and MEMR data [10, 20] show that kerosene and gas (LPG and natural gas)
15 consumption for cooking in 2016 was 1,896 and 1,774 MJ/person, respectively. This is very
16 close to the minimum annual cooking energy requirement for the basic human needs of 40 kg
17 of oil equivalence or 1,675 MJ/person [94]. The per-person consumption of energy for cooking
18 indicates that the average Indonesian lives a very modest lifestyle. A study assessing energy
19 poverty in typical rural, suburban, and urban areas in Central Java shows that 48% of the
20 households fell into the category of extreme energy poor, and another 43% is considered
21 medium energy poor [48]. Central Java is one of the provinces with the lowest electricity
22 consumption per household, which was 1090.6 kWh/household, or about 981.5 MJ/person, in
23 2017 (Tier 3 electricity access) [30]. The study used household energy consumption thresholds
24 of 2,088 and 4,320 MJ/cap to define extreme and medium energy-poor households,
25 respectively.

26 In energy efficiency measures, assessing the policy impacts of reducing national energy
27 consumption and intensity is challenging. Different variables influence sectoral energy use in
28 a country. In the industrial and other sectors, for example, economic performance (growth) has
29 a significant impact on energy consumption, while low economic growth is associated with
30 lower energy demand. In the transportation sector, fuel prices particularly appear to shape
31 consumption as a reduction in energy consumption is noted every time energy prices increase.
32 While in residential and commercial sectors, energy consumption is associated with fuel

1 choices, in which cooking with LPG or natural gas is more efficient than cooking with
2 kerosene.

3 Figure 7 shows that the transport sector has surpassed the industrial sector as the sector that
4 consumed the most energy in Indonesia since 2013. At the same time, the energy consumption
5 of the commercial and residential sectors also increased. As Indonesian production systems
6 follow a more energy-efficient path, people are moving to a more energy-intensive society.
7 This claim is supported by the IEA findings, in which the residential sector energy consumption
8 in Indonesia increased 35% from 2000 to 2015 caused by increases in population, house
9 ownership and spatial dimensions, and average per capita device and equipment ownership
10 [95]. The study also shows that 86% of the increase in passenger transport energy consumption
11 during the same period was due to a greater distance travelled per passenger. At the same time,
12 there has been an activity shift from energy-intensive manufacturing to less energy-intensive
13 production and services [96].

14 Consequently, in order to meet the required targets, more attention needs to be given to the
15 transport, residential, and commercial sectors. Efficiency improvement efforts in these sectors
16 may include: transportation infrastructure improvements to reduce traffic congestion and
17 increase access to public transport; vehicle fuel conversion from oil to gas and electricity;
18 increasing fuel efficiency standards for large and inefficient vehicles; the application of
19 building energy efficiency standards, and promoting the adoption of more efficient LED lamps,
20 air conditioners, and other appliances.

21 5.5. Data limitation

22 A shortcoming of the present study is that it relies mostly on government data to analyse the
23 achievement of the targets. Some studies show that official data may be intentionally
24 manipulated for political gains [97, 98] and to generate more aid [99]. A comparison of
25 electrification ratio data between the World Bank and the Indonesian government shows a
26 divergence that has narrowed in the most recent figures (Figure 11). Indonesia regularly
27 conducts an intercensal population survey (every ten years between the census) and annual
28 national socio-economic surveys, which collect data on household electricity and cooking fuel
29 use (see for example [32, 33]).




Figure 11. Electrification ratio in Indonesia: The World Bank estimate and Indonesia's claim. Data sources: [30, 50, 100, 101].

Table 11 reveals that estimates of the Indonesian government are significantly higher than those of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) and the World Bank. Since the government energy data are based on censuses and surveys, we are convinced that they are reliable.

Table 11. Access to clean energy for cooking (% of population) in Indonesia, according to the Indonesian government, UNDESA, and the World Bank. Data sources: [35, 76, 102-104]

	2015	2016	2017
Indonesian Government	69.42	73.23	76.71
UNDESA	60	63	65
World Bank	56.49	58.37	-

6. Conclusion

Indonesia has declared its commitment to incorporate the SDGs, including the energy goal, into its national development plan, as stated in its voluntary national reviews (VNRs) on the SDGs. The electrification ratio increased dramatically from 67.15% in 2010 to 98.3% in 2018. The decision to promote rural electrification programs as nationally prioritised programs financed under the specifically allocated state budget (DAK) is the main policy responsible for the achievement. However, the programs have not been under DAK since 2019, which explains the small increase in the electrification ratio to only 98.89% the same year. Providing electricity

1 access to the remaining 1.1 million households by the end of 2020 will be very challenging for
2 Indonesia as most of them are located in the outermost and least developed regions of the
3 country. Indonesia may need to revise its universal electricity access target to 2025, instead of
4 2020, as more than five times the currently allocated budget is needed to meet the target.

5 Access to clean cooking fuels and technology has increased significantly from 12.4% to
6 82.54% of total households between 2007 to 2019. However, much still needs to be done to
7 ensure zero traditional use of biomass for cooking. The current policy, which only focuses on
8 promotion of gas, is unlikely to be effective since household choice for cooking fuels is driven
9 by affordability, availability, accessibility, and acceptability of the fuels. In areas where clean
10 cooking fuels are unaffordable, the willingness to pay for them is low, and solid fuels are
11 abundant, so ICS use should be encouraged. Policy on ICS use may not fully address the SDG
12 target of ensuring access to clean cooking fuels and technology for everyone, but in the short
13 and medium term, it ensures more efficient use of biomass and improves residential indoor air
14 quality. The ICS program can be executed in line with the distribution of free LPG starter kits
15 and stand-alone solar systems. Furthermore, rural energy programs, which address rural
16 electrification and clean cooking, should be reinstated and funded under DAK.

17 Renewable energy deployment rose significantly from 4.4% to 8.43% between 2010 to 2017,
18 but current efforts will not be enough to meet the 23% target by 2025. The mandatory biodiesel
19 blending programs, B20 and B30, has been successfully implemented since 2016 and early
20 2020. However, its contribution to the primary energy mix was only 1.94% in 2018 as diesel
21 fuel consumption is less than a quarter of the total use of crude oil and petroleum products. A
22 similar mandatory blending policy is not enforced for bioethanol. Regulatory uncertainties and
23 frequent policy changes discourage investment in renewable electricity generation. Tariff
24 policies change from feed-in tariffs, to reverse auction mechanisms, to fixed tariffs based on
25 average generation costs (BPP). PLN, the utility company, is reluctant to support FIT and
26 reverse auction policies for the loss they create due to high tariffs. In contrast, low tariffs
27 created by the BPP mechanism discourage private investments. As a result, renewable
28 generation increases only about 0.36 GW annually, far from the annual target of 4.5 GW.

29 Policy assessments on energy efficiency and conservation show that sectoral energy
30 consumption is influenced mostly by variables and regulation not primarily intended to
31 improve energy efficiency. Energy consumption in the transportation sector is shaped largely
32 by fuel pricing policy more efficient energy use in household and commercial sectors is

1 associated with the cooking fuel conversion policy, while decreases in industrial and other
2 sectors' energy demand are associated with low economic growth. The energy intensity of
3 GDP, as a proxy for energy efficiency, is currently lower in Indonesia than the 2030 global
4 target, indicating modest energy consumption per dollar of production (GDP). Indonesia's
5 annual 1% reduction target of final energy intensity is lower than the annual 2.73% reduction
6 the country has been achieving. However, while the energy intensity of GDP tends to decrease
7 over time, the fact that energy demand in the transport sector has surpassed that of the industrial
8 sector, and energy use in household and commercial sectors is increasing indicates that a more
9 energy-intensive standard of living is expected. Therefore, appropriate policy responses will
10 be needed in these sectors. Fossil fuel energy subsidies have also hindered progress in
11 renewable energy and energy efficiency. Gradually removing subsidies for fossil fuels is
12 necessary if progress is to be made on these targets.

13

14 **Acknowledgment**

15 W.G. Santika thanks the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Ministry of Finance of the
16 Republic of Indonesia for their financial support under the Indonesian Lecturer Scholarship
17 (BUDI-LPDP).

18 Y. Simsek acknowledges the financial support of the Chilean National Commission for
19 Scientific and Technological Research under scholarship CONICYT-PCHA/ Doctorado
20 Nacional/ 2018–21181469.

21

22 **References**

- 23 [1] UN. (2015). *Historic new sustainable development agenda unanimously adopted by 193 UN*
24 *members*. Available at: [https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2015/09/historic-](https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2015/09/historic-new-sustainable-development-agenda-unanimously-adopted-by-193-un-members/)
25 [new-sustainable-development-agenda-unanimously-adopted-by-193-un-members/](https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2015/09/historic-new-sustainable-development-agenda-unanimously-adopted-by-193-un-members/).
26 Accessed on 29 March 2019.
- 27 [2] D. L. McCollum *et al.*, "Connecting the Sustainable Development Goals by their energy inter-
28 linkages," *Environmental Research Letters*, vol. 13, no. 3, p. 033006, 2018.
- 29 [3] F. F. Nerini *et al.*, "Mapping synergies and trade-offs between energy and the Sustainable
30 Development Goals," *Nature Energy*, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 10-15, 2018.
- 31 [4] W. G. Santika, M. Anisuzzaman, P. A. Bahri, G. Shafiullah, G. V. Rupf, and T. Urmee, "From
32 goals to joules: A quantitative approach of interlinkages between energy and the Sustainable
33 Development Goals," *Energy Research & Social Science*, vol. 50, pp. 201-214, 2019.
- 34 [5] J. Sachs, G. Schmidt-Traub, C. Kroll, G. Lafortune, and G. Fuller, *SDG Index and Dashboards*
35 *Report 2018*. New York: Bertelsmann Stiftung and Sustainable Development Solutions
36 Network (SDSN), 2018.

- 1 [6] World Bank, "Tracking SDG7: The energy progress report 2018," Washington DC: The World
2 Bank,, 2018.
- 3 [7] IEA and the World Bank, "Sustainable Energy for All 2017: Progress Towards Sustainable
4 Energy," Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017. Available at:
5 [http://seforall.org/sites/default/files/eegp17-
6 01_gtf_full_report_final_for_web_posting_0402.pdf](http://seforall.org/sites/default/files/eegp17-01_gtf_full_report_final_for_web_posting_0402.pdf).
- 7 [8] MEMR/DGE, "Laporan Kinerja Tahun 2018 (2018 Performance Report)," Jakarta: Directorate
8 General of Electricity - MEMR, 2019.
- 9 [9] A. D. Afriyadi, "98% orang RI sudah nikmati listrik, Jonan: Alhamdulillah (Some 98% of the
10 population have enjoyed electricity, Jonan says *alhamdulillah*)," ed: Detik.com, 2019.
- 11 [10] BPS. (2017). *Percentage of Household Population by Province and Type of Cooking Fuel,
12 2001, 2007-2016*. Available at:
13 [https://www.bps.go.id/statictable/2014/09/10/1364/persentase-rumah-tangga-menurut-
14 provinsi-dan-bahan-bakar-utama-untuk-memasak-tahun-2001-2007-2016.html#](https://www.bps.go.id/statictable/2014/09/10/1364/persentase-rumah-tangga-menurut-provinsi-dan-bahan-bakar-utama-untuk-memasak-tahun-2001-2007-2016.html#). Accessed
15 on 18 June 2018.
- 16 [11] C. Mulyana. (2018). *Indonesia bertekad bauran energi baru dan terbarukan 23% (Indonesia
17 to increase renewable energy share to 23%)*. Available at:
18 [http://mediaindonesia.com/read/detail/149971-indonesia-bertekad-bauran-energi-baru-
19 dan-terbarukan-23](http://mediaindonesia.com/read/detail/149971-indonesia-bertekad-bauran-energi-baru-dan-terbarukan-23). Accessed on 16 March 2019.
- 20 [12] World Bank. (2019). *World Development Indicators: Sustainable Development Goals*.
21 Available at: <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/sdgs/>. Accessed on 20 March 2019.
- 22 [13] ICSU, "Guide to SDG Interactions: from Science to Implementation," Paris: International
23 Council for Science (ICSU), 2017.
- 24 [14] K. R. Smith and A. Pillarissetti, "Household Air Pollution from Solid Cookfuels and Its Effects
25 on Health," in *Injury Prevention and Environmental Health*, C. N. Mock, R. Nugent, O.
26 Kobusingye, and K. R. Smith, Eds. Washington (DC): The International Bank for
27 Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2017.
- 28 [15] B. Hou, H. Liao, and J. Huang, "Household cooking fuel choice and economic poverty:
29 evidence from a nationwide survey in China," *Energy and Buildings*, vol. 166, pp. 319-329,
30 2018.
- 31 [16] IRENA, "Evaluating policies in support of the deployment of renewable power," Abu Dhabi:
32 International Renewable Energy Agency, 2012. Available at:
33 [https://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/Evaluating_policies_in_support
34 of_the_deployment_of_renewable_power.pdf](https://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/Evaluating_policies_in_support_of_the_deployment_of_renewable_power.pdf).
- 35 [17] World Bank. (2019). *Population, total*. Available at:
36 <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ID>. Accessed on 25 March
37 2019.
- 38 [18] World Bank. (2018). *GDP, PPP (current international \$)*. Available at:
39 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?year_high_desc=true. Accessed
40 on 25 March 2019.
- 41 [19] IEA, "Southeast Asia energy outlook 2017," Paris: International Energy Agency, 2017.
42 Available at:
43 [https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2017SpecialReport_Sou
44 theastAsiaEnergyOutlook.pdf](https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2017SpecialReport_SoutheastAsiaEnergyOutlook.pdf).
- 45 [20] MEMR, "Handbook of Energy & Economic Statistics of Indonesia 2018 (Final Edition),"
46 Jakarta: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,, 2019.
- 47 [21] MEMR, "Rencana Umum Energi Nasional (National Energy General Plan)," Jakarta: Ministry
48 of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2017.
- 49 [22] R. Dutu, "Challenges and policies in Indonesia's energy sector," *Energy Policy*, vol. 98, pp.
50 513-519, 2016.

- 1 [23] S. Mujiyanto and G. Tiess, "Secure energy supply in 2025: Indonesia's need for an energy
2 policy strategy," *Energy Policy*, vol. 61, pp. 31-41, 2013.
- 3 [24] N. Gunningham, "Managing the energy trilemma: The case of Indonesia," *Energy policy*, vol.
4 54, pp. 184-193, 2013 2013.
- 5 [25] IRENA, "Evaluating renewable energy policy: A review of criteria and indicators for
6 assessment," Abu Dhabi: International Renewable Energy Agency, 2014. Available at:
7 [https://www.irena.org/-](https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2014/Evaluating_RE_Policy.pdf)
8 [/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2014/Evaluating_RE_Policy.pdf](https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2014/Evaluating_RE_Policy.pdf).
- 9 [26] IEA, "Deploying renewables: Principles for effective policies," Paris: International Energy
10 Agency, 2008.
- 11 [27] MEMR, "Handbook of Energy & Economic Statistics of Indonesia 2012," Jakarta: Ministry of
12 Energy and Mineral Resources, 2012.
- 13 [28] MEMR, "Statistik EBTKE 2016 (2016 Statistics of new and renewable energy and energy
14 conservation)," Jakarta: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2016.
- 15 [29] MEMR/DGE, "Laporan Kinerja Tahun 2017 (2017 Annual Performance Report)," Jakarta:
16 Directorate General of Electricity - MEMR, 2018.
- 17 [30] MEMR, "Statistics of Electricity 2017," Jakarta: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
18 2018.
- 19 [31] PLN, "PLN's Electricity Power Supply Business Plan 2019-2028," Jakarta: Ministry of Energy
20 and Mineral Resources,, 2019.
- 21 [32] BPS. (2018). *SUSENAS*. Available at:
22 <https://mikrodata.bps.go.id/mikrodata/index.php/catalog/SUSENAS>. Accessed on 19 August
23 2019.
- 24 [33] BPS, "Profil penduduk Indonesia hasil SUPAS 2015 (Indonesia's population profiles based on
25 SUPAS 2015)," Jakarta: BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2016.
- 26 [34] BPS, "2019 Welfare Statistics," Jakarta: BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2019.
- 27 [35] World Bank. (2019). *Access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking (% of population)*.
28 Available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.CFT.ACCS.ZS?locations=ID>. Accessed
29 on 17 June 2019.
- 30 [36] M. Bhatia and N. Angelou, "Beyond connections: energy access redefined," Washington DC:
31 The World Bank, 2015.
- 32 [37] IEA and the World Bank, "Global Tracking Framework," Washington, DC: World Bank, 2014.
- 33 [38] World Bank, "Rwanda Beyond Connections: Energy Access Diagnostic Report Based on the
34 Multi-Tier Framework," Washington DC: The World Bank,, 2018.
- 35 [39] World Bank, "Ethiopia Beyond Connections: Energy Access Diagnostic Report Based on the
36 Multi-Tier Framework," Washington DC: The World Bank,, 2018.
- 37 [40] World Bank, "Cambodia Beyond Connections: Energy Access Diagnostic Report Based on the
38 Multi-Tier Framework," Washington DC: The World Bank,, 2018.
- 39 [41] MEMR, "2008 Statistics of Electricity and Energy," Jakarta: Ministry of Energy and Mineral
40 Resources, 2008.
- 41 [42] BPS, "Trends of selected socio-economic indicators of Indonesia," Jakarta: BPS-Statistics
42 Indonesia, 2018.
- 43 [43] A. C. Nugroho, "Proyek listrik pedesaan: PLN raup dana APBN 2,54 triliun (Rural
44 electrification projects: The PLN granted IDR 2.54 trillion of the state budget)," ed:
45 Bisnis.com, 2012.
- 46 [44] ESMAP. (2016). *Indonesia clean cooking: ESMAP supports innovative approaches to build
47 the local cookstoves market, helps increase access*. Available at:
48 <https://www.esmap.org/node/57286>. Accessed on 13 March 2019.
- 49 [45] ASTAE, "Indonesia: Toward universal access to clean cooking. East Asia and Pacific Clean
50 Stove Initiative Series," Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2013. Available at:

- 1 <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/16068/792790ESW0P1290>
2 [ox0377371B00PUBLIC00.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/16068/792790ESW0P1290/ox0377371B00PUBLIC00.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y).
- 3 [46] K. Thoday, P. Benjamin, M. Gan, and E. Puzzolo, "The Mega Conversion Program from
4 kerosene to LPG in Indonesia: Lessons learned and recommendations for future clean
5 cooking energy expansion," *Energy for Sustainable Development*, vol. 46, pp. 71-81, 2018.
- 6 [47] MEMR, "Handbook of Energy & Economic Statistics of Indonesia 2017," Jakarta: Ministry of
7 Energy and Mineral Resources, 2017.
- 8 [48] R. K. Andadari, P. Mulder, and P. Rietveld, "Energy poverty reduction by fuel switching.
9 Impact evaluation of the LPG conversion program in Indonesia," *Energy Policy*, vol. 66, pp.
10 436-449, 2014.
- 11 [49] G. A. Panggabean. (2017). *Pemerintah bidik bauran energi terbarukan 18% (The government*
12 *aims 18% renewable energy share)*. Available at:
13 <https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/20171015/44/699308/pemerintah>. Accessed on 16 March
14 2019.
- 15 [50] MEMR, "2013 Statistics of electricity," Jakarta: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
16 2013. Available at: [http://www.djk.esdm.go.id/images/pdf/statistik-](http://www.djk.esdm.go.id/images/pdf/statistik-ketenagalistrikan/statistik-ketenagalistrikan-2013.pdf)
17 [ketenagalistrikan/statistik-ketenagalistrikan-2013.pdf](http://www.djk.esdm.go.id/images/pdf/statistik-ketenagalistrikan/statistik-ketenagalistrikan-2013.pdf).
- 18 [51] MEMR, "2014 Statistics of electricity," Jakarta: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
19 2014. Available at: [http://www.djk.esdm.go.id/images/pdf/statistik-](http://www.djk.esdm.go.id/images/pdf/statistik-ketenagalistrikan/Statistik%20Ketenagalistrikan%202014%20FINAL.pdf)
20 [ketenagalistrikan/Statistik%20Ketenagalistrikan%202014%20FINAL.pdf](http://www.djk.esdm.go.id/images/pdf/statistik-ketenagalistrikan/Statistik%20Ketenagalistrikan%202014%20FINAL.pdf).
- 21 [52] GAPKI. (2017). *Perkembangan biodiesel Indonesia dan keberatan Indonesia atas bea masuk*
22 *anti dumping Uni Eropa (Biodiesel development in Indonesia and objections to European*
23 *Union anti dumping measures on biodiesel)*. Available at:
24 [https://gapki.id/news/2519/perkembangan-biodiesel-indonesia-dan-keberatan-indonesia-](https://gapki.id/news/2519/perkembangan-biodiesel-indonesia-dan-keberatan-indonesia-atas-bea-masuk-anti-dumping-uni-eropa)
25 [atas-bea-masuk-anti-dumping-uni-eropa](https://gapki.id/news/2519/perkembangan-biodiesel-indonesia-dan-keberatan-indonesia-atas-bea-masuk-anti-dumping-uni-eropa). Accessed on 16 March 2019.
- 26 [53] GAPKI. (20). *Perkembangan biodiesel di Indonesia dan terbesar di Asia (Indonesia biodiesel*
27 *production biggest in Asia)*. Available at: [https://gapki.id/news/3250/perkembangan-](https://gapki.id/news/3250/perkembangan-biodiesel-di-indonesia-dan-terbesar-di-asia)
28 [biodiesel-di-indonesia-dan-terbesar-di-asia](https://gapki.id/news/3250/perkembangan-biodiesel-di-indonesia-dan-terbesar-di-asia). Accessed on 16 March 2019.
- 29 [54] A. Arvirianty, "Jonan: Energy baru hanya capai 20% di 2025 (Jonan: Renewable energy share
30 will only be 20% by 2025)," ed: CNBC Indonesia, 2018.
- 31 [55] M. Maulidia, P. Dargusch, P. Ashworth, and F. Ardiansyah, "Rethinking renewable energy
32 targets and electricity sector reform in Indonesia: A private sector perspective," *Renewable*
33 *and Sustainable Energy Reviews*, vol. 101, pp. 231-247, 2019.
- 34 [56] MEMR/DGNREEC, "Laporan Kinerja Tahun 2017 (2017 Performance Report)," Jakarta:
35 Directorate General of New and Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation of the Ministry
36 of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2017. Available at:
37 <http://ebtke.esdm.go.id/post/2018/10/08/2030/laporan.kinerja.ditjen.ebtke.tahun.2017>.
- 38 [57] R. S. Ayu, "PLTB Tolo tambah pasokan listrik di Sulawesi (Tolo wind power park increases
39 electricity supply in Sulawesi)," in *Kompas*, ed. Jakarta: Kompas Gramedia, 2019.
- 40 [58] Y. Taqwa. (2019). *Energi angin berpotensi 1,6 GW yang dapat Dikembangkan (Wind energy*
41 *has 1.6 GW potential)*. Accessed on 26 August 2019.
- 42 [59] MEMR/DGNREEC, "Laporan Kinerja Tahun 2018 (2018 Performance Report)," Jakarta:
43 Directorate General of New and Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation of the Ministry
44 of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2018.
- 45 [60] MEMR/DGNREEC, "Laporan Kinerja Tahun 2016 (2016 Performance Report)," Jakarta:
46 Directorate General of New and Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation of the Ministry
47 of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2016.
- 48 [61] MEMR/DGNREEC, "Laporan Kinerja Tahun 2015 (2015 Performance Report)," Jakarta:
49 Directorate General of New and Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation of the Ministry
50 of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2015.

- 1 [62] MEMR/DGNREEC, "Laporan Kinerja Tahun 2014 (2014 Performance Report)," Jakarta:
2 Directorate General of New and Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation of the Ministry
3 of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2014.
- 4 [63] F. Polzin, F. Egli, B. Steffen, and T. S. Schmidt, "How do policies mobilize private finance for
5 renewable energy?—A systematic review with an investor perspective," *Applied energy*, vol.
6 236, pp. 1249-1268, 2019.
- 7 [64] M. Horn and A. Sidharta. (2017). *New Indonesian feed-in tariffs: Will renewables benefit?*
8 Available at:
9 [https://www.dlapiper.com/en/newzealand/insights/publications/2017/03/new-indonesian-](https://www.dlapiper.com/en/newzealand/insights/publications/2017/03/new-indonesian-feed-in-tariffs/#ref4)
10 [feed-in-tariffs/#ref4](https://www.dlapiper.com/en/newzealand/insights/publications/2017/03/new-indonesian-feed-in-tariffs/#ref4). Accessed on 4 April 2019.
- 11 [65] S. F. Kennedy, "Indonesia's energy transition and its contradictions: Emerging geographies of
12 energy and finance," *Energy research & social science*, vol. 41, pp. 230-237, 2018.
- 13 [66] MEMR, "Kebijakan pengembangan energi terbarukan dan konservasi energi (Policy on
14 renewable energy and energy conservation)," Jakarta: Ministry of Energy and Mineral
15 Resources, 2003.
- 16 [67] MEMR, "Indonesia Energy Outlook 2010," Jakarta: The Ministry of Energy and Mineral
17 Resources, 2010.
- 18 [68] MEMR, "Handbook of Energy & Economic Statistics of Indonesia 2018," Jakarta: Ministry of
19 Energy and Mineral Resources, 2018.
- 20 [69] Kontan.co.id. (2013). *Kinerja industri selama tahun 2013 menurun (The industrial sector*
21 *performance slowing down in 2013)* [News]. Available at:
22 <https://industri.kontan.co.id/news/kinerja-industri-selama-tahun-2013-menurun>. Accessed
23 on 19 March 2019.
- 24 [70] J. Gruber. (2014). *Welcome to phase three of the global financial crisis*. Available at:
25 [https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesgruber/2014/01/29/welcome-to-phase-three-of-the-](https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesgruber/2014/01/29/welcome-to-phase-three-of-the-global-financial-crisis/#34a17b454a62)
26 [global-financial-crisis/#34a17b454a62](https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesgruber/2014/01/29/welcome-to-phase-three-of-the-global-financial-crisis/#34a17b454a62). Accessed on 19 March 2019.
- 27 [71] W. G. Santika, T. Urmee, M. Anissuzaman, G. Shafiullah, and P. A. Bahri, "Sustainable energy
28 for all: Impacts of Sustainable Development Goals implementation on household sector
29 energy demand in Indonesia," presented at the The 2018 International Conference on
30 Smart-Green Technology in Electrical and Information Systems, Bali, 25 October 2018, 2018.
- 31 [72] S. Pachauri, A. Scott, L. Scott, and A. Shepherd, "Energy for All: Harnessing the Power of
32 Energy Access for Chronic Poverty Reduction," in "Energy Policy Guide," Chronic Poverty
33 Advisory Network, 2013. Available at:
34 <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/getWSDoc.php?id=1364>.
- 35 [73] S. Oparaocha and S. Dutta, "Gender and energy for sustainable development," *Current*
36 *Opinion in Environmental Sustainability*, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 265-271, 2011.
- 37 [74] S. R. Khandker, H. A. Samad, R. Ali, and D. F. Barnes, "Who Benefits Most from Rural
38 Electrification? Evidence in India," *Energy J.*, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 75-96, 2014.
- 39 [75] W. G. Santika, M. Anisuzzaman, Y. Simsek, P. A. Bahri, G. Shafiullah, and T. Urmee,
40 "Implications of the Sustainable Development Goals on national energy demand: The case of
41 Indonesia," *Energy*, vol. 196, p. 117100, 2020.
- 42 [76] UNDESA. (2019). *SDG Indicator*. Available at:
43 <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/database/>. Accessed on 28 March 2020.
- 44 [77] ADB, *Achieving Universal Electricity Access in Indonesia*. Manila: Asian Development Bank,
45 2016.
- 46 [78] M. Fauzia, "Kementerian ESDM Bagikan Lampu Tenaga Surya Hemat Energi di Pedalaman
47 Papua," ed: Kompas.com, 2018.
- 48 [79] Y. Petriella. (2020). *Kementerian ESDM: Rasio elektrifikasi menuju 99,9 persen di 2020*.
49 Available at: [https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/20200210/44/1199187/kementerian-esdm-](https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/20200210/44/1199187/kementerian-esdm-rasio-elektifikasi-menusju-999-persen-di-2020)
50 [rasio-elektifikasi-menusju-999-persen-di-2020](https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/20200210/44/1199187/kementerian-esdm-rasio-elektifikasi-menusju-999-persen-di-2020). Accessed on 12 March 2020.

- 1 [80] World Bank. (2014). *Cleaner cook stoves for a healthier Indonesia*. Available at:
2 [https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/11/03/cleaner-cook-stoves-for-a-](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/11/03/cleaner-cook-stoves-for-a-healthier-indonesia)
3 [healthier-indonesia](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/11/03/cleaner-cook-stoves-for-a-healthier-indonesia). Accessed on 15 August 2019.
- 4 [81] K. R. Smith and K. Dutta, "Cooking with gas," *Energy for Sustainable Development*, vol. 2, no.
5 15, pp. 115-116, 2011.
- 6 [82] R. Bridle *et al.*, "Missing the 23 per cent target: Roadblocks to the development of
7 renewable energy in Indonesia," Winnipeg, Manitoba: The International Institute for
8 Sustainable Development, 2018.
- 9 [83] C. Attwood *et al.*, "Financial supports for coal and renewables in Indonesia," Manitoba:
10 International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2017.
- 11 [84] MoF. (2019). *Subsidi (subsidies)*. Available at: [http://www.data-](http://www.data-apbn.kemenkeu.go.id/Dataset/Details/1037)
12 [apbn.kemenkeu.go.id/Dataset/Details/1037](http://www.data-apbn.kemenkeu.go.id/Dataset/Details/1037). Accessed on 27 August 2019.
- 13 [85] T. Adharsyah. (2019). *Jokowi dan setumpuk risiko di balik rencana naiknya harga BBM*
14 *(Jokowi and risks associated with the plan to rise the prices of fuels)*. Available at:
15 [https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20190702133701-4-82127/jokowi-dan-setumpuk-](https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20190702133701-4-82127/jokowi-dan-setumpuk-risiko-di-balik-rencana-naiknya-harga-bbm)
16 [risiko-di-balik-rencana-naiknya-harga-bbm](https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20190702133701-4-82127/jokowi-dan-setumpuk-risiko-di-balik-rencana-naiknya-harga-bbm). Accessed on 27 August 2019.
- 17 [86] Y. Susmiati, "Prospek produksi bioetanol dari limbah pertanian dan sampah organik (The
18 prospect of bioethanol production from agricultural residues and organic waste)," *Industria:*
19 *Jurnal Teknologi dan Manajemen Agroindustri*, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 67-80, 2018.
- 20 [87] T. L. Chew and S. Bhatia, "Catalytic processes towards the production of biofuels in a palm
21 oil and oil palm biomass-based biorefinery," *Bioresource technology*, vol. 99, no. 17, pp.
22 7911-7922, 2008.
- 23 [88] UNCTAD, "Second generation biofuel markets: State of Play, trade and developing country
24 perspectives," Geneva: The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
25 (UNCTAD), 2016. Available at:
26 https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditcted2015d8_en.pdf.
- 27 [89] J. C. Kurnia, S. V. Jangam, S. Akhtar, A. P. Sasmito, and A. S. Mujumdar, "Advances in biofuel
28 production from oil palm and palm oil processing wastes: a review," *Biofuel Research*
29 *Journal*, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 332-346, 2016.
- 30 [90] H. Eggert, M. Greaker, and E. Potter, "Policies for second generation biofuels: current status
31 and future challenges," Oslo: Statistics Norway 1892-7513, 2011.
- 32 [91] I. U. Aldin. (2018). *Pembangkit Kincir Angin Sidrap Tahap 2 Siap Beroperasi 2019 (Sidrap*
33 *wind power plant 2 ready in 2019)*. Available at:
34 [https://katadata.co.id/berita/2018/07/03/pembangkit-kincir-angin-sidrap-tahap-2-siap-](https://katadata.co.id/berita/2018/07/03/pembangkit-kincir-angin-sidrap-tahap-2-siap-beroperasi-2019)
35 [beroperasi-2019](https://katadata.co.id/berita/2018/07/03/pembangkit-kincir-angin-sidrap-tahap-2-siap-beroperasi-2019). Accessed on 7 April 2019.
- 36 [92] M. Agustinus. (2018). *PLN: Rumah di Jakarta Jangan Pasang PLTS Atap, Listrik Sudah*
37 *Berlebih (PLN: Do not install rooftop solar panel in Jakarta, which has surplus power)*
38 Available at: [https://kumparan.com/@kumparanbisnis/pln-rumah-di-jakarta-jangan-pasang-](https://kumparan.com/@kumparanbisnis/pln-rumah-di-jakarta-jangan-pasang-plts-atap-listrik-sudah-berlebih-1543317995047086339)
39 [plts-atap-listrik-sudah-berlebih-1543317995047086339](https://kumparan.com/@kumparanbisnis/pln-rumah-di-jakarta-jangan-pasang-plts-atap-listrik-sudah-berlebih-1543317995047086339). Accessed on 7 April 2019.
- 40 [93] S. Suehiro, "Energy intensity of GDP as an index of energy conservation: Problems in
41 international comparison of energy intensity of GDP and estimate using sector-based
42 approach," Tokyo: Institute of Energy Economics Japan, 2007.
- 43 [94] V. Modi, S. McDade, D. Lallement, and J. Saghir, "Energy services for the Millennium
44 Development goals," New York: Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme, United
45 Nations Development Programme, UN Millennium Project, and World Bank, 2005.
- 46 [95] IEA, "Energy Efficiency 2017: Indonesia focus (Bahasa Indonesia)," in "Market Report Series,"
47 Paris: International Energy Agency, 2017.
- 48 [96] IEA. (2019). *Energy efficiency in Indonesia*. Available at:
49 <https://www.iea.org/topics/energyefficiency/e4/indonesia/>. Accessed on 8 April 2019.

- 1 [97] P. Zhang, X. Shi, Y. Sun, J. Cui, and S. Shao, "Have China's provinces achieved their targets of
2 energy intensity reduction? Reassessment based on nighttime lighting data," *Energy policy*,
3 vol. 128, pp. 276-283, 2019.
- 4 [98] J. L. Wallace, "Juking the stats? Authoritarian information problems in China," *British Journal*
5 *of Political Science*, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 11-29, 2016.
- 6 [99] A. Kerner, M. Jerven, and A. Beatty, "Are Development Statistics Manipulable? Simons
7 Papers in Security and Development (No. 37/2014)," Vancouver: School for International
8 Studies, Simon Fraser University, 2014.
- 9 [100] World Bank. (2019). *Access to electricity (% of population)*. Available at:
10 <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS?locations=ID>. Accessed on 19 August
11 2019.
- 12 [101] J. Waage *et al.*, "Governing the UN Sustainable Development Goals: interactions,
13 infrastructures, and institutions," *The Lancet Global Health*, vol. 3, no. 5, pp. e251-e252,
14 2015 2015.
- 15 [102] BPS, "2015 Welfare Statistics," Jakarta: BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2015.
- 16 [103] BPS, "2016 Welfare Statistics," Jakarta: BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2016.
- 17 [104] BPS, "2017 Welfare Statistics," Jakarta: BPS-Statistics Indonesia,, 2017.

18



Click here to access/download
Table
Appendices.docx



Declaration of interests

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

The authors declare the following financial interests/personal relationships which may be considered as potential competing interests:

None
