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Energy for Sustainable Development 59 (2020) 33–48 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Energy for Sustainable Development An assessment of energy policy impacts on achieving Sustainable Development Goal 7 in Indonesia Wayan G. Santika a,b,\*, Tania Urmee a, Yeliz Simsek a,c,d, Parisa A. Bahri a, M. Anisuzzaman a a Discipline of Engineering and Energy, Murdoch University, 90 South Street, Murdoch, Western Australia 6150, Australia b Department of Mechanical Engineering, Politeknik Negeri Bali, Bali, Indonesia c Department of Mechanical and Metallurgical Engineering, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Vicuña Mackenna 4860, Macul, Santiago, Chile d UC Energy Research Center, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Vicuña Mackenna 4860, Macul, Santiago, Chile article info Article history: Received 20 December 2019 Revised 30 August 2020 Accepted 31 August 2020 Available online xxxx **Keywords:** Sustainable Development Goals Energy policy effectiveness Energy access Renewable energy Energy efficiency Indonesia abstract As countries start to implement the Sustainable Development Goals in their national development agendas, re- views of the current policy environment are necessary to ensure that the goals are achievable by 2030. The pres- ent study assesses the effectiveness of energy policy in Indonesia in supporting progress towards universal energy access, a substantial increase in renewable energy deployment, and improvement in energy efficiency. Laws and regulations related to energy were reviewed, and their contribution to achieving the energy targets of the Sustainable Development Goals in Indonesia was evaluated in terms of policy effectiveness. Results show that providing electricity for the remaining 1.1 million households living in the outermost and least devel- oped regions of the archipelago is very challenging. However, Indonesia is still on track to achieve 100% residen- tial electrification by 2030 as long as enough budget is allocated annually. Indonesia may not be able to provide access to clean cooking fuels and technology for everyone by 2030. The current policy focusing mostly on gas for cooking will be less effective in reaching the remaining households that cook with solid biomass and usually live in poverty. Similarly, the current policy scenario is not sufficient to allow enough progress to achieve the renew- able energy target. Finally, the assessment of energy efficiency policy suggests that sectoral energy use is shaped by variables and regulation not primarily intended to improve energy efficiency. © 2020 International Energy Initiative. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Introduction The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were ratified in Septem- ber 2015. A total of 193 countries agreed to strive to achieve 169 ambi- tious targets associated with the 17 SDGs by 2030, including to eradicate poverty and hunger, provide access to basic services, promote prosper- ity, and protect the environment (UN, 2015). This 2030 global agenda for sustainable development is expected to provide a framework to in- tegrate social, economic, and environmental goals. The vital role of en- ergy as a key enabling factor in achieving the SDGs was acknowledged (McCollum et al., 2018; Nerini et al., 2018; Santika et al., 2019). It was therefore included as the seventh SDG (SDG7): to ensure access to af- fordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all. SDG7 has three main targets for 2030: universal energy access, an increase in the share of





allocated to PLN for electrification programs increased more than fivefold, from only IDR 571 billion in 2010 to IDR 2.93 trillion in 2011 (Nugroho, 2012). As a result, almost 5.6 million more houses were connected with electricity in that year alone, and the electrification ratio grew considerably from 67.15% to 72.95% (MEMR, 2018a). FTP 1 continued to contribute to the improvement together with fast track program 2 (FTP 2). A more recent announcement from the ministry claimed that the electrification ratio reached 98.3% in 2018 (Afriyadi, 2019). Fig. 2 indicates that, if the current progress is maintained [under the current policy scenario](#), 100% [electricity](#) access is achievable by 2020. Targets EA CC RE EE EA-CC EA-RE [EA-EE CC-RE](#) CC-EE RE-EE EA-CC-RE EA-CC-EE EA-RE-EE EA-CC-RE-EE Total Regulations 5 5 29 20 0 5 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 4 73 80 70 Million households 60 50 40 30 20 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Total households Households with electricity Fig. 2. Electricity access in Indonesia. Data source: (BPS, 2018b; MEMR, 2008; MEMR, 2018a; MEMR/DGE, 2019). Access to clean cooking fuels and technology Households without access to clean fuels for cooking are defined as those cooking with kerosene, charcoal, or fuelwood using unimproved cookstoves. We assume that families cooking with improved cookstoves (ICSs) in Indonesia are negligible as only 5500 ICSs of the 7000 stoves target were distributed by 2012 (from a pilot project under the Indonesia Clean Stove Initiative) (ASTAE, 2013; ESMAP, 2016). Overall, [the successful](#) implementation [of the](#) "Kerosene to LPG Conversion Program" substantially reduced the number of households without access from 48.49 to 17.81 million during the 2007–2016 period (calculated from (BPS, 2017a)). Households using primarily kerosene for cooking reduced dramatically from 20.25 million (36.6%) in 2007 to 2.51 million (3.8%) in 2016. During the same period, households cooking mainly with fuelwood have been halved from 27.3 million to 14.3 million (reduced from 49.4% to 21.6%). It is not clear if the reduction in fuelwood use was due to the conversion program (Thoday et al., 2018). Fig. B2 presents the few laws and regulations affecting access to clean cooking and technology, and Fig. 3 shows households without access [to clean](#) cooking [fuels and technology](#) between 2007 [and](#) 2016. During this period, the percentage of households without access to clean fuels and technology decreased significantly from 87.6% to 26.8%. Between 2008 and 2009, under PR 104/2007, approximately 15.8 million and 24.2 million free LPG starter kits were distributed to households and small/micro enterprises respectively (Thoday et al., 2018), contributing to a substantial reduction from 48.5 million households in 2007 to 36.7 million households in 2009 without access to clean cooking technology. From 2010 to 2015, a total of 13.6 million LPG starter kits were distributed (Thoday et al., 2018), contributing to a further reduction to 20.1 million households without access in 2015. By 2016, about 17.8 million households remained without access to clean cooking fuels and technology (BPS, 2017a). A recent national socio-economic census reveals that 17.46% of households were still without access to clean fuels and technology in 2019 (BPS, 2019). Unlike electricity, there is no policy specifically targeting the reduction of fuelwood use (or solid biomass in general). A proxy target of [the 2014 National Energy Policy](#) ([locally known as KEN](#)) was to achieve an 85% share of gas use in the household sector by 2015, but almost 30% of households still cooked either with fuelwood, kerosene, or charcoal in 2015 (BPS, 2017a). The 2017 [National Energy General Plan](#) ([locally known as RUEN](#)) sets targets of 4.7 million and 1.7 million houses connected to natural gas pipelines and biogas digesters, respectively, by 2025 (MEMR, 2017a). A centrally controlled gas pipeline will mostly serve city houses previously consuming LPG, and in this way, biogas digesters may replace LPG and traditional biomass. Since there is no major program addressing solid biomass use, universal access to clean cooking energy may not be achieved by 2030, as predicted by the (dashed) trendline2 (Fig. 3). When the trendline is extended to 2030, almost 5 million households [will still be](#) left behind [without access to clean cooking fuels](#). At this stage, it appears that [Indonesia is](#) not [on track to](#) reach [universal access to](#) clean cooking. Targeting only [1.7 million houses connected](#) to [biogas digesters](#) will not suffice to address the issue, especially when the ministerial data (MEMR, 2017b) suggest that biomass consumption of the household sector (mostly solid) increased significantly during the 2007–2016 period. It suggests that households relying on solid biomass for cooking could be much higher than the estimation, with fuel stacking (using more than one fuel side-by-side) likely (Andadari et al., 2014; Thoday et al., 2018). Renewable energy SDGs Target 7.2 is to increase the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix substantially. Indonesia sets its target to be 23% of the total primary energy supply (TPES) by 2025. Fig. B3 shows laws and regulations strongly associated with the development of the renewable energy share in Indonesia. The interactions between these regulations and the development in renewable energy are depicted in Fig. 4. 2 More information about trendlines can be found at <https://support.office.com/en-us/article/choosing-the-best-trendline-for-your-data-1bb3c9e7-0280-45b5-9ab0-d0c93161daa8> 60.00 50.00 Million households 40.00 30.00 20.00 10.00  $y = 53.561e-0.107x$   $R^2 = 0.9859$  - Fig. 3. [Households without access to clean fuels for cooking and its trendline to 2030, fitted to the 2007–2016 historical data](#). Data source: (BPS, 2017a). The government claimed an achievement of 8.43% RE share in 2017, which increased from 4.42% in 2010 (MEMR, 2016; Mulyana, 2018). The policies responsible for this progress include Energy Law 30/2007, which obligates local and central governments to increase the utilization of local and renewable energy and encourages them to provide incentives for renewable energy use. In 2009, the Electricity Law was passed. In agreement with the Energy Law, the Electricity Law requires that electricity generation should prioritize renewable sources. The laws were soon supported by MEMR 31/2009 and MEMR 32/2009, obligating [PLN to buy electricity generated from](#) small RE [and](#) geothermal producers, respectively, under the feed-in-tariff (FIT) mechanism. Presidential Regulation (PR) 61/2011, concerning the national action plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (RAN-GRK), also sought to provide electricity from RE and biogas digester sets in compliance with the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The protocol bound its state parties to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and Indonesia passed the protocol as a national law in 2004. However, progress was slow until 2012 despite the regulatory framework development. The RE share in the energy mix only increased from 4.42% in 2010 to 4.52% in 2012 (MEMR, 2016). The slow rate of increase is understandable, considering that RE projects may take years to complete. In 2013, electricity consumption from RE increased by almost 9 million BOE to 60.68 million BOE (see Table 6). However, the increase was mainly due to the contribution of two large hydropower plants (603 MW total capacity) operating since the 1980s in North Sumatra, and three hydropower plants (365 MW) located in South Sulawesi. It turns out that those plants were added to the national list only in 24  $22 y = 0.0636x^2 + 0.0538x + 4.0918$   $20 R^2 = 0.9788$  18 16 Percent 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0  $y = 3.6111e0.1044x$   $R^2 = 0.9502$   $y = 0.626x + 3.1382$   $R^2 = 0.94$  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Fig. 4. [Modern renewable energy share in the TPES and its trendlines to 2030](#). The blue, orange, and grey dashed lines assume polynomial, exponential, and linear trends, respectively, fitted to the 2010–2017 historical data. Data sources: (MEMR, 2016; Mulyana, 2018; Panggabean, 2017). Table 6 Primary energy use in Indonesia. Data source: (MEMR, 2016). Sources Primary energy use (Million BOE) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Renewable electricity Biodiesel Coal Oil Natural gas 48.18 49.77 1.26 2.03 281.40 334.14 518.41 546.64 269.94 261.71 51.68 60.68 3.79 5.93 377.89 406.37 533.83 542.95 259.46 270.13 66.73 10.44 321.60 544.80 271.38 73.50 5.18 364.62 545.73 279.63 [Table 7 Targets and realization of renewable power plants \(off- and on-grid\)](#) (MEMR/DGNREEC, 2017). Power plant capacity 2016 2017 (MW) Target Realization % Target Realization % Geothermal Bioenergy Hydro Solar Wind 1713.0 1643.50 2069.4 1787.9 9252.0 5334.7 92.1 91.6 11.5 2.4 95.9% 1976.0 86.4% 2291.9 57.7% 9590.0 99.5% 118.6 21.0% 19.2 1808.5 91.5% 1839.5 80.3% NA NA 96.76 81.6% NA NA 2013 (MEMR, 2013; MEMR, 2014). Biodiesel consumption also grew significantly at the same time, thanks to the MEMR 32/2008 ordering mandatory biodiesel blends ranging from 5% in the transportation sector to 10% in industrial, commercial, and generation sectors by 2015. Consequently, the total RE share rose to 5.18%. Another meaningful improvement was observed after the enactment of MEMR 25/2013. It demanded a mandatory blending of 10% biodiesel (B10) in the transport, industrial, and commercial sectors, and 20% in the electricity generation sector, in effect since January 2014. The biodiesel consumption

almost doubled from 5.93 million BOE in 2013 to 10.44 million BOE the next year (see Table 6). Electricity generated from renewables increased from 60.68 million to 66.73 million BOE in the same period, and coal consumption dropped significantly, which contributed to the increase in the share of RE to 6.35%. However, due to low fossil fuel prices, the biodiesel price could not compete and domestic biodiesel demand halved in 2015, slowing down RE penetration in the energy mix (GAPKI, 2017a). The government responded by passing MEMR 12/2015 and PR 61/2015. The former was the revised version of MEMR 25/2013 and increased mandatory biodiesel blending to 20% (in transport, industrial, and commercial sectors) and 30% (in the electricity generation sector) in January 2016. Under PR 61/2015, money collected from palm oil export levies initiated oil palm plantation funding to be used to subsidize the difference between diesel and biodiesel prices. In reality, the mandatory blending implementation of B20 and B30 in the transport sector began in 2016 and 2020, respectively. The regulations effectively increased domestic biodiesel consumption from 0.86 million kilolitres in 2015 to 2.25 million kilolitres (2016) and 2.4 million kilolitres (2017) (GAPKI, 2017b). It helped to boost the RE share to 7.7% in 2016 and 8.43% in 2017. Fig. 4 also shows extended linear, exponential, and second-order polynomial trendlines of the renewable energy share to 2030. The most optimistic projection (the polynomial trendline) indicates that the share will be 21% by 2025. When exponential growth is assumed, it will be 19%, and the 23% target by 2025 will not be achieved if the trend continues. The minister of energy and mineral resources admitted that Indonesia might miss the target, and a target of 20% by 2025 will be more reasonable (Arvirianty, 2018). Similarly, the 2017 RUEN estimates that 45.2 GW power capacity from renewables will be necessary to reach the 23% target. However, the current power capacity from renewable energy only increased from 5.5 GW in 2012 to 7.3 GW in 2017 (see Fig. 5). If the trend continues, the total power capacity will be less than 12 GW by 2025, substantially lower than the RUEN target. In an attempt to achieve 23% of renewable energy share by 2025, Indonesia will depend mostly on hydropower, bioenergy, and geothermal because of their large reserves (Maulidia et al., 2019) and their dispatchable and non-intermittent nature. Targets increased by more than 200 MW in most RE areas between 2016 and 2017, but the realization of those targets fell short in all areas (see Table 7). Geothermal and bioenergy power plant development targets were missed by 8.5% and 19.7% in 2017, respectively. Hydropower plants achieved only 57.7% of their target in 2016. Indonesia missed its renewable electricity targets 50,000 45,000 40,000 35,000 Mega Watts 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0 y = 5612.7e0.0473x R<sup>2</sup> = 0.813 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Actual power capacity from renewables RUEN Target Expon. (Actual power capacity from renewables) Fig. 5. [Actual power capacity from renewable energy \(solid blue\), its exponential trendline \(dashed blue\), and RUEN target to 2025 \(orange\)](#). Data sources: (MEMR, 2017a; MEMR, 2018a). Hydropower Geothermal Bioenergy Wind energy Solar energy Biofuel 25% Policy Effectiveness Indicators 15% 5% -5% -15% 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Fig. 6. [Policy Effectiveness Indicators \(PEIs\) of RE measured based on total power capacity added from 2013 to 2018](#). The biofuel PEI was based on biodiesel production. Constructed based on (MEMR, 2018a; MEMR/DGNREEC, 2014; MEMR/DGNREEC, 2015; MEMR/DGNREEC, 2016; MEMR/DGNREEC, 2017; MEMR/DGNREEC, 2018). even though the annual target was increased by less than 1 GW in 2017. To achieve the renewable electricity capacity of 45.2 GW by 2025, an annual target of at least 4.5 GW has to be met. Fig. 6 shows the policy effectiveness indicators (PEIs) of each RE. The measure is related to its annual increase in power capacity during the 2013–2018 period, except for biofuel, which was estimated based on the total volume of biodiesel production during the same period. The graph indicates that the current RE policies in Indonesia are not effective in supporting the development of hydropower and solar technology. The 6% hydropower increase in 2013 was not caused by newly added power, as has been previously explained. Geothermal energy shows progress over the last three years, but it will not be enough to meet the target. Bioenergy (electricity generated from biomass, biogas, and solid waste) showed promising progress in 2014 and 2015 only. Positive development in wind energy technology is expected in the near future. After the installation of Sidrap wind park in 2018 (75 MW), Jeneponto wind park with the power capacity of 72 MW was also installed to the Sulawesi system in early 2019 (Ayu, 2019). Other wind projects, including Sukabumi (170 MW), Lebak (150 MW), Jeneponto (175 MW), and Sidrap II (75 MW), are under negotiation with PLN (Taqwa, 2019). Finally, biofuel production fluctuated, but corrective policy responses, including the mandatory biodiesel blending and oil palm plantation funding, created considerable progress towards reaching the target. Good policy instruments attract private and foreign investments (Maulidia et al., 2019; Polzin et al., 2019). These investments are represented by [the capacity development of renewable power plants owned by the IPPs and PPUs](#) (see Table 8). Overall, only 745 MW of new power from RE was added between 2013 and 2017, indicating a slow influx of investments. Most of the investments flowed to geothermal energy (455 MW) and mini hydropower (177 MW). During the same period, PLN only added 31 MW of renewable power to the system (MEMR, 2018a). In contrast, almost 5000 MW of power from fossil fuels was added during the same period, of which two-thirds was generated from coal power plants (MEMR, 2018a). Similarly, PLN is planning to add 27,063 MW (48%) coal-based power plants and 12,617 MW other fossil-based power plants between 2019 and 2028 (PLN, 2019). This time, however, renewables will contribute about 30% of the planned installations (16,714 MW). Compared to the current achievement, this plan shows Indonesia's commitment to achieving its 23% renewable share in the national energy mix. However, intention does not always translate to the actual realisation of the plan. For example, the second fast track program (FTP2) has been initiated since 2010, and its latest plan was to install 17,458 MW power plants, including 6658 MW hydro and geothermal power plants (PLN, 2019). Still, only 755 MW power has been connected to the systems by the end of 2018. The policy most responsible for the development of RE, or the lack thereof, was the FIT mechanism. The FIT policy for geothermal energy, for example, has changed four times (under MEMR Reg. 32/2009, 2/ 2011, 22/2012, and 17/2014), offering higher prices to attract investments. Similarly, the FIT policy of small hydropower has changed three times (MEMR Reg. 12/2014, 22/2014, and 19/2015) after MEMR Reg. 31/2009 and 4/2012, which regulated small and medium scales RE in general, did not attract enough investments. The regulations were finally responded positively to by the geothermal and mini-hydro energy developers, as shown in Table 8. [Table 8 The capacity of renewable power plants operated by the IPPs and PPUs in Indonesia, in Megawatts](#). Data source: extracted from (MEMR, 2018a). Year Hydro Mini hydro Micro hydro Geothermal Wind power Solar Waste Biomass Total /biogas 2012 587.12 2013 1567.37 2014 1567.37 2015 1567.37 2016 1612.37 2017 1612.37 34.43 3.38 46.35 17.82 103.28 18.59 114.18 18.59 155.58 53.89 223.33 53.89 770.80 0.59 775.40 0.59 830.40 0.69 860.40 0.69 1065.40 0.69 1230.40 0.69 0.03 26 0.06 26 0.06 36 7.06 36 8.06 36 0 1422.35 0 2433.59 0 2556.39 0 2597.29 0 2930.99 13.7 3178.44 600,000,000 500,000,000 400,000,000 300,000,000 200,000,000 100,000,000 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Industrial and other Transport Fig. 7. [Final energy consumption of different sectors in Indonesia and related regulations to energy conservation \(in BOE\)](#). Energy data are from (MEMR, 2012; MEMR, 2018b). In contrast, the tariff policy for solar photovoltaic followed a reverse auction mechanism under MEMR Reg. 17/2013. Given a ceiling price of USD 0.25/kWh (USD 0.30/kWh if the technology had 40% local content), the bidder with the lowest bid won. The high ceiling prices without a clear mechanism for loss recovery made PLN reluctant to support the policy (Horn & Sidharta, 2017). For comparison, the current electricity price in Indonesia is approximately USD 0.10/kWh. The initial regulation did not work well and was replaced with MEMR Reg. 19/2016. This time PLN costs were compensated, and the prices were fixed without auction, ranging from USD 0.145 to USD 0.25 in Java and Papua islands, respectively. We have yet to see the full impact of these policies when the MEMR changed the regulations again under MEMR Reg. 12/2017. In the same year, [it was amended and replaced with MEMR Reg. 43/2017 and 50/ 2017](#), regulating all types of RE. The tariffs were fixed based on the regional and national average generation costs (locally known as BPP). On some occasions, the tariffs were set to only 85% of the BPP. Since the BPP is influenced mainly by the costs of coal-generated power plants (PPs), the renewable

PPs now must directly compete with cheap coal PPs. The low tariffs as a consequence of the regulation will reduce the profitability of a project and thus will discourage private investments (Kennedy, 2018). Energy efficiency Fig. B4 presents the structure of the laws, policies, and respective players responsible for energy efficiency related activities. One of the most significant regulations related to energy conservation in the 21st century Indonesia is policy on renewable energy development and energy conservation (under MEMR Decree 2/2004) (MEMR, 2003). This regulation includes energy subsidies, standardizing energy products, regulating energy conservation and management, and prioritizing renewable energy use. Subsequently, MEMR 31/2005 and PR 55/2005 were released and provided guidelines for increasing energy conservation in commercial, industrial, and residential sectors as well as fuel price increases. Effective energy efficiency policies reduce energy consumption. Changes in energy consumption patterns were observed and associated with policies applied before the changes (see Fig. 7). MEMR 31/2005 and, in particular, PR 55/2005 on oil price controls, restricted growth in energy consumption in the transport, residential, and commercial sectors. However, higher fuel prices were responded to differently by the industrial sector. The sector reduced fuel use and replaced it with much cheaper coal (MEMR, 2010). From 2004 to 2007, oil and gas consumption in the industrial sector decreased from 159.79 million to 132.14 million BOE, and coal use doubled from 55.34 million to 121.9 million BOE (MEMR, 2012). Consequently, the industrial sector energy consumption rose substantially in 2007. Another significant endeavour into energy conservation was the kerosene to LPG mega-conversion program (PR 104/2007), causing residential and commercial sectors to reduce consumption during the 2007–2010 period. Unfortunately, the program had no meaningful impact on the transport and industrial sectors. The reduction observed in the industrial sector was mainly due to an economic slowdown and coal price increase. Economic growth dropped from 6.35% in 2007 to 4.63% in 2009 (see Table 9) while the imported coal price peaked at 324.98 USD/t in 2009 from only 131.5 USD/t in 2007 (MEMR, 2012; MEMR, 2018b). These conditions helped reduce coal consumption from 121.9 million BOE in 2007 to 82.59 million BOE in 2009, while oil and gas consumption were stagnant (MEMR, 2018b). Subsequently, GR 70/2009 was passed in November 2009. It proposed energy efficiency standardization and labelling, encouraged incentives for energy conservation, and required entities consuming 6000 TOE or more energy per year to conduct mandatory energy management. It was followed by the introduction of PR 61/2011 concerning [the national action plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions \(RAN-GRK\)](#) and MEMR 14/2012 concerning energy management. They provide more detailed procedures for the implementation of GR 70/2009. The impact on energy consumption of those regulations is unclear at this point in time. The substantial drop in industrial sector energy consumption in 2013–2014 is likely due to a global economic crisis hitting emerging markets, including Indonesia (Gruber, 2014; Kontan.co.id, 2013). Even now, Indonesia is still experiencing slow economic growth. It appears that economic crises have kept the industrial sector energy consumption low, so it is difficult to tell if the energy conservation programs have contributed to it. In June 2013, the government significantly decreased subsidies and increased the prices of gasoline (increased 44.4% to IDR 6500) and diesel fuel (22.2% to IDR 5500) under MEMR 18/2013. In November 2014, the prices were increased further to IDR 8500 for gasoline (31%) and IDR 3. Compared to kerosene, LPG has a higher calorific value. Table 9 Indonesia GDP growth (MEMR, 2018b). Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 GDP 6.01 4.63 6.22 6.49 6.23 5.81 5.01 4.88 5.03 5.07 growth (%) 7500 for diesel oil (27%) under MEMR 34/2014. Less than six weeks later, the prices were corrected to IDR 7600 and IDR 7250 for gasoline and diesel oil, respectively, on 1 January 2015 (MEMR 39/2014). The new prices are still significantly higher than the 2013 ones. As a result, transportation sector energy consumption slowed down in 2013 and 2014 (as a consequence of MEMR 18/2013) and became negative in 2015 (associated with MEMR 34/2014 and 39/2014). SDG energy efficiency Target 7.3 is to double the annual global rate of energy efficiency improvement. Energy efficiency is measured using [the energy intensity of GDP \(SDG Indicator 7.3.1\)](#), and the target is to achieve an annual reduction in energy intensity of 2.6% by 2030 (IEA and the World Bank, 2017). Assuming the reduction increases linearly from 2.1% in 2015 to 2.6% by 2030 (IEA and the World Bank, 2017), global energy intensity will decline from 5.131 MJ/\$2011 PPP GDP in 2015 (World Bank, 2019a) to 3.58 MJ/\$2011 PPP GDP by 2030 (Santika et al., 2019). Interestingly, the energy intensity in Indonesia was 3.53 MJ/\$2011 PPP GDP in 2015 (World Bank, 2019a), which is lower than the 2030 SDGs target. The World Bank data (World Bank, 2019a) also shows that the Indonesian energy intensity declined from 5.24 to 3.53 MJ/\$2011 PPP GDP during the 2001–2015 period. The annual reduction in energy intensity, therefore, became 2.79% during the period, surpassing the 2.6% reduction target of the SDGs (Santika et al., 2018). This is supported by our calculation showing that final energy intensities in 2001 and 2015 were 3.67 and 2.49 MJ/\$2011 PPP GDP, respectively, which give a slightly lower reduction in final energy intensity of 2.73% during the period. Lower energy intensity of GDP is associated with higher energy efficiency. The higher the percentage of the annual energy intensity reduction, the lower the energy intensity. Indonesia has, however, set a lower reduction target of 1% in final energy intensity than what has been achieved, and it is suggested it should revise it to, at least, maintain the current achievement of 2.73%. Fig. 8 compares the primary energy intensity in Indonesia with the average energy intensities of high and lower-middle-income group countries and with the average value for the whole world. The graph shows that Indonesia consumed less energy for every dollar of GDP it produced than all income group countries and the world averages. Low energy intensity of GDP does not mean that Indonesia is advanced in energy efficiency. This issue is discussed in the next section. Discussions [Government Regulation 79/2014 on national energy policy](#) sets national energy targets for Indonesia (see Table 10). The first four targets are comparable to the SDG7 targets, as previously discussed. The next two targets show that the primary energy supply in 2025 is expected to increase to more than twice its 2015 supply (MEMR, 2017a). While these targets and those for power generation and electricity consumption support the energy access target of SDG7, a trade-off may exist between these targets and the energy efficiency target. Indonesia expects an ambitious reduction in oil share from 46% of the total primary energy mix in 2015 to less than 25% in 2025, and at the same time to increase its coal share in order to improve its energy security. Indonesia is an oil net importer country with vast coal resources. The oil share reduction target provides an opportunity to increase renewable energy use, which is undermined by a growing coal consumption target. Finally, the natural gas share remains the same. Synergies and trade-offs also exist between SDG7 and other SDGs. For instance, poor access to energy (SDG7) keeps people in poverty (SDG1), and energy poverty is strongly associated with economic poverty (Pachauri et al., 2013). Poor energy access usually means a lack of access to electricity and clean energy for cooking. Fig. 9 shows an example of [a synergy between electricity access and poverty reduction in Indonesia](#). Access to electricity has a strong negative correlation with poverty. Lack of access to clean energy also will adversely affect women more than men (SDG5) (Oparaocha & Dutta, 2011). Without access to clean energy for cooking, women will spend more time 7.6 MJ/\$2011 PPP GDP 5.4 3 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Indonesia High income Lower middle income World Fig. 8. The primary energy intensity in Indonesia. The average primary energy intensities of high and lower-middle-income groups and the world are shown for comparison. Data source: (World Bank, 2019a). Table 10 Indonesian national energy targets. 1. Electrification ratio 2. Gas for cooking access 3. Renewable energy share 4. Reduction of final energy intensity 5. Primary energy 6. Per capita primary energy 7. Power generation 8. Electricity consumption 9. Oil share 10. Coal share 11. Natural gas share 100% by 2020 85% by 2015 More than 23% and 31% by 2025 and 2050, respectively 1% annually 400 and 1000 MTOE by 2025 and 2050, respectively 1.4 and 3.2 TOE/capita by 2025 and 2050, respectively 115 and 430 GW by 2025 and 2050, respectively 2500 and 7000 kWh/cap Less than 25% and 20% by 2025 and 2050, respectively More than 30% and 25% by 2025 and 2050, respectively More than 22% and 24% by 2025 and 2050, respectively collecting solid biomass (Khandker et al., 2014), and cooking with it harms their health. In addition, a recent study estimates that the implementation of [SDGs in the national development agenda of Indonesia will](#)

[increase energy demand](#) (Santika et al., 2020). Electricity access The analysis shows that several policies have contributed to the expansion of electricity access since 2001. The inclusion of rural electrification programs in the DAK has contributed to the increase in access to electricity and put them in the spotlight since 2011. Although our trendlines indicated this could continue, experience from other countries shows that supplying electricity to the last 10% to 15% of the population is the hardest, the slowest, and the costliest since most of these houses are more remotely located (ADB, 2016). One of the latest regulations in response to the challenge in rural electrification is Presidential [Regulation 47/2017](#), requiring the [provision of free solar panel systems with LED lamps](#) (locally known as LTSHE) [to people in the most remote areas of Indonesia](#). During 2017–2019, some 400 thousand LTSHEs were to be distributed to the most remote locations for free (Fauzia, 2018). However, in 2019 there are still 1.2 million houses (1.7%) without access to electricity. Since 2019, rural electrification programs are no longer under DAK, which indicates that the programs are not a national priority anymore. The Ministry now estimates that almost IDR 11 trillion (USD 758.62 million) will be needed to provide electricity for the remaining households and that the PLN's budget is only IDR 2.1 trillion (Petriella, 2020). The ADB predicts that, with the current level of funding, universal [electricity access will not be achieved in Indonesia by 2020](#). It is therefore suggested a revised target may need to be set to 2025. Access to clean cooking fuels and technology in contrast to electricity access, significantly less attention has been paid [to clean cooking fuels and technology](#) access. [The existing policies](#) do not sufficiently respond to the SDG target. There is not a specific policy [to ensure zero traditional use of solid biomass for cooking, which is the dominant contributor to low clean cooking access after the kerosene to LPG conversion program](#) successfully reduced kerosene use. Addressing the traditional use of biomass with natural gas and biogas programs will not be enough. Natural gas usually replaces LPG in urban areas, and biogas cannot reach non-farming communities. Providing LPG starter kits to the households may not bridge the gap since household choice for cooking fuels is influenced by affordability, availability, accessibility, and acceptability of the fuels (ASTAE, 2013). Without their willingness to pay for clean fuels, especially when solid biomass is abundant, people will be reluctant to adopt a clean way of cooking. A solution could be to promote the use of improved cookstoves (ICS) for those using solid biomass for cooking by including the ICS program in the national energy plan. It can be done in a similar way to the government provision of free LPG starter kits (under PR 104/2007) or free stand-alone solar systems (under PR 47/2017) to rural households. This will ensure all households have access to a cleaner way of cooking by 2030. Lessons learned from the Kerosene-to-LPG Conversion Program and the Indonesia Clean Stove Initiative can be used to develop more effective policy at the national level. Lesson learned from the successful kerosene-to-LPG conversion program includes the necessity for 30 10 Population below international poverty line (%) 9 25 8 20 7 6 15 5 4 10 3 5 2 1 0 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Population below international poverty line (%) Households without electricity access Households without electricity access (%) Fig. 9. [A synergy between electricity access and poverty reduction in Indonesia](#). Data source: (UNDESA, 2019). strong political commitment and firm policy objectives, effective marketing and a good public awareness campaign, a sole credible implementing agency (Pertamina), and effective monitoring and evaluation (ASTAE, 2013). Rural energy programs, including electrification and clean cooking, which have been nationally prioritized and financed under the DAK since 2013, were renamed in 2016 as small and medium scale energy programs to allow for urban application. However, the programs were removed from the 2019 DAK list, indicating that the government lacks commitment to achieving universal access to clean cooking. Judging from policy development and target achievement as well as the inadequate public awareness campaign, it appears that even policymakers are unaware of the indoor air pollution hazards from solid biomass smoke. The World Bank estimates that [indoor air pollution from the traditional use of biomass for cooking](#) in Indonesia leads to about 165,000 premature deaths annually (World Bank, 2014). According to the Asia Sustainable and Alternative Energy Program (ASTAE), barriers to expanding the ICS program include a lack of a development roadmap, limited working capital for producers, and no market demand for advanced ICS (ASTAE, 2013). ASTAE also finds that traditional production models, a limited supply chain, and the lack of awareness by consumers and government on the adverse effects of indoor air pollution are some other obstacles to the expansion. To achieve the target of universal access to clean cooking fuels and technology, the MEMR will need to orchestrate all aspects of the program (from planning to implementation) and encourage participation from different institutions and stakeholders. Those stakeholders include public and private sectors, not-for-profit organizations, universities, international bodies, users, and the relevant ministries responsible for public health, women and children, social lives and villages, industries and enterprises, and research. Another aspect worth mentioning is the fact that cooking with biomass is associated with poverty, and when people can afford gas, they will switch to it (Smith & Dutta, 2011). This situation creates an energy dilemma between providing clean energy access (mitigating energy poverty) and promoting renewable energy (mitigating climate change). The dilemma is common in developing countries such as Indonesia, and the government response to it is usually to relegate the renewable energy target to a peripheral role (Gunningham, 2013). It is also true in the context of electricity access, in which the government prefers cheap coal-fired electricity to renewables. The domestic pressures to provide affordable and reliable energy access in the short term trump international commitments and expectations to increase the share of renewable energy in the national energy mix (Gunningham, 2013). Renewable energy in regard to the renewable energy target, [the current policy is not enough to allow Indonesia to meet the target. The government may push the mandatory biodiesel blend to be more than 30% by 2025](#) but, overall, the transport sector consumes more gasoline than diesel fuels. For example, the share of biodiesel in the total primary energy supply was only 1.94% in 2018 (MEMR, 2019). Indonesia is reluctant to force a compulsory bioethanol blend because ethanol production may become a risk to its food security. In the electricity generation sector, significant improvement has been shown by hydropower, bioenergy, and geothermal; however, their output is not enough to meet the target, while solar and wind energy show a very low deployment. In the case of wind energy, it is argued that low wind speeds in the country make it unattractive for investment, but such barriers do not exist for solar energy. A study involving stakeholder interviews revealed that the current policy is not attractive for investments for the following reasons (Bridle et al., 2018): Firstly, regulatory uncertainties due to frequent policy changes increase investment risks for the developers. These uncertainties have been discussed in the previous section of this paper. Secondly, the coal industry has strong ties with the government, which, in turn, offers the industry fiscal supports (tax exemption, loan guarantees, and price supports) that keep the BPP relatively low. In this economic environment, tariffs become less attractive for renewable generation. Next, the rent-seeking behaviour in fossil fuel industries hinders RE development.4 For instance, in many rural electrification cases, electricity generation from more expensive diesel generators is preferred over cheaper renewables. The involvement of subsidiaries of PLN and Pertamina (the state-owned oil company) as diesel fuel suppliers allegedly creates a conflict of interests that hinder the penetration of renewable energy. Lastly, the build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) requirement, in which developers should transfer the ownership of the renewable PPs to PLN after 20 years of operation, significantly reduces the incentive for investment. Another study involving a detailed inventory of coal and renewable energy subsidies demonstrates that coal subsidies are substantially larger than renewable energy subsidies (Attwood et al., 2017). The study estimates that subsidies to coal in 2014 and 2015 were worth about USD 946 million and 644 million, respectively, while subsidies to renewables were worth around USD 36 million and 133 million. Since coal generates most of the electricity in Indonesia, the cost of subsidies for coal-fired electricity was around 4.9 USD/GWh in 2015, slightly lower than that for renewable electricity of 5.5 USD/GWh (Attwood et al., 2017). The study also reveals that total costs per unit of renewable electricity were still higher than those of coal power generation, even though renewables received higher subsidies. These total costs, however, do not reflect the true costs of generation as

they do not take into account the large environmental and social costs associated with carbon emissions and air pollution. These externality costs of coal-generated and renewable energy electricity are estimated at 60 and 0.2 USD/MWh, respectively (Attwood et al., 2017). If the externality cost is included, then coal will not be able to compete with renewables. Likewise, subsidies for diesel fuel, kerosene, and LPG increased significantly in 2018 as the global oil prices increased (see Fig. 10). Fossil fuel subsidies reduce the competitiveness of renewables and decrease incentives to conserve energy. As the production of first-generation bioethanol may become a risk to its food security, Indonesia needs to encourage the production of second generation bioethanol, which is made from non-food sources. In 2015, the potential of agricultural wastes for bioethanol production in Indonesia was about 11.88 billion litres, mostly from rice straws, bananas, and oil palms (Susmiati, 2018). For comparison, gasoline consumption was 30.69 billion litres in the same year (MEMR, 2018b). Indonesia is the world's largest producer of palm oil, and its production generates a vast amount of wastes, as only 10% of the plant can be extracted for oil (Chew & Bhatia, 2008). However, since the national price of gasoline is low (subsidised), justifying the use of bioethanol exclusively based on cost considerations will be difficult. To enable the government to reach its renewable energy targets, it needs to increase spending on second-generation bioethanol research and development and provide financial incentives for its production as it is currently only in the early phases of commercialization (UNCTAD, 2016). [Kurnia et al. \(Kurnia et al., 2016\) suggest the development of more research on \(1\) efficient systems of transportation and distribution to link oil palm plantation, processing plants, and users, and \(2\) methods for efficient, cost-effective, and profitable biofuel production from oil palm wastes with less environmental impacts. At the same time, the bioethanol blending mandate should be imposed, and a tariff should be put on cheaper, foreign first-generation bioethanol \(Eggert et al., 2011\). These policy initiatives will increase bioethanol production, which in turn will increase learning in second generation](#)

4 Some middlemen, including in some cases PLN subsidiaries, who are involved in the fuel distribution allegedly make profits from their close tie with PLN, which provides power purchasing agreements in favour of gas and diesel-fired power plants (Smith & Dutta, 2011). 8.0 6.0 USD billion 4.34 4.0 2.0 - 2015 3.12 3.36 2016 2017 6.93 2018 Fig. 10. [Fuel subsidies in Indonesia \(assuming USD 1 equals IDR 14,000\)](#). Data sources: (Adharsyah, 2019; MoF, 2019).

bioethanol. The mandatory biodiesel blending program resulted in high social acceptance and so similar would be expected from a mandatory bioethanol program. In the wind energy sector, a 75 MW wind farm in operation since 2018 in South Sulawesi proves that wind energy can attract substantial foreign investment. The electricity feed-in tariff was set at USD 0.11/ kWh in 2015 (Aldin, 2018). More recently, the developer signed another contract to increase its capacity by adding another 60–75 MW. Under MEMR Reg. 50/2017, the new tariff is set to be USD 0.07/kWh, which is 85% of the regional BPP. The developer's spokesman explained that the new tariff was still feasible since the second project does not need to invest in sea or road infrastructure to access to the site. It is not clear whether the BOOT scheme is part of this new agreement, but MEMR Reg. 50/2017 does not seem to discourage investment in wind energy. Responding to the slow deployment of solar energy, the government passed MEMR Reg. 49/2018. It allows PLN's customers to install rooftop solar panels and export excess power to the grid. However, only 65% of the costs can be claimed back. While the regulation promotes rooftop solar energy production and use, PLN had indicated an unwillingness to participate in the project as it will cause significant loss of revenue from reduced consumers' electricity bills. A PLN regional business director said that rooftop solar panels should only be installed outside Java, where electricity is scarce (Agustinus, 2018). Under the current electricity price, the selling price of 65% of the existing electricity tariff will prolong the payback period for rooftop solar and discourage investment. The regulation also limits the capacity a customer can install. A house powered by 2 kW grid electricity can only have 2 kW rooftop of solar panels. Lessons learned from the mandatory biodiesel blend could also be applied to solar energy. For instance, a compulsory deployment of solar energy could be imposed on governmental offices and new commercial and industrial buildings. When a new norm of rooftop solar energy develops, the regulation can be extended to existing buildings and houses. Energy efficiency GDP represents a country's total value of production and income, and energy is consumed as an input factor for production as well as to support the average standard of living (Suehiro, 2007). Therefore, while [the energy intensity of GDP](#) can indicate [the energy efficiency](#) of both the production system and standard of living, it may mask a lower quality of life. Advanced countries usually have efficient production systems and an energy-intensive standard of living. In contrast, developing nations will usually have inefficient production systems and a non-energy-intensive standard of living. It would appear that low energy intensity in Indonesia is unlikely to be the result of efficient production systems; and instead be due to a lower standard of living. Using 2004 data, Suehiro (Suehiro, 2007) found that the industrial sector energy intensity in Indonesia was about 2.5 times less efficient than that of Japan, while the energy intensity of the non-industrial sector was significantly lower. The per capita electricity and cooking energy consumption measures are a proxy for living standards. In 2017, 62,543,434 households (93%) enjoyed grid electricity, consuming approximately 93,583.52 GWh of electricity (MEMR, 2018a). Hence, on average, Indonesian families consume about 1496 kWh, annually, which falls under Tier-4 of household electricity access. Electricity access under this category is reliable enough to power daily household appliances, including general lights, phone charger, fan, television, food processor, washing machine, and refrigerator (without air conditioning). Household energy consumption for cooking in Indonesia is very modest. Calculations using the BPS and MEMR data (BPS, 2017a; MEMR, 2019) show that kerosene and gas (LPG and natural gas) consumption for cooking in 2016 was 1896 and 1774 MJ/person, respectively. This is very close to the minimum annual cooking energy requirement for the basic human needs of 40 kg of oil equivalence or 1675 MJ/person (Modi et al., 2005). The per-person consumption of energy for cooking indicates that the average Indonesian lives a very modest lifestyle. A study assessing energy poverty in typical rural, suburban, and urban areas in Central Java shows that 48% of the households fell into the category of extreme energy poor, and another 43% is considered medium energy poor (Andadari et al., 2014). Central Java is one of the provinces with the lowest electricity consumption per household, which was 1090.6 kWh/household, or about 981.5 MJ/person, in 2017 (Tier 3 electricity access) (MEMR, 2018a). The study used household energy consumption thresholds of 2088 and 4320 MJ/cap to define extreme and medium energy-poor households, respectively. In energy efficiency measures, assessing the policy impacts of reducing national energy consumption and intensity is challenging. Different variables influence sectoral energy use in a country. In the industrial and other sectors, for example, economic performance (growth) has a significant impact on energy consumption, while low economic growth is associated with lower energy demand. In the transportation sector, fuel prices particularly appear to shape consumption as a reduction in energy consumption is noted every time energy prices increase. While in residential and commercial sectors, energy consumption is associated with fuel choices, in which cooking with LPG or natural gas is more efficient than cooking with kerosene. Fig. 7 shows that the transport sector has surpassed the industrial sector as the sector that consumed the most energy in Indonesia since 2013. At the same time, the energy consumption of the commercial and residential sectors also increased. As Indonesian production systems follow a more energy-efficient path, people are moving to a more energy-intensive society. This claim is supported by the IEA findings, in which the residential sector energy consumption in Indonesia increased 35% from 2000 to 2015 caused by increases in population, house ownership and spatial dimensions, and average per capita device and equipment ownership (IEA, 2017b). The study also shows that 86% of the increase in passenger transport energy consumption during the same period was due to a greater distance travelled per passenger. At the same time, there has been an activity shift from energy-intensive manufacturing to less energy-intensive production and services (IEA, 2019). Consequently, in order to meet the required targets, more attention needs to be given to the transport, residential, and commercial sectors. Efficiency improvement efforts in these sectors may include: transportation infrastructure improvements to reduce traffic congestion and increase access to public



transport; vehicle fuel conversion from oil to gas and electricity; increasing fuel efficiency standards for large and inefficient vehicles; the application of building energy efficiency standards, and promoting the adoption of more efficient LED lamps, air conditioners, and other appliances. Data limitation A shortcoming of the present study is that it relies mostly on government data to analyse the achievement of the targets. Some studies show that [official data may be intentionally manipulated for political gains](#) (Wallace, 2016; Zhang et al., 2019) and to generate more aid (Kerner et al., 2014). A comparison of electrification ratio data between the World Bank and the Indonesian government shows a divergence that has narrowed in the most recent figures (Fig. 11). Indonesia regularly conducts an intercensal population survey (every ten years between the census) and annual national socio-economic surveys, which collect data on household electricity and cooking fuel use (see for example (BPS, 2016a; BPS, 2018a)). Table 11 reveals that estimates of the Indonesian government are significantly higher than those of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) and the World Bank. Since the government energy data are based on censuses and surveys, we are convinced that they are reliable. Conclusion [Indonesia has declared its commitment to incorporate the SDGs, including the energy goal, into its national development plan](#), as stated in its voluntary national reviews (VNRs) on the SDGs. The electrification ratio increased dramatically from 67.15% in 2010 to 98.3% in 2018. The decision to promote rural electrification programs as nationally prioritised programs financed under the specifically allocated state budget (DAK) is the main policy responsible for the achievement. However, the programs have not been under DAK since 2019, which explains the small increase in the electrification ratio to only 98.89% the same year. Providing electricity access to the remaining 1.1 million households by the end of 2020 will be very challenging for Indonesia as most of them are located [in the outermost and least developed regions of the country](#). Indonesia may need to revise its universal electricity access target to 100%.

Year	World Bank (%)	Indonesian Government (%)
2010	67.15	72.95
2011	69.46	77.01
2012	70.14	77.54
2013	71.62	78.14
2014	73.14	79.35
2015	74.51	80.51
2016	76.35	81.35
2017	77.16	82.3
2018	78.56	83.91
2019	79.16	84.35
2020	80.70	85.50
2021	81.50	86.40
2022	82.15	87.15
2023	82.95	87.95
2024	83.75	88.75
2025	84.55	89.55

Fig. 11. [Electrification ratio in Indonesia: The World Bank estimate and Indonesia's claim](#). Data sources: (MEMR, 2013; MEMR, 2018a; Waage et al., 2015; World Bank, 2019d). [Table 11 Access to clean energy for cooking \(% of population\) in Indonesia, according to the Indonesian government, UNDESA, and the World Bank](#). Data sources: (BPS, 2015; BPS, 2016b; BPS, 2017b; UNDESA, 2019; World Bank, 2019c). 2015 2016 2017 Indonesian Government UNDESA World Bank 69.42 73.23 60 63 56.49 58.37 76.71 65 – 2025, instead of 2020, as [more than five times the currently allocated budget](#) is needed to meet the target. [Access to clean cooking fuels and technology](#) has [increased significantly from 12.4% to 82.54% of total households](#) between 2007 and 2019. However, much still needs to be done [to ensure zero traditional use of biomass for cooking](#). [The current policy](#), which only focuses on promotion of gas, is unlikely to be effective since household choice for cooking fuels is driven by affordability, availability, accessibility, and acceptability of the fuels. In areas where clean cooking fuels are unaffordable, the willingness to pay for them is low, and solid fuels are abundant, so ICS use should be encouraged. Policy on ICS use may not fully address the SDG target of ensuring [access to clean cooking fuels and technology for everyone](#), but in the short and medium term, it ensures more efficient use of biomass and improves residential indoor air quality. The ICS program can be executed in line with the distribution of free LPG starter kits and stand-alone solar systems. Furthermore, rural energy programs, which address rural electrification and clean cooking, should be reinstated and funded under DAK. Renewable energy deployment rose significantly from 4.4% to 8.43% between 2010 and 2017, but current efforts will not be enough to meet the 23% target by 2025. The mandatory biodiesel blending programs, B20 and B30, has been successfully implemented since 2016 and early 2020. However, its contribution to the primary energy mix was only 1.94% in 2018 as diesel fuel consumption is less than a quarter of the total use of crude oil and petroleum products. A similar mandatory blending policy is not enforced for bioethanol. Regulatory uncertainties and frequent policy changes discourage investment in renewable electricity generation. Tariff policies change from feed-in tariffs, to reverse auction mechanisms, to fixed tariffs based on average generation costs (BPP). PLN, the utility company, is reluctant to support FIT and reverse auction policies for the loss they create due to high tariffs. In contrast, low tariffs created by the BPP mechanism discourage private investments. As a result, renewable generation increases only about 0.36 GW annually, far from the annual target of 4.5 GW. [Policy assessments on energy efficiency and conservation show that sectoral energy consumption is influenced mostly by variables and regulation not primarily intended to improve energy efficiency](#). Energy consumption in the transportation sector is shaped largely by fuel pricing policy, more efficient energy use in household and commercial sectors is associated with the cooking fuel conversion policy, while decreases in industrial and other sectors' energy demand are associated with low economic growth. The [energy intensity of GDP, as a proxy for energy efficiency](#), is currently lower in Indonesia [than the 2030 global target, indicating modest energy consumption per dollar of production](#) (GDP). Indonesia's annual 1% reduction target of final energy intensity is lower than the annual 2.73% reduction the country has been achieving. However, while the energy intensity of GDP tends to decrease over time, the fact that energy demand in the transport sector has surpassed that of the industrial sector, and energy use in household and commercial sectors is increasing indicates that a more energy-intensive standard of living is expected. Therefore, appropriate policy responses will be needed in these sectors. Fossil fuel energy subsidies have also hindered progress in renewable energy and energy efficiency. Gradually removing subsidies for fossil fuels is necessary if progress is to be made on these targets. Declaration of competing interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper. Acknowledgment [W.G. Santika thanks the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia for their financial support](#) under the Indonesian [Lecturer Scholarship \(BUDI-LPDP\)](#). Y. Simsek acknowledges the financial support of the Chilean National Commission for Scientific and Technological Research under scholarship CONICYT-PCHA/ Doctorado Nacional/ 2018–21181469. Appendix A. Supplementary data Supplementary data to this article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esd.2020.08.011>. References ADB (2016). Achieving universal electricity access in Indonesia. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Adharsyah, T. (2019). Jokowi dan setumpuk risiko di balik rencana naiknya harga BBM [Jokowi and risks associated with the plan to rise the prices of fuels]. Available at: <https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20190702133701-4-82127/jokowi-dan-setumpuk-risiko-di-balik-rencana-naiknya-harga-bbm> (Accessed 27 August 2019). Afriyadi, A. D. 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